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Printed in the FR of  Germany Preface 
by Enrique Baron Crespo, 
President of the 
European Parliament 
The question of  the Community's cohesion in the period following the completion of  the internal market is already 
one of  the major questions faced by the Community's institutions and is likely to remain an important and contro-
versial issue for many years to come. It is, of  course, a point on the agenda of  the current intergovernmental confe-
rences,  which - if  not the most controversial - is certainly one of  the most difficult to resolve. 
There is, however, general agreement that cohesion needs to be seen in the perspective of  efforts to raise the level of 
economic and social development of  the Community's poorest regions towards the average levels prevailing in the 
Community. These efforts risk being overshadowed by recent developments in the Community's external environ-
ment, but they are of  very great and increasing importance if  the process of  European integration is to be main-
tained. 
The regional development of  the Community's present- and future- Member States is certainly an issue which is 
also of  great interest to the participants in the Second Conference of  the European Parliament on  'Regions of  the 
Community' which takes place in Strasbourg from 27 to 29 November 1991 and whose proceedings I shall have the 
honour to open. 
The European Parliament, aware of  the growing role which the regions are called upon to play in the future develop-
ment of  our continent,  wishes to contribute to the clarification of  the debate. 
It was in the knowledge of  the interest on your part and of  the important place of  cohesion on the agenda of  the 
Conference that I requested the Directorate-General for Research of  the European Parliament to commission an 
outside institute to carry out this study, which we hope will now be of  assistance to your discussions in this field.  We 
asked Sir Donald MacDougall,  who chaired a study group for the Commission of  the European Communities on 
the role of  public finance in European integration, to advise us in this work.  The report produced by his group in 
1977 is widely acknowledged to be of  classic importance in this field and has formed the basis for all subsequent 
discussions. Sir Donald assisted in the preparation of  the terms of  reference for the present study, commented on an 
interim version and produced for the Parliament the foreword  which follows this preface. 
The National Institute of  Economic and Social Research of  London  was selected to carry out the study on  our 
behalf, following a call for tenders.  The work has been carried out to tight deadlines under the supervision of  the 
Parliament's Directorate-General for Research. However,  the National Institute has been encouraged to produce 
independent recommendations which are, of  course, entirely its own responsibility.  The European Parliament and 
its Committees have not yet had the opportunity do debate this study, but I believe that it constitutes a major con-
tribution  to  work in  the field of  cohesion.  The National Institute has an  excellent reputation and the principal 
researchers responsible for this document have a wide experience of  preparing studies in  this and related fields. 
Other similar institutes in several other Member States were asked to contribute and have had the opportunity to 
comment on the study and its conclusions. 
3 Foreword 
by Sir Donald MacDougall 
This study was commissioned by the Directorate-General for Research of  the European Parliament at the sugges-
tion of  President Baron Crespo. I agreed to the President's request, that I should assist Parliament in drawing up the 
text of  the specification for the study, in reviewing the interim report and in writing this foreword. 
The study is one of  a series on regional policy commissioned by the Directorate-General for Research as part of  its 
external studies programme.  Together with studies on 'The regional impact of  Community policies' by the Deut-
sches Institut fiir Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) in Berlin and on 'The impact of  1992 and associated legislation on 
the less favoured regions of  the European Community' by the Institut fiir Wirtschaftsforschung (IFO) in Munich, it 
forms a trilogy of  studies prepared for the Second Conference of  the European Parliament on 'Regions of  the Com-
munity', to be held in Strasbourg in November 1991. 
The theme of  the Conference is 'The regions of  the Community and economic and social cohesion on the eve of  the 
completion of  the internal market'. Cohesion is a subject of  very great importance for the European Community at 
this time and is also an important issue in the work of  the intergovernmental conferences on political and on econo-
mic and monetary union which should draw to a conclusion this year. 
Cohesion is, however, not a new issue even if  the word itself  has come to the fore in Community parlance only re-
cently. The original signatories to the Treaty of  Rome stated in 1957 in the Preamble to that Treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community that they were 'anxious to strengthen the unity of  their economies and to ensure 
their harmonious development by reducing the differences existing between the various regions and the backward-
ness of  the less favoured regions'. Although the market forces released by the creation of  the Customs Union and by 
the legislation creating an  'Economic Community' have helped to bring about a transformation of  the European 
economy, including its least-favoured regions, the gap in living standards between richest and poorest remains very 
large; both economically and politically this could represent a real threat to the single internal market and to econo-
mic and monetary union.  This is a fundamentally important fact  which must be faced by the authorities of  the 
Community at all levels. 
The role of  public finance,  and in particular of  the Community budget, is therefore a crucial factor in creating the 
climate of  mutual confidence necessary for progress towards European  Union,  the objective proclaimed regularly 
by Heads of  State or Government meeting in the European  Council.  This progress had been  the subject of  four 
major reports- the Werner Report of  1970 on the implementation in stages of  Economic and Monetary Union in 
the Community, 1 the report in  1977 of  the study group on the role of  public finance in European integration, 2 
which I had the honour to chair (sometimes referred to as the 'MacDougall Report'), the Padoa-Chioppa Report of 
1987 3 and the Delors Report of  1989. 4 
The social and economic cohesion of  the Community is now the main theme of  Parliament's Conference on the 
regions - and in particular is the subject of  a draft report prepared for the Conference by the Committee on Regio-
nal Policy and Regional Planning,  with Mrs Izquierdo Rojo as rapporteur. 
The present study by the National Institute of  Economic and Social Research of  London is a most useful contribu-
tion to the debate-on cohesion in the Community and the development of  regional policies. It covers a great deal of 
ground,  is highly informative and helps  to  clarify many of the complex issues involved.  It sets out,  in  a well-
balanced way, the arguments for and against the numerous possible ways of  achieving greater cohesion, and makes 
many interesting suggestions. 
1  Supplement 11  to Bulletin of the European Communities, No 19,  1970. 
2  Studies collection of  the Commission of  the European Communities, Economic and financial series, No A  13,  1977. 
3  'Efficiency, stability and equity: a strategy for the evolution of  the economic system of  the European Community', Commission of  the 
European Communities, Brussels,  1987. 
4  'Report on economic and monetary union in the European Community', Committee for the Study of  Economic and Monetary Union, 
Office for Official Publications of  the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1989. 
5 It rightly regards cohesion as much more than convergence of  inflation and interest rates and of  budget balances. 
There is an apt quotation from  the Delors Report: 
'Ifsufflcient consideration were not given to regional imbalances, the economic union would be faced with grave 
economic and political risks'.  (p.  18) 
One might add another quotation from  the same report: 
'The permanent fixing of  exchange rates would deprive individual countries of  an important instrument for the 
correction of  economic imbalances'.  (p.  16) 
The present report makes a powerful case for stronger regional policies in the Community. It paints a worrying pic-
ture of  the outlook for many of  the less prosperous regions (and of  some areas, hitherto relatively prosperous, but 
likely to lose ground); and of  the possible adverse effects on them, relative to the rest of  the Community, not only of 
the single internal market and the transition to EMU,  but of  a number of  other unrelated developments likely to 
occur in the 1990s. 
The authors, rightly, do not refrain from discussing a number of  possible measures that seem to them unlikely to be 
acceptable in the foreseeable future,  either for political reasons or because they would involve excessive demands 
on Community funds; some of  these might become feasible at a later date, for political attitudes change- and may 
indeed need to change if  the degree of  integration hoped for by many is to be achieved. They include quite radical 
changes in the Community's agricultural policies, although the authors believe the most likely outcome, at least in 
the medium term, is that agricultural support will be 'held in check'; a Community unemployment fund,  as pro-
posed in the MacDougall Report; a Community-wide progressive tax on individuals or households, although they 
do propose an interesting new welfare fund to provide income support for less favoured households; abandonment 
of  the concept ofjuste retour; automatic transfers from richer to poorer regions on the lines of  the German Lander-
finanzausgleich. 
The report, however, concentrates in its final recommendations on measures designed to improve cohesion - or at 
least to reduce or prevent growing lack of  cohesion- that would be consistent with a Community budget of  JI/4% of 
Community GDP, only marginally higher than at present, over the period to  1998. 
Now the MacDougall Report suggested that in practice a much larger Community budget would be necessary to 
provide sufficient equalization of  productivity, living standards and cushioning of  temporary fluctuations to sup-
port a full EMU.  We suggested a budget of  the orderof5 to 7% of  Community GDP, but the precise figure does sot 
matter in this context. (We took this view even though in theory unconditional transfers of  much smaller amounts 
between the national governments of  the richer and poorer member countries could have achieved the same reduc-
tion in inequalities in national per capita incomes as taxation and public expenditure did in the existing EMUs we 
studied.) 
The size of  the Community budget we proposed is not, however, necessarily inconsistent with the much smaller one 
assumed in the present report to be feasible in the medium term. First,  the report also considers the possibility of 
more ambitious programmes, including a package of  real, not just financial, objectives, with quantitative targets for 
reductions in regional disparities in such measures as GDP per head or unemployment levels which might well 
require a budget of  considerably more than  1114% of  Community GDP.  Secondly,  the report recognizes that its 
recommendations would go only part of  the way to achieving cohesion, and proposes that later in the decade a tho-
rough examination of  possible mechanisms for more substantial interregional redistribution should be carried out. 
A larger Community budget need not increase total public expenditure at Community, national and regional levels 
taken together to the extent that it consisted of  a transfer of  functions to the Community, e.g. through a Community 
unemployment fund; and in so far as favourably placed countries or regions paid more to the Community under 
any redistribution scheme they might, in the communautaire climate assumed for a sustainable EMU, be prepared 
to cut back somewhat at least the growth of  their public spending on things other than help to less favoured areas. 
I am attracted by the possibility, discussed in the report, that the European Investment Bank (BIB) might make a 
much greater contribution to the achievement of  cohesion. BIB loans for regional development are already of  the 
6 same order as structural Fund grants for this purpose. The provision of'soft' loans (subsidized by the Community), 
and possibly of  venture capital (perhaps administered by a separate body), might make a substantial additional con-
tribution,  at relatively small cost to the Community budget, and thus lower somewhat the total required. 
In conclusion, I commend this report not only to the participants in  the Conference to be held in Strasbourg in 
November 1991  but also to what I hope will be a much wider readership. 
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12 Summary 
Purpose 
1.  This research, undertaken by the National Institute 
of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) of London 
with a group of researchers drawn from right across the 
Community, was commissioned by the Directorate-Ge-
neral for Research of the European Parliament on the 
initiative of  President Baron Crespo. The report on this 
work should be read alongside two companion pieces 
commissioned  from  D IW  in  Berlin  on  the  regional 
impact of  Community policies and from IFO in Munich 
on  the  regional  impact  of completing  the  internal 
market. 
2.  The NIESR report seeks to provide the background 
necessary for determining and formulating a strategy for 
social  and economic cohesion  in  the European Com-
munity after 1992. It proceeds by defining what cohes-
ion is and why it is important. In the light of an evalua-
tion of  the likely new pressures on cohesion in the 1990s 
and the success of  previous policies, it explores the opti-
ons for policy, looking at both the principles and how 
they can be applied in practice. Drawing on this analy-
sis,  the authors put forward  their view of an optimal 
strategy for moving the Community towards social and 
economic cohesion in the 1990s. They stress the practi-
cal constraints on policy and the issues which have to be 
faced by the Community if it is to achieve its objectives. 
Cohesion 
3.  Cohesion in the context of the European Commun-
ity  has  no  easy  definition.  It is  best  explained as  the 
degree to which disparities in social and economic wel-
fare  between  different  regions  or groups  within  the 
Community  are  politically  and  socially  tolerable. 
Whether it has been achieved is thus largely a political 
question and the answer varies both across the Com-
munity and as time passes. However, objective indica-
tors have a role to play both in determining absolute 
gaps  and in  formulating targets  for  addressing them. 
GDP per capita and the percentage of the workforce 
unemployed  are  the  indicators  most  widely  used, 
although in this report we conclude that these alone are 
inadequate criteria, particularly of social cohesion. 
Cohesion is important 
4.  Cohesion has always been an objective of the Com-
munity and an explicit commitment is set out in Article 
130a of the Single European Act.  It is widely expected 
that this commitment will be reinforced as a result of 
the two intergovernmental conferences that are current-
ly taking place. 
5.  Without  adequate  cohesion  the  process  of inte-
gration  in  the  Community may  be  slowed,  halted  or 
even  reversed if less  advantaged groups feel  they can 
improve their welfare without some of  the constraints of 
membership. The process of economic development is 
inherently  unbalanced,  with  the  competitiveness  of 
some regions outstripping that of others for prolonged 
periods, often with a cumulation of advantage and dis-
advantage. Most nation States, while seeking to foster a 
high rate of  growth, redistribute the benefits more equi-
tably through taxation,  public expenditure and direct 
intervention. Not only does the European Community 
lack such  a  redistributive  mechanism, but disparities 
are greater than for most States and the process of inte-
gration tends to exacerbate them. As a consequence it 
has to pay more than usual attention to the problem of 
cohesion. 
As  the  President  of the  Commission  puts  it  in  the 
Report on economic and monetary union (p.  18): 
'If sufficient consideration were  not given to regional 
imbalances, the economic union would  be  faced  with 
grave economic and political risks.' 
Cohesion will become even more important 
in the 1990s 
6.  Although there has been some improvement in rec-
ent years, disparities shown on the map (see Figure 1) of 
GOP per capita have not tended to narrow markedly. 
As time passes, the less favoured tend to become more 
impatient for  improvement. Events in the  1990s may 
well  push the Community away from cohesion rather 
than towards it: 
•  completing  the  internal  market  reduces  barriers 
between countries hence reducing the protection of 
the less  efficient and increasing the importance of 
economies  of scale  and  scope.  This  is  likely  to 
increase disparities; 
•  progress  towards  economic  and  monetary  union 
imposes harsh conditions of convergence on Mem-
ber States with problems of inflation, debt, internal 
and external imbalance, such as Greece and Italy, 
with  consequences  for  their  domestic  ability  to 
achieve structural change and to promote regional 
equality. Achievement of the required convergence 
13 is  likely  to result  in  substantial  unemployment  in 
some parts of the Community. Within a  monetary 
union, the inability to change the exchange rate may 
impose a greater unemployment cost for adjustment 
to external shocks for some regions: 
•  widening of  the Community is likely to add to dispa-
rities as the applicants are at both ends of the spec-
trum of income per capita; 
•  the need to deal with the problems of Eastern and 
Central Europe may divert funds from existing pur-
poses and increase the number of people in  need, 
whom the Community should help effectively: 
•  demographic  changes,  notably  the  ageing  of the 
population  and  the  threat  of  substantial  immi-
gration from Central and East European countries, 
means that dependency on those in employment in 
the West will intensify; 
•  the environment, energy sources and transport are 
all  likely to  become more important in the  1990s, 
adding to the cost burden on those who are currently 
less well endowed; 
•  the escalating costs of German unification have pro-
vided a salutary lesson about the possible extent of 
the political and technical difficulties of achieving 
cohesion and the resources needed to put it  right. 
They also tend to divert investment funds from else-
where in the Community towards the former Ger-
man Democratie Republic. 
Figure 1: 
Income per capita in the Community,  1989 
D 
14 
~
%  <  E 8
~ average 
80  - 100 
100  - 120 
>  120 
No  data 
7.  Not all influences are adverse. The increasing press-
ure  to  reform  the  common  agricultural  policy,  both 
from outside in the Uruguay Round and from  inside, 
through rising costs of price support and the squeezing 
of the Community budget, should result in the reduc-
tion  of the  main  element  in  the  Community budget 
which actually redistributes funds away from many of 
the less favoured regions, thus increasing not diminish-
ing some disparities. 
Problems with existing policy 
8.  Although we  are approaching the agreed target of 
doubling the Community's structural Funds and await-
ing the mid-term review of progress, it is clear that cur-
rent programmes, even though they result in transfers of 
3 to 5%  of the GDP of the countries with the lowest 
GDP per capita, will  come nowhere near solving the 
lack of  convergence in real incomes. It is not merely that 
spending on this scale, however effective, can only have 
a limited impact but also that there is no assessment of 
the  efficiency  of programmes  in  achieving  cohesion. 
This may give scope for  reallocating existing funds to 
more  effect.  Furthermore,  the  process  of monitoring 
and  evaluation  used  does  not  itself achieve  the  best 
practice amongst Member States. Problems of absorp-
tion and administrative difficulty mean that even the 
funds  which  are  available  are  not  taken  up  in  full. 
Spending is concentrated on a relatively narrow range of 
physical  infrastructure  and  human  resource  develop-
ment  projects.  A  widening  of criteria  for  eligibility 
could assist in addressing social cohesion in particular 
through spending on areas such as health and education. 
Lack of involvement of the social partners means that 
the relevance and gearing of  projects are not all that they 
might be. But most important of all, not only does two-
thirds of the Community's budget not have the aim of 
redistibution  towards  the  less  favoured  regions  but 
much  of it  actually  distributes  resources  away  from 
them. 
Principles for a new strategy 
9.  The underlying principles of a strategy for cohesion 
should  balance  equity and  efficiency  - the  available 
funds should be applied where there is greatest need and 
the Community should be convinced that it is  getting 
the best possible value for money in their application. 
At a minimum, equity should involve equality of  oppor-
tunity. In an ideal world, the steps which the Commu-
nity is  taking in liberalizing markets to allow the free 
movement of  labour, capital, goods and services under a 
regime which prevents the exercise of monopoly power 
and restrictive practices should ensure an efficient allo-cation of  resources. However, imperfections in the mar-
ket such as the immobility of  labour through choice and 
the existence of  economies of  scale, scope and agglomer-
ation  mean  that the  opening of the  market  alone  is 
insufficient to ensure that the benefits percolate to all 
parts of the Community. 
10.  There  are  two  main  mechanisms  which  can  be 
used  to try to  compensate for  these  imperfections  in 
order to provide adequate equity. The first is simply to 
redistribute the benefits to the less favoured regions by 
fiscal  transfers, giving them the resources to raise  the 
income and welfare of their inhabitants to a level rela-
tive to the rest of the Community which is sufficient to 
achieve cohesion.  However,  unhypothecated transfers 
of this magnitude are widely thought to act as a disin-
centive to economic activity and efficiency in the recip-
ient regions,  increasing the dependency on unemploy-
ment benefit rather than encouraging the seeking out of 
employment opportunities. At the same time the higher 
taxation required in the more favoured regions may also 
act as a disincentive. The alternative is to use specific 
transfers to try to achieve a structure in the less favour-
ed regions which generates the capacity to compete on 
equal terms with the rest of the Community. This im-
plies investment aimed at bolstering long-term econo-
mic performance, notably by improving the infrastruc-
ture in terms of  public facilities, communications, infor-
mation and the availability of finance and improving 
the  quality  of the  workforce  through  education  and 
training. While, initially, the emphasis is on the creation 
of  such assets, subsequently it will change towards their 
maintenance, operation and repair. 
The scope of policy to achieve cohesion 
11.  Achieving social cohesion requires more than eco-
nomic measures, and extends the need for such structu-
ral support into health, social services and other facets 
of the enhancement of the quality of life.  Experience 
from  regional policy in Member States and elsewhere 
round the world shows that even this level of interven-
tion will  be insufficient to achieve cohesion and ulti-
mately that there will have to be some element of fiscal 
transfers. 
12.  Creating a framework to enable a region to com-
pete effectively involves far more than building struc-
tures. It also involves creating institutions. Innovation 
is an essential ingredient for success, since simply trying 
to emulate what is happening elsewhere is a recipe for 
being a permanent follower and institutionalizing less 
favoured status. Successful regional development tends 
to involve local R&D activities and the existence and 
close  involvement of institutions of higher education 
and research. It also seems to involve a strong sense of 
partnership  between  sectors  of  the  economy  and 
between the various organs of government. 
13.  Emphasis on purely regional and economic indica-
tors disguises some of the problems of social cohesion 
which relate to  urban areas and disadvantaged social 
groups such as  ethnic minorities. Identifying the need 
for  action  to  achieve  social  cohesion  requires  social 
indicators, which may relate to facets such as the condi-
tion of  the private housing stock, the provision of  health 
services,  literacy  and  mortality  rates.  In  rural  areas, 
sparseness of population and fragmentation of commu-
nities pose similar problems. This implies a wider range 
of objectives for the use of the structural Funds than is 
currently accepted in the Community and a more flex-
ible  determination  of  eligibility.  Disparities  which 
affect cohesion relate not just to levels of  indicators but 
also to their rates of change. Areas which are in decline 
also  feel  lack  of cohesion.  They  do  not  necessarily 
require the same sorts of intervention, needing resour-
ces to maintain rather than build up the economic and 
social infrastructure. Both absolute and relative dispa-
rities bear on cohesion. Targeting those in greatest need 
and focusing on programmes which deliver the greatest 
improvement in cohesion entail a detailed and complex 
programme. 
14.  Targeting  at  present  is  mainly  on  the  basis  of 
regions. However, it can be argued that it is those house-
holds that are  most  disadvantaged which are the real 
target and that spending is focused on regions because 
those households are regionally concentrated and that 
characteristics of those regions which can be altered by 
structural spending are responsible for the disparities. 
Furthermore, richer regions  can be  expected to solve 
their own internal disparities since they have resources 
to do so. However, targeting regions alone runs the risk 
that resources will be transferred from the poor in rich 
regions to the rich in poor regions. Hence even at this 
stage, the structural Funds can be supplemented by pay-
ments targeted on households. One means of doing this 
would be to have a social security fund. A second possi-
bility that has been widely canvassed is  an unemploy-
ment fund, whereby those in employment throughout 
the Community contribute to trying to improve the con-
dition of  those who are not. Normally this means expen-
diture on training and job creation  rather than  pay-
ments to the unemployed themselves. 
15 Implementing the strategy 
15.  There are two prime concerns in trying to make 
sure that the limited funds available are applied effec-
tively. The first is the need to ensure that the funds are 
properly administered and the second that the principle 
of  subsidiarity is applied. These two may appear to con-
flict. Three mechanisms need to be employed to ensure 
that budgetary management is of a high standard. First, 
spending programmes need  to be subjected to full  ex 
ante appraisal, to establish their objectives, their costs 
and benefits relative to alternative projects and alterna-
tive  ways  of achieving  the  same  objective.  Secondly, 
projects need to be monitored in terms of tangible prog-
ress as  well  as payments. Lastly,  ex post evaluation is 
necessary to ensure not just the legality of the spending 
but that it has achieved value for money by being used 
with maximum efficiency and effectiveness. The Com-
munity also needs to be convinced, as far as this is tech-
nically possible, that the funds are being used to add to 
domestically-financed expenditure in these areas, not to 
substitute for  it.  The idea of additionality is  that the 
Community should enable achievement of what is not 
currently within the capacity of less  favoured  regions 
and the Member States within which they lie. 
16.  The Court of Auditors has complained of weak-
nesses in the past at both national and Community level 
in all three mechanisms and the Commission has raised 
doubts about the proper application of additionality by 
some States. These deficiencies must clearly be rectified 
as a matter of urgency. They are the responsibility not 
just of public administrations and the Commission but 
also  of legislatures  in  providing a  proper scrutiny of 
expenditures. For the Community as a whole, this is in 
part a role for the European Parliament and its Com-
mittee for  Budgetary  Control.  The intergovernmental 
conference on political union may result in a strength-
ening of these powers. 
17.  It is  clear  that  some  regions  have  reached  the 
limits  of absorptive  capacity  and  cannot  use  all  the 
funds available. To some extent this is because of their 
own lack of fiscal capacity to provide matching funding 
and here there is a case for increasing the proportion of 
eligible expenditure from the Community budget if the 
money can be well spent. In other cases, it is a problem 
of lack  of administrative  and  technical  capacity  in 
defining, running and evaluating programmes. In such 
cases, capacity can be increased by technical assistance, 
indeed it can be made a condition of  the grant. A widely 
canvassed means of  achieving this is through task forces 
in the field. Experience in other areas of policy such as 
small and medium-sized enterprises suggests that a task 
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force in the Commission would be a possible means of 
ensuring rapid achievement of targets, separating polit-
ical decisions from issues of implementation. 
18.  Trying to ensure efficiency through Community-
level action and rules is  only one facet of a successful 
approach. There are tiers of responsibility at Member 
State, regional and local levels. Successful programmes 
require not merely local knowledge  and involvement, 
but motivation as  well.  The principle of subsidiarity, 
assigning  responsibility to  the  lowest  efficient  tier,  is 
one means of helping this but the principle of partner-
ship between the tiers of government and the Commis-
sion embodied in the Community support frameworks 
needs to be  extended and the role of the regional tier 
reinforced. Ultimately, it is the private sector which will 
make  use  of the improved  infrastructure and greater 
workforce skills. It is  therefore only prudent that they 
should  be  involved  in  defining  the  needs  and where 
possible should have a stake in the enterprise to reduce 
the chance of creating assets which are of little benefit. 
Establishing the right relationship between the tiers of 
responsibility  is  clearly  difficult,  but  the  idea  of an 
agreed  contract between  central and regional govern-
ment on a plan for regional development with clear per-
formance targets (as practised in France) might be an 
innovative means of  trying to combine compliance with 
the objectives and flexibility in the means of execution. 
Similar performance contracts are used with consider-
able  success  in  other  Member  States  for  providing 
equipment  and  services.  There  are  clearly  strong 
arguments which suggest that the most efficient treat-
ment of regional problems requires a level  of govern-
ment low enough to be fully conversant with the variety 
of local  needs  and flexible  enough  to  allow  effective 
local methods of  meeting them, while on the other hand 
being large scale enough to provide a full range of expe-
rience and technical and administrative competencies. 
These point to an enhanced role  for  regional govern-
ment. 
Paying for cohesion 
19.  It is  unrealistic to estimate at the outset what a 
programme  to  achieve  cohesion  might  cost  because 
cohesion as  a target will  vary over the future and the 
behavioural responses to spending are highly complex. 
In any case,  cohesion can be  advanced by  policies to 
reduce  disparities  as  well  as  actual  achievements  in 
reducing them. It is also possible to invert the question 
and to explore (as the MacDougall Report of 1977 did) 
what most countries feel they have to spend to achieve 
it.  National budgets  represented  about  40  to  50%  of 
national income in the countries studied for the report, 
while federal budgets for countries using that structure were lower at 25 to 30%. On average the countries used 
interregional transfers, both specific and unhypothecat-
ed, to reduce outstanding disparities in GOP per capita 
by about 40%. In 1977 it would have required a transfer 
equivalent to 2% of  Community GOP to reduce the dis-
parity  between  the  six  richest  and  the  three  poorest 
Member States by 40 %.  The total Community budget 
consistent with achieving such a transfer would in their 
opinion have been 5 to 7% of GOP in a 'federal' Com-
munity.  With  the  accession  of Greece,  Portugal  and 
Spain the task has become greater. 
20.  A figure of  the order of 2 % still seems appropriate 
but with a Community budget currently only 1.2% in 
total and likely to reach only  1. 3 % by  the end of the 
1990s at current growth rates we are clearly not discuss-
ing an approach to cohesion of that degree of effective-
ness.  Roughly  a  quarter of the  Community's current 
budget is spent on structural operations and less than 
half that spending goes  to the four countries with the 
lowest per capita GOP (Greece, Ireland, Spain and Por-
tugal). By comparison, just over half of  the total budget 
goes on agricultural price support. There is,  therefore, 
considerable scope for having a major impact on cohe-
sion for  the least-favoured  regions  and groups  in the 
Community within the existing budget on its  current 
growth rates. A target for spending on cohesion of0.6% 
GOP by  the end of the  1990s, which would  be  more 
than a further doubling in real terms and thus be a rela-
tively modest and attainable target, would  reduce the 
disparities of  the Objective 1 regions to 85% of average 
Community GOP per head  on current  growth  rates. 
However our view remains that the targets set for pro-
grammes  should  relate  to  the  ultimate  objective  of 
improving cohesion and not to the means. Input targets, 
such as amounts spent or proportions of GOP, should 
not substitute for  output targets  such  as  real  conver-
gence. 
21.  The principle of equity also suggests that net con-
tributions to the Community budget should follow abili-
ty to pay in terms of  the resources of  the Member States, 
perhaps along the lines suggested by the Padoa-Schiop-
pa Report of 198 7. At present, because of the structure 
of the common agricultural policy, there are two major 
departures from  this:  the  Netherlands and Denmark, 
although  well  above  average  Community  GOP  per 
head, are net beneficiaries, while among the four lowest 
income Member States, Spain seems to receive a consi-
derably  smaller  net  benefit  than  might  be  expected. 
Even if the structure of the Community's expenditure 
programme is  broadly preserved,  these net budgetary 
concerns can be addressed to improve cohesion. 
22.  These inconsistencies can be addressed in a num-
ber of ways: by direct transfers between Member States 
in an equivalent of the Liinderfinanzausgleich form of 
regional equalization in Germany; or by a change in the 
structure of spending and income raising. As  the rela-
tive importance of agricultural price support falls,  the 
latter will be achieved automatically. 
23.  There is a tendency to emphasize grant rather than 
loan finance in achieving cohesion but both are valuable 
in the process of  economic development. Loans can per-
form two major roles which are not played by the com-
mercial banking sector: firstly the European Investment 
Bank can provide lower cost finance because of their 
access to funds at the most favourable rates of interest. 
Such  loans can be  used  for  projects where there is  a 
more direct pay-off and where public revenue can be 
obtained from the services which the investment pro-
vides, for example. Secondly, in the transition to econo-
mic  and  monetary  union  a  number of pressures  for 
adjustment are placed on Member States with higher 
budget  deficits  or  inflation.  Temporary  assistance 
beyond that available through the mechanisms of the 
EMS  would be  valuable,  subject to  conditions in the 
same way that loans are provided to Member States by 
the IMF. 
24.  Since the purpose of Community funds is both to 
augment and to focus  domestic expenditures on pro-
grammes of action it would appear sensible to include 
not just public sector sources of finance but the private 
sector as  well.  Gearing  up  public funds  with  private 
money would be not just a useful means of increasing 
the size and effectiveness of projects but a means of  try-
ing to ensure commitment and relevance to local econo-
mic and social needs. This indicates a more comprehen-
sive and flexible concept of  additionality than is used at 
present. 
Proposals for a new strategy 
25.  In our view a suitable strategy to tackle the Com-
munity's objectives for cohesion after 1992 should con-
tain six elements: 
(  1)  An  evaluation of existing policies,  to ensure that 
funds achieve their maximum impact on achieving 
cohesion and give value for money. 
(2)  A  development  of the  structural  Funds  to  make 
them more effective and better targeted; even with-
out  expanding  the  range  of objectives,  existing 
funds can achieve a greater pay-off by being more 
closely focused on more precise indicators of local 
need. 
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increase social cohesion. There has been a tendency 
to focus  on economic aspects of cohesion, in part 
because they are easier to measure and it is easier to 
show  how  they  contribute  to  regional  growth. 
Nevertheless, social aspects relating to the quality of 
life of all people in the Community, whether or not 
employed or seeking work,  are an integral part of 
ensuring that Article  130a is  applied and harmo-
nious development achieved. The Community is for 
the  benefit  of citizens,  not  just  some  economic 
interest groups. 
(  4)  A tightening of the administration, evaluation and 
monitoring procedures  to  improve  accountability 
on the one hand and the operation of subsidiarity 
on the other. With limited resources, it is essential 
to ensure that they are used to their best effect and 
that administrative competences are available at all 
levels to carry through their impact on cohesion as 
soon as possible. Full participation by both public 
and  private  sector  at  local  and  regional  level  is 
required if the dynamism for inducing cohesion by 
indigenous growth is to be generated and sustained. 
(5)  The introduction of a new instrument to assist the 
poorest  households  in  the  Community.  Current 
policy  focuses  on  providing  support  for  regional 
infrastructure, but cohesion also involves the wel-
fare of citizens directly, and the next logical step in 
the development of policy would be to target new 
funds  on  the  welfare  of those  people  in  greatest 
need. 
(6)  A reappraisal of the Community's budget to reform 
its structure towards a greater emphasis on cohe-
sion; help with specific projects will only go part of 
the way towards achieving cohesion. The Commun-
ity still has to grasp the challenges of an equitable 
system of fiscal transfers set out in the MacDougall 
Report of 1977 and refined 10 years later by Tom-
maso Padoa-Schioppa in  'Efficiency, stability and 
equity: a strategy for the evolution of the economic 
system of the European Community'. 
A need for action 
26.  With the intergovernmental conferences presaging 
progress to economic, political and monetary union, the 
internal market nearing completion and the dramatic 
changes in Central and Eastern Europe, the Community 
not only needs to refocus its strategy for cohesion but it 
needs to do so forthwith before it is overtaken by events. 
Several of our recommendations can be implemented 
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now- the tightening of administrative procedures, the 
development of task forces to ensure that programmes 
can be fully developed and taken up, the involvement of 
the private sector in development, implementation and 
financing, the evaluation of the relative merits of var-
ious structural measures. Others will be addressed when 
the  conclusions of the  intergovernmental conferences 
have been agreed. 
27.  A new five-year budgetary perspective is required 
for  1993-98 and this will provide the timescale for the 
implementation  of most  of our other proposals:  the 
expansion of  the scope of  the structural Funds to have a 
greater emphasis on social cohesion, the creation of a 
new social security fund, the expansion in the role of  the 
EIB  and  the  provision  of new  lending  facilities  for 
Member  States  with  transition  problems  for  conver-
gence to EMU. At the same time, the objectives of the 
Funds could be revised to target them more closely on 
needs, particularly of groups like those in urban areas 
that tend to be  neglected  by the present system.  This 
new  budgetary  perspective could also  bring a greater 
balance to net contributions by Member States to take 
account of their ability to pay. 
28.  During the same period, while the regions of the 
former GDR will have already been incorporated with-
in the Community support frameworks,  attention will 
have to be  turned to the needs of the new applicants, 
whether from  EFT  A,  Eastern  and  Central  Europe  or 
elsewhere. 
29.  Taking a rather longer-term perspective, the Com-
munity  still  has  to  come  to  terms  with  how  it  will 
approach cohesion more fully along the lines set out in 
the  MacDougall  Report.  Our  suggestions  here  only 
relate to  immediate improvements that can be  made 
within the existing budgetary framework and its trend 
development. That will not be enough to ensure cohe-
sion and a quantum leap into interregional transfers will 
be required if the Community is to approach the more 
federal  systems  that have  been outlined  in the  inter-
governmental  conferences.  Current  arrangements  are 
not  sufficient  for  economic,  political  and  monetary 
union. 
A target 
30.  Targets have been very successful in the Commun-
ity in galvanizing action and support for initiatives, par-
ticularly in the case of  the 1992 programme for complet-
ing the internal market and the doubling of the structu-
ral Funds in five  years.  We  feel  strongly that another 
memorable target  is  required  for  a  policy  of moving towards cohesion if this is to be perceived as  a reality 
within the regions of the Community. It is tempting to 
pose this concept in terms of another financial target, 
such as a 50% increase in the share of  Community GDP 
going towards cohesion during  1993-98.  However,  we 
have argued  strongly  in  favour of output targets,  not 
input targets, since the former do not have any require-
ment for the efficiency with which funds are financed. 
We suggest therefore that a real target is developed such 
as a reduction in disparities by 2%  a year over a five-
year period.  On that basis it would  take  a  decade  to 
reach the halfway point of  achieving a 40% reduction in 
disparities by Community action. On current policies a 
reduction of only 1% a year seems likely. 
In short 
31.  There can be little doubt that the European Com-
munity will have to revitalize its approach to social and 
economic cohesion after 1992. Completion of  the single 
market, progress towards economic, political and mon-
etary union, the likely admission of  new members to the 
Community and the need to deal with the problems in 
Central and Eastern Europe are just some of the pros-
pective  influences  on  the  future  development  of the 
Community that can be expected to affect its cohesion. 
At  the same time,  different constituencies within  the 
Community will  have to  be persuaded that it  is  ulti-
mately in their best interests to remain part of  the Com-
munity and to continue to work to achieve its aims. The 
increasing focus on social and economic cohesion testi-
fies  to the growing recognition that its achievement is 
central  to  the  future  of the  Community  rather than 
being simply a temporary obstacle to be overcome. 
32.  Yet, despite the explicit commitment to social and 
economic  cohesion  written  into  Article  130a  of the 
Treaty,  current  efforts  to  secure  cohesion  are  inade-
quate. The resources available to the Community are 
limited  in  scale  and  are  not  always  used  to  optimal 
effect.  Indeed,  much  of Community  expenditure  is 
spent in relatively more prosperous regions. Shortcom-
ings in strategy, in coordination and in policy delivery 
diminish the impact of policy, with the result that there 
has been little success in narrowing regional disparities 
in  the  Community.  We  consequently  argue  in  this 
report  for  a  more  comprehensive  approach  to  the 
achievement of social and economic cohesion coupled 
with improvements in policy instruments. 
33.  We recognize in our proposals that achievement of 
social and economic cohesion is a long-term objective. 
Transformation of less competitive regional economies 
takes decades rather than months, while  new  sorts of 
problems  are  inevitably  going  to  arise  from  time  to 
time. Nor does cohesion imply that there should ulti-
mately be complete equality and standardization within 
the Community; on the contrary, regional diversity is a 
strength that has to be sustained. Nevertheless, the guid-
ing principle for a new strategy for social and economic 
cohesion  should  be  the  achievement  of equality  of 
opportunity for the regions of  the Community as a basis 
for confronting the competitive challenges of  the 1990s. 
More emphasis also needs to be placed on the identifi-
cation and channelling of assistance to disadvantaged 
social groups. 
34.  We  propose  the  following  as  part  of a  fresh 
approach to a strategy for social and economic cohesion 
after 1992: 
•  The focus of policy should be on the achievement of 
cohesion,  and  not  on how  much  money  is  spent 
where. This will mean an enhanced role for regional 
authorities in setting priorities and in  monitoring 
the effectiveness of policy. 
•  The resulting strategy should have plausible targets 
to  be  met  within  sensible  time-frames and policy 
should be sufficiently flexible to adapt where neces-
sary. 
•  The principle of additionality needs to be reviewed 
so that it is the total effect (including private-sector 
responses) of assistance that is monitored. 
•  A  new  instrument  operating  through  the  social 
security system should be established to target aid 
directly  at  disadvantaged  individuals  and  house-
holds. In the longer term, an explicit mechanism for 
effecting  interregional  transfers  is  likely  to  be 
needed. 
•  The structural Funds should be empowered to inter-
vene  in  improving  social  provision,  as  well  as  in 
building up infrastructure and human resources. 
•  Procedures  for  effective  monitoring  and,  more 
importantly,  evaluation  should  be  introduced  as 
quickly as possible, and where these reveal adminis-
trative  shortcomings,  task  forces  to  provide tech-
nical  assistance  should  be  called  in.  Community-
funded initiatives are needed to improve adminis-
trative capacity. 
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Additionality 
The aim of  the structural Funds is to add to the expendi-
ture of Member States or regional tiers of government 
for  structural purposes. Additionality is  a measure of 
the extent to which this actually occurs, and is meant to 
be a criterion for the authorization of structural Fund 
expenditure. 
Comparative advantage 
The principle of comparative advantage is that an eco-
nomy  will  gain  by  specializing  in  the  production  of 
goods (or services) which it can produce relatively more 
efficiently than a trading partner, even if its productiv-
ity is below that of  the trading partner in the production 
of all goods. The key implication is that, by agreeing to 
integration, both high and low productivity economies 
stand to benefit. 
Competitiveness 
Competitiveness is measured by the extent to which a 
company is  able  to offer goods  or services which  are 
more attractive to purchasers than those of its competi-
tors. Lower operating costs, superior products, or a well-
differentiated product are  among the main attributes 
that  enter  into  the  competitiveness  of a  company. 
Exchange  rates,  wage  rates and other aspects  of eco-
nomies contribute to their general competitiveness. 
Conditionality 
A grant-giving body or the issuer of a loan may impose 
conditions which do not necessarily relate to the direct 
use of  the assistance. The International Monetary Fund, 
for example, has often insisted on structural changes as · 
conditions  for  short-term  loans  for  macroeconomic 
adjustment. 
European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund 
(EAGGF) 
The main instrument of  the common agricultural policy 
(CAP), the EAGGF absorbs over half the Community 
budget.  Most  of this  expenditure  goes  on  providing 
guaranteed prices for farm products, with the balance 
going on restructuring aid. 
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Externalities 
When a proportion of the costs or benefits of economic 
activity do not accrue to either the producers or consu-
mers  of the  activity,  they  affect  others  not  directly 
involved. Congestion or pollution are examples of  exter-
nal costs, while the opening of new transport facilities 
may yield non-user benefits to users of other forms of 
transport. 
Financial perspective 
The central feature of Community budgetary discipline 
is  a  five-year  expenditure  framework  known  as  the 
financial perspective. This sets binding ceilings for total 
spending and the priorities for  different categories of 
Community expenditure. 
GDP 
Gross domestic product (GOP) is a measure of what is 
produced in an economy. Although not an ideal meas-
ure of economic well-being,  because  it  does  not take 
account of  transfers or factor incomes, it is widely used 
as a measure to compare economies. 
Intergovernmental conferences 
Two conferences on economic and monetary union and 
on political union are currently in progress. Their pur-
pose is to pave the way for the negotiation of  a new trea-
ty which will be the basis for the next stages of  European 
integration. 
Liinderfinanzausgleich 
In Germany, there is a system of  equalization payments 
between the  11  Lander of the former West Germany, 
which transfers income directly from relatively richer to 
poorer Lander. 
Maghreb 
The Arab countries of North Africa. 
Market failure 
Markets may not always  produce outcomes which are 
socially  optimal,  for  instance,  if there  is  too  short  a 
payback period or where collective consumption makes 
collection of  revenue difficult. Major infrastructure pro-
jects or education and training are widely  held to be 
examples of investments that will be under-supplied by 
the market, necessitating public intervention. NUTS 
The  Nomenclature  of territorial  units  for  statistics 
(NUTS) is a classification of regional boundaries in the 
Community. It is hierarchical, with three levels of spa-
tial disaggregation defined, and the lower tier mapping 
into higher tiers. 
Objectives of the structural Funds are sometimes used 
as shorthand for classifying types of regions: 
Objective  1 regions  are  those  judged  to  be  lagging 
behind in their economic development, comprising all 
of Portugal, Greece and the whole of Ireland, parts of 
Spain  and  Italy,  as  well  as  Corsica  and the overseas 
departments of France; 
Objective  2  refers  to  industrial  regions  in  decline, 
mostly  areas  of high  unemployment  in  the  northern 
countries; 
Objective  5 b  comprises  rural  regions  in  northern 
Member States which have too high a level of  income to 
be  part of Objective  1 but which  face  difficulties  in 
development. 
Two further objectives (3 and 4) concern action on long-
term unemployment and youth unemployment. Objec-
tive 5 a is concerned with agricultural restructuring. 
Own resources 
The income  of the  EC  comes  from  certain revenues 
raised by Member States which are hypothecated direct-
ly to the Community. The two traditional own resources 
are  agricultural  levies  and  Common  Customs  Tariff 
duties (27. 7% of revenue in 1989). The main source of 
income  is  a charge on Member States'  VAT  receipts 
(58.5%  in  1989).  In the  1988  reform of the budget, a 
fourth  resource  based  on  Member  State  GDPs  was 
agreed. This is only called in if the first three resources 
do not yield sufficient revenue. 
Reservation wage 
Unless  wage  levels  are  high  enough  to be  attractive, 
workers will not be inclined to take job opportunities. 
The level and availability of welfare support will be a 
key element in setting this reservation wage. 
State aids 
Public-sector  assistance  to  commercial  undertakings 
which confer competitive advantage. As the Second sur-
vey on State aids reveals, these take many forms and are 
substantially greater in value than regional policy. 
Structural Funds 
There are three structural Funds which are intended to 
support the restructuring of economies. These are: agri-
cultural guidance which is intended to support change 
in agriculture; the Social Fund (ESF),  which supports 
training and initiatives to promote social change;  and 
the Regional Development Fund (ERDF), charged with 
supporting less favoured regions through investment in 
infrastructure and in productive capacity. 
Subsidiarity 
The principle of  subsidiarity asserts, to quote the Delors 
Report, that 'the functions of higher levels of govern-
ment should be as limited as possible and should be sub-
sidiary to those of lower levels. Thus, the attribution of 
competences to the Community would have to be con-
fined specifically to those areas in which collective deci-
sion-making was necessary'. 
Trickle-down or spillover effects of  growth 
A rise in the income of  any region or social group usual-
ly gives rise to an increase in its spending. Some of this 
will  flow  to other regions or groups,  so  that a change 
which initially favours only part of  the Community will 
'trickle down' or 'spill over' to others. 
Uruguay Round 
Following earlier multilateral trade agreements  under 
the auspices of GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade), an international body set up after the Sec-
ond World War to promote free and fair international 
trade, a further round of negotiations was  initiated in 
1986 and is now known as the Uruguay Round. As well 
as  trying to promote further liberalization of trade in 
goods  (notably  agricultural  products),  the  Uruguay 
Round agenda includes negotiations on traded services 
and intellectual property rights. 
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a critical issue? 
It is now generally accepted that the pursuit of econo-
mic  integration  in  Europe  can  only  be  justified  if 
mechanisms exist  to ensure that the benefits of inte-
gration are widely and equitably distributed. This has 
been evident as the two intergovernmental conferences 
have proceeded, with the issue of  cohesion moving stea-
dily  up the  agenda.  Failure  to achieve  a  satisfactory 
accord on cohesion could ultimately jeopardize agree-
ment on a new Treaty. Even if a new Treaty is agreed, 
inadequate action to achieve cohesion could undermine 
the  development of the Community and conceivably 
lead to its disintegration. 
There is an explicit commitment to cohesion in Article 
130a of the Single Act which states that: 
'In order to promote its overall harmonious develop-
ment,  the  Community  shall  develop  and  pursue  its 
actions leading to the strengthening of its economic and 
social cohesion. In particular the Community shall aim 
at reducing disparities between the various regions and 
the backwardness of the least favoured regions.' 
It is plain from the various papers which have been cir-
culated in connection with the intergovernmental con-
ferences that the corresponding article in any new treaty 
will be at least as affirmative. However, despite the clar-
ity of  this commitment, it leaves open a large number of 
questions about what achievement of cohesion entails 
and  what  it  means  in  social,  economic  and political 
terms. An important objective of  this report is to review 
what is meant by cohesion, to assess what is required in 
order to make progress towards it and to consider what 
Community policy can do to further cohesion. 
As  explained below, Europe's medium-term economic 
development, assuming there are no major changes in 
the scale of policy support for less favoured regions, is 
likely to be unbalanced. The initial advantages of the 
single European market, economic and monetary union 
(EMU) and related measures are expected to accrue dis-
proportionately to  the more favoured  Member States 
and the more prosperous regions within them. To the 
extent that it creates 'areas of excellence' in investment 
and innovation, making Europe more competitive on a 
world scale, this imbalance should enable more rapid 
growth in the Community overall. This could be in the 
long-term interests of  the less advantaged regions as well 
as the favoured ones, but only if  there are instruments to 
ensure that the benefits are equitably distributed. In the 
absence of policy action, a widening of economic dispa-
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rities is,  however, likely,  with some regions,  including 
some  which  had,  hitherto,  been  favoured,  losing 
ground. In the 1990s, many new factors beyond EMU, 
such  as  the  changes  in  Eastern  Europe,  the  possible 
accession of EFTA countries to the Community, pres-
sures on European agriculture resulting from the GATT 
negotiations and a range of other factors can be expect-
ed to affect social and economic cohesion. 
For these reasons, a fresh look at cohesion and at how to 
attempt to achieve it in the 1990s is timely. This report 
consequently reviews the objectives for a new cohesion 
strategy,  considers what  instruments are  or could  be 
used to pursue the strategy, and discusses problems of 
implementation. 
1.1. Assessing the meaning 
of cohesion for the 1990s 
It is useful to start by posing the question: What is cohe-
sion? Fundamentally, cohesion within the Community 
is a political objective. Failure to achieve it carries the 
risk that the political will necessary to achieve European 
integration will be lost. Social groups, regions or Mem-
ber States  which  conclude  that economic  integration 
does not yield sufficient advantages, may be tempted to 
opt out. Cohesion can consequently be thought of  as the 
absence of  an effective desire to do so, although it has to 
be recognized that that this is not a measurable pheno-
menon.  More  narrowly,  cohesion  concerns  economic 
and social welfare. A simple definition is that it is the 
degree of disparity between different regions or groups 
within the  European Community which  is  politically 
and socially tolerable. This, however, is only a starting 
point. It leaves open issues such as which indicators to 
use to measure cohesion and how to draw boundaries 
between relevant statistical populations. These will vary 
depending on which objectives are being pursued and 
on the weight  that is  attached to  different  priorities, 
although it is common to equate cohesion with conver-
gence  in  per capita  real  incomes.  Simply  looking  at 
income is an inadequate measure of social and econo-
mic well-being in the Community, since  account also 
has to be taken of  its distribution and of  other aspects of 
the quality of life. Dynamic considerations also have to 
be examined. 
In  the  context  of the  acceleration  of economic  inte-
gration  that  will  occur  in  Europe  in  the  1990s,  the 
dynamics of  cohesion must be expected to be particular-
ly  important, since major restructuring will  be  engen-
dered.  It  is  a  concept that will  evolve  through  time: 
achievements that seem to go rather too far today may 
well seem inadequate 10 years from now. It might also be the case that there is  an asymmetry between 'win-
ners' and 'losers' of different types. A previously pros-
perous region which lost ground as a result of economic 
integration may be more sensitive to such a change than 
a region  which  had a long  history of lagging  behind. 
Cohesion, therefore, has to be seen as a concept open to 
multiple and changing interpretations. 
1.1.1. Cohesion as a political imperative 
Several of the political leaders interviewed in the course 
of this  study  have  made  the  obvious,  if easily  over-
looked, point that cohesion is not a prerequisite for eco-
nomic integration. From a technical perspective, both a 
single  market  and  an  economic  and  monetary  union 
(EMU) can function in a perfectly satisfactory manner 
without  any  policies  to  promote  cohesion.  It follows 
that it is  political imperatives which  are  central to  a 
search  for  cohesion,  rather than  economic  necessity. 
Indeed, cohesion  may even necessitate forgoing  some 
potential  gains  to  Community  GDP.  In  view  of the 
political and institutional circumstances of the  Com-
munity in which there is  mounting disquiet about the 
'democratic deficit' (Martin, 1991) and in which a reap-
praisal of the roles of different bodies (the Parliament, 
the Council, the Commission, etc.) is taking place, the 
political dimensions of cohesion are especially impor-
tant as the Community moves towards a new Treaty. 
What are  these? A first  dimension concerns decision-
making in the Community. Cohesion as  a principle is 
closely bound up with equity, so that if major decisions 
are being made which affect the distribution of income, 
employment and welfare, different constituencies with-
in the Community will want to be convinced that their 
voices are being heard. This implies that the form  of 
democratic control of such decisions inevitably enters 
into the debate. A second aspect is citizenship and the 
sense of belonging to the Community. Being part of  the 
Community  implies  rights  - to  social  standards,  to 
opportunities and to a share in the rewards as well as the 
obligations of  membership. If  inhabitants ofless favour-
ed regions are led to believe that there is no real econo-
mic advantage to them in belonging to the Comm1,1nity, 
they must be expected to doubt the wisdom of  persever-
ing. It is worth noting that this point may also apply to 
relatively favoured  regions which feel  they incur bur-
dens or losses as a result of integration. 
The economic and social  disparities within the Com-
munity are much wider than those within most unitary 
States or federal  systems and there is  a much greater 
diversity  of  political  traditions  and  administrative 
structures. Political solidarity must also  be  taken into 
account as  a necessary condition for  the creation of a 
structure  for  income  equalization.  The  issue  is  that, 
although disparities in factor incomes in the Commu-
nity might not be much greater than in another econ-
omy of similar size  such as  the USA,  the absence  of 
redistributive  mechanisms  means  that  differences  in 
disposable incomes remain almost unaffected by  inte-
gration in the EC, whereas they shrink in the USA, even 
though the latter is not known for the generosity of its 
welfare  system.  As  the  MacDougall  Report  ( 1977) 
showed, a system of  budgetary-equalization transfers on 
the scale of, for example, Germany, would require reve-
nue considerably in excess of the current Community 
budget. Since this would imply much larger levies than 
at present on richer regions,  a much stronger political 
commitment to assist less favoured regions would have 
to be achieved for such a system to be feasible. 
A third aspect of political cohesion is that the capacity 
of the Community to move forward and to take initia-
tives in its own right will depend on being able to win 
over support for its actions from its various constituen-
cies.  Cohesion  is,  therefore,  an  important element in 
assuring the legitimacy of the Community as a political 
entity, although its  priority on the political agenda is 
open to doubt. Like 'motherhood and apple pie', cohe-
sion is something that few oppose, but it is difficult to 
judge the depth of support for it.  For some observers, 
cohesion could well  be  the  rock on which the ship of 
EMU founders. Others regard it as a worthwhile target, 
but not one that should be allowed to stand in the way of 
progress.  A  critical  political  question,  then,  is  what 
weight to give to cohesion relative to other policy tar-
gets. 
A further political issue is 'subsidiarity' and its implica-
tions for  accountability.  As  the Delors Report makes 
clear (p. 14 ), it is desirable for lower tiers of  government 
to be responsible for policy unless there is a compelling 
case for a higher tier to be involved. Equally, higher tiers 
of  government have a role to play in mediating potential 
policy conflicts between lower tiers. If  economic inte-
gration threatens to remove effective control over key 
economic factors  from  the local,  regional  or Member 
State level of public administration, this in itself could 
undermine cohesion.  Instead, there is  a pressing need 
for all levels to be and to be seen to be involved in the 
political process. There is  a difficult and delicate bal-
ance to be struck between central power in the EC and 
the maximum possible devolution of power to regional 
authorities. The tensions this engenders are graphically 
demonstrated by  recent events in Yugoslavia and the 
Soviet Union. 
23 Traditionally, it has  been Member States which have 
been  seen  as  the  main  protagonists  in  any  dialogue 
about  the  Community.  In  the  circumstances  of the 
1990s, however, the regional tier of  the Community can 
be expected to play a more prominent role. Many of  the 
effects of  further economic integration will be felt at the 
level  of the  region  rather than of the Member State, 
highlighting the need for the regions to be able to have a 
distinctive voice in any negotiations. In parallel, there 
has been a trend towards assertion of regional identities 
in many countries, suggesting that a more active role for 
a  regional  tier  of government  will  be  sought  in  the 
1990s. 
This, however, raises significant problems. One is that it 
is difficult to define what is meant by a 'region': should 
the criteria be administrative, cultural, economic, geo-
graphical or something else? Because models of govern-
ment vary enormously amongst Member States, there is 
no common system of regional government in the EC. 
Whereas Member States have responsibility for an iden-
tifiable range of policy fields  (macroeconomic policy, 
defence, foreign affairs, etc.), assignation of  administra-
tive competences varies substantially from  country to 
country.  Germany,  for  example,  has a  very  devolved 
system, while in the UK it is highly centralized. For the 
regions  to play a more meaningful  role  in addressing 
problems of cohesion, it is clear that a review of their 
role is important. 
1.1.2. Economic cohesion 
Conventionally, it is disparities in economic indicators 
- usually some measure of  income per head or of  unem-
ployment - which are used to compare the welfare of 
different regions.  Since cohesion  is  in large  part con-
cerned with relative economic welfare, economic relati-
vities are bound to figure prominently in appraisals of 
cohesion. 
A basic question, therefore, is the extent to which cohe-
sion  requires  'real  convergence'  (see  Section  2.1)  of 
social  and  economic  conditions,  the  less  favoured 
regions advancing relatively faster so as to close the gap 
with the more advantaged. Given the expectation that 
integration will not have a spatially balanced economic 
impact, some regions will, ex ante, enjoy a greater share 
of  the benefits. Even if no region loses absolutely, there-
fore, there can be no presumption of  convergence in liv-
ing standards. Yet, for the process of integration to be 
effective in achieving higher rates of  growth in the EC as 
a  whole,  unbalanced  growth  is  almost  certainly  re-
quired:  it  is  only  because,  to  quote  the  1985  White 
Paper  (Commission  of the  European  Communities, 
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1985),  resources  move  to 'areas of greatest economic 
advantage' that the gains are realized in the first place. 
This raises a number of problems concerning cohesion. 
First, it highlights the important question of whether 
cohesion is seen as an absolute or a relative concept. If  it 
is the former, it would be sufficient for there to be net 
benefits to all regions from integration for cohesion to 
be served, even if disparities widened. But if cohesion 
requires that existing disparities should be  narrowed, 
there would have to be some degree of  convergence. It is 
important, in this regard, to consider which relativity to 
use in measuring disparities, as these could be: 
(a) Ratios of the level of an indicator in favoured and 
less favoured regions; 
(b) absolute differences in the relevant indicator. 
Achievement of  cohesion could well be affected depend-
ing on which concept is chosen. It is possible, for exam-
ple, for the ratio of incomes in different regions to nar-
row at the same time as the absolute gap widens. A sce-
nario in which disparities narrow, but in which overall 
gains are lower can also  be envisaged.  Would this be 
more or less cohesive? In the end the answer must rely 
on a value judgement, although a view attributed to the 
late Professor Saraceno of Svimez provides useful guid-
ance: 
'It is better for the South of  Italy to grow rapidly, though 
more slowly than the Centre-North, than for the South 
to  grow  slowly,  but  more  rapidly  than  the  Centre-
North.' 
A second dilemma is whether policy should seek to sti-
mulate activity (whether by supply-side improvements 
or by aids to enterprises) in uncompetitive areas, since 
this carries the risk of negating the favourable effects of 
integration. If  taxes in competitive regions have to rise 
in  order to  subsidize  the  output  of less  competitive 
firms, the outcome could be lower aggregate output. On 
the other hand, unbalanced growth could lead to unem-
ployment of factors of production. Indeed, one of the 
main arguments for regional policy is, precisely, that it 
enables idle resources to be activated. 
The prospect of loss of activity further implies that, for 
the less competitive regions, there is little point in pro-
ceeding with integration unless there is some prospect of 
gain.  To forgo  protection or to adopt macroeconomic 
policies which cause losses of output may,  in the lm!lg 
term, be beneficial, but the short-term price may not )!)e 
worth paying.  Regions which stand to lose  from  inte-gration  must,  consequently,  be  persuaded  that  any 
short-term losses will be limited in scale and duration. 
1.1. 3. Social cohesion 
Social aspects of cohesion are altogether more difficult 
to pin down than the economic, since it is far from easy 
to reach a consensus on objectives or to obtain relevant 
comparative indicators. The word 'social' is  also open 
to  varying  interpretations.  In  some  countries,  the 
emphasis is on interactions between the social partners 
- the  State,  the  employers  and  organized  labour.  In 
other countries,  the concern  of social  policy  is  more 
with  disadvantaged  groups.  The  term  is  further  con-
fused by the debate on the Social Charter which aims to 
promote common standards in areas such as conditions 
of employment or workers' rights. 
There can be little doubt that economic integration will 
cause  social  change  whichever  perspective  on  social 
affairs is  taken.  The spatial reallocations of resources 
that  will  be  induced  by  economic  change  must  be 
expected to affect different social groups unevenly.  In 
particular, if the intensification of competition that is 
one of  the main objectives of  integration causes a labour 
shakeout,  the bulk of the  resulting job losses  will  be 
amongst the least qualified employees. This could create 
problems for  the  most  vulnerable social  groups  - for 
example, ethnic minority immigrants or displaced agri-
cultural populations migrating to large congested cities 
- and may  also  lead  to  concentrations of social  pro-
blems in specific localities. In France, as an illustration, 
the  'Delegation inter-ministeriel a  la  ville'  (DIY)  has 
identified over 400  disadvantaged precincts in  urban 
areas, many in cities which are otherwise prosperous. 
According to DIY, residents in these areas face multiple 
handicaps in trying to secure  better opportunities.  In 
addition, crime, drug-dependence, declining standards 
of health and other consequences of social deprivation 
tend to accumulate in such areas.  Although organized 
crime in Calabria, Sicily and Campania or terrorism in 
Northern Ireland are phenomena with deep  historical 
roots,  they must, nevertheless, be seen as  issues to be 
confronted. Social cohesion calls for recognition of the 
effects of economic and political change in fomenting 
social problems and for action to alleviate them. 
Equally,  there will  be pressures for  harmonization of 
levels  of social  protection  and  means  of delivery  of 
social policy, building on the current round of  proposals 
for the Social Charter. There is an economic dimension 
to this in so  far as  it is  considered desirable to avoid 
'social dumping' - cutting levels of social provision in 
order to lower the burden on business taxes and thus to 
secure competitive advantage. Improving social provi-
sion can, in addition, be regarded as a political objective 
aimed at consolidating the sense of  belonging to the EC. 
If residents of  less favoured regions or of disadvantaged 
communities in  favoured  regions  perceive the gap  in 
social provision between them and more favoured areas 
either  to  be  excessive  or not  narrowing  sufficiently, 
social cohesion will be difficult to achieve. In particular, 
if the  Community  is  not  able  to  address  poverty  in 
whatever form  it  manifests  itself (low  rural  incomes, 
inactive or discriminated-against inner city or suburban 
populations),  it  will  struggle  in  vain  to  attain  social 
cohesion. 
The  ultimate  test  of  social  cohesion,  however,  is 
whether or not residents of certain regions  face  long-
term inequality in opportunities relative to the rest of 
the Community. Education and training play a crucial 
part in determining economic opportunity and conse-
quently deserve attention. Similarly, standards of  health 
care and housing, as well as the quality of the environ-
ment  contribute  substantially  to  the  quality  of life. 
Social  cohesion,  though  rather more  amorphous  as  a 
concept, has to be seen as a key target of policy for the 
Community in the 1990s. 
1.2. The economics of integration and 
regional disparities 
Existing regional disparities are the product of a large 
number of diverse factors which have been the subject 
of extensive theorizing and analysis by  economists. A 
comprehensive discussion would be out of place in the 
present document, but it is worth highlighting the main 
strands of the debate. 
The prevailing orthodox view is  that disparities arise 
largely because of obstacles to the effective functioning 
of markets. This philosophy is implicit in the rationale 
for seeking to complete the internal market, and there 
are many who would argue that by far the most effective 
way to overcome disparities (and thus to advance cohe-
sion) is  to ensure that the free  play of markets is  not 
impeded. Much the same approach is followed in anal-
ysis of the desirability of monetary union.  Under this 
reasoning,  prices will  send signals to economic agents 
which will prevent disequilibria from causing persistent 
disparities.  However,  it has  to be  recognized that the 
implied mechanism may require greater factor mobility 
than is realistically attainable. 
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principal vehicle for market adjustment is open to con-
siderable doubt.  Migration of unskilled labour,  which 
played a considerable part in reducing labour market 
imbalances in the early development of  the EC, depends 
on there being demand for such labour. For a variety of 
reasons- social, occupational and political- migration 
of unskilled labour is unlikely to be a powerful mecha-
nism for alleviating regional imbalances in the 1990s. In 
general, opportunities for unskilled labour are likely to 
be much fewer in the 1990s, with the main job opportu-
nities  occurring  in  the  more  knowledge-intensive 
industries.  To the  extent that there  is  an  increase  in 
labour mobility, therefore, it is much more likely to be 
amongst  skilled,  professional  and  managerial  groups, 
which could induce problems of deskilling in less com-
petitive regions. 
Theories of regional growth and of interregional trade 
(see, for example, Armstrong and Taylor, 1985), are not 
easy to relate to the circumstances of European regions 
in the 1990s. In models relying on analysis of compara-
tive costs, factor endowments are considered to play a 
large part in determining both what type of activity a 
region has and the extent to which it is able to grow, and 
they are portrayed as the determinants of regional spe-
cialization  in  different  forms  of economic  activity. 
Opportunities for cross-regional trade stem largely from 
differences  in  factor  endowments,  while  monetary 
issues  are  assumed  not  to  affect  regional  prospects. 
Similarly, the theory of customs unions and other con-
ventional trade theories do not provide very satisfactory 
models for understanding the effects of integration on 
regions. In such models, the regional question is effec-
tively assumed away, because the assumptions of com-
plete  factor  mobility  within  countries  and  constant 
returns to scale ensure that regional economies main-
tain equilibrium. This model and the strong assump-
tions on which  it  relies  are  so  far  removed  from  the 
realities of Europe today - where intra-industry trade 
between regions is the norm, where economies of scale 
are critical, and where markets are both segmented and 
oligopolistic  - that  it  offers  few  insights  into  how 
regions will fare in a more integrated Europe. 
Recent developments in trade theory (see Helpman and 
Krugman,  1985;  Kierzkowski,  1987),  such  as  explicit 
acknowledgement of the role of economies of scale in 
explaining trade patterns and of the predominance of 
intra-industry trade in differentiated products, can be 
extended to give more convincing predictions of regio-
nal outcomes. Contemporary theory also recognizes the 
significance of  trade between subsidiaries of  multinatio-
nal companies - a phenomenon that must be expected 
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to become more relevant as activity is reorganized on a 
European rather than a national basis. 
Although  these  approaches  to  trade  theory  do  not 
directly  identify  possible  regional  ramifications  of 
integration, they do at least help to point to aspects of 
economies that will influence how they are affected by 
it. For instance, the prediction that agglomeration exter-
nalities  will  induce  industries  subject  to  increasing 
returns to concentrate in countries with larger domestic 
markets (Helpman,  1981 ),  would be expected to have 
parallels  in  a  single  market with  the  distribution  be-
tween  'core' and 'peripheral' regions.  Centripetal pull 
towards the core regions would tend to favour industries 
subject to increasing returns locating centrally, leaving 
less  dynamic industries in the periphery. The types of 
activity  (such  as  headquarters  activities,  low-skill 
assembly) in which a region specializes will,  similarly, 
have a bearing on its potential to gain from integration, 
in the same way as countries do. 
An alternative approach is to acknowledge that there are 
wide and persistent differences in the endowments and 
attributes  of different  regions.  There  are,  moreover, 
longstanding  differences  in  the  social  and  economic 
structures of different regions which mean that funda-
mental changes in economic circumstances have to be 
measured  in  decades  rather  than  short-term  adjust-
ments. Models of regional development which empha-
size  regional  competitiveness  in  what  are  termed 
'export-base'  activities  provide  an  alternative  to  the 
comparative costs approach. What is  clear from these 
export-base models is  that in a dynamic context, it is 
easy to predict a persistent widening of regional dispa-
rities giving rise to cumulative change. Certain attribu-
tes of regions will favour or discourage the implantation 
and growth of different forms of  economic activity and, 
as a result, the dynamics of the region will depend on 
how successful it is in attracting and nurturing growth-
orientated activity. In the present-day environment of 
oligopolistic competition and segmented markets, it is 
unrealistic to expect market solutions to be sufficiently 
effective. Rather, persistent cycles of advantage or dis-
advantage have to be regarded as the norm. 
Through time, the characteristics of  a region which con~ 
fer such absolute advantage on it may become dissipat  .. 
ed or lose their relevance. The recent deterioration in 
the  economic  circumstances  of a  number of regions 
partly reflects the loss of competitiveness of Europe in 
many of the industries which provided much of the sti-
mulus to post-war growth. Equally, the rise of new sec· 
tors (such as high-technology manufacturing or produc· 
er services) has highlighted different regional attributes as critical in driving economic growth. Propensities to 
innovate are coming to be seen as decisive in improving 
competitiveness, and more attention is being focused on 
indigenously-generated economic growth. 
A basic question, therefore, is whether market mecha-
nisms can, in practice, be relied upon to deliver cohe-
sion.  Given the degree  and persistence of disparities 
both within countries and between them, it is  difficult 
to believe that they can. Nor is it likely that the market 
will respond sufficiently quickly to congestion and over-
heating in favoured regions and thus bring about a rapid 
diffusion of improved economic efficiency. On the con-
trary, the evidence is that it is only when cost differen-
tials become considerable that companies are prepared 
to overcome the inertia and sunk costs of current loca-
tions, or to contemplate the greater uncertainty of new 
locations. 
Perhaps  the  key  to  analysing  the  regional  impact of 
European integration is to recognize that the benefits of 
integration stem directly from  improved allocation of 
resources. Seen in this way, the gains from integration 
are generated endogenously and  result  from  a one-off 
shift,  rather  than  being .the  rc-.~lt  of an  exoge~ous 
change, such as technological  pru~rcss. For any regiOn, 
the  benefits  from  integration  will  come  from  two 
mechanisms. First, it would be expected that some of 
the additional growth (assuming it is  actually realized) 
for  Europe  as  a  whole  would  'trickle  down'  to  all 
regions, though not evenly. Second, the process of real-
location implied by resources moving will, particularly 
in  a  dynamic  context,  mean  that  there  will  be  net 
inflows or outflows of factors of production. In a neo-
classical world, this would lead to adjustments of  factor 
costs and changes in regional specializations, but would 
not be expected to give rise to regional problems. Past 
experience suggests,  however,  that adjustment simply 
does  not  occur  in this  way.  Plant closures,  losses  of 
skilled labour or outflows of capital are cumulative in 
their effect  and lead  to worsening  regional  problems. 
For  uncompetitive  regions,  therefore,  the  rationali-
zation of production on which the success of the 1992 
programme is predicated could cause severe difficulties. 
1.3. Implications for cohesion 
as an objective 
If the presumption that growth  is  intrinsically unbal-
anced is  correct, the inference to be  drawn is  that an 
acceleration of  economic integration in the EC will pro-
duce winners and losers. This means that unless a satis-
factory  policy  towards  cohesion  is  formulated  and 
implemented, the solidarity necessary to sustain Europe 
as a genuine Community will be threatened. Such a poli-
cy has to take account simultaneously of  multiple objec-
tives,  limited resources and conflicting economic and 
political constraints. 
What aims should policy have? A successful policy for 
cohesion must ensure an adequate diffusion of econo-
mic  advantages  from  the  growth  centres  to  other 
regions, without stifling the creation of those advanta-
ges.  'Recipient' regions  must be satisfied that growth 
imbalances have been kept to an acceptable minimum, 
while 'donor' regions must believe that any short-term 
sacrifice will contribute to greater market stability and 
reduced  need  for  redistribution  in  the  longer  term. 
Equally  regions  which  have  their  competitiveness 
damaged by the integration process have to be persuad-
ed that this is ultimately in their own best interest, while 
regions that gain have to recognize that their gains stem 
in part from others' losses. 
If 'cohesion'  means  purely  redistribution  of income, 
whether between regions or households, the main con-
cern will  be  to ensure  that the  money  is  successfully 
transferred to target groups. How it is spent is then their 
affair.  Resources  could  be  transferred  in  a  relatively 
simple manner, according to a key based on an indicator 
such as GDP per capita or the yield of some tax on a 
harmonized basis. It is important, in this regard, to dis-· 
tinguish between pre- and post-tax disparities in inco~­
es, since regions with high incomes will tend, automati-
cally, to pay a larger amount of  tax. Many federal Sta!es 
also  have  redistributional  budgets  for  transfernng 
resources to weaker areas, which leave considerable dis-
cretion to the recipient State authorities as to how the 
money is spent. However, within such federations (e.g. 
Germany, Canada, Australia) there is typically a signifi-
cant commonality of administrative capacity and qual-
ity of budgetary management. Similarly, there tends to 
be a shared set of  political and social values between the 
different regions of such countries. 
The main alternative approach is to improve the long-
term productive potential of the weaker regions,  pro-
moting future rather than current income. In principle, 
such  policies  would  be  transitional,  their  intention 
being to raise the regions' income-generating capacity 
until  a  further  transfer  of resources  is  unnecessary, 
although in practice they may be unable to generate an 
effect sufficient to achieve this aim. They imply a closer 
targeting of transferred resources towards 'productive' 
investment in physical capital, human capital and infra-
structure. With this approach, three major issues need 
to be confronted:  the financial  management capacity 
and  culture  of Community  institutions  (and  of the 
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to cooperate), the question of subsidiarity, and the role 
of the private sector. 
1.4. National differences in definitions 
and priorities 
Inevitably,  there are  differences between countries in 
their views of priorities for attempting to attain cohe-
sion.  In much of Northern Europe, where  systems of 
public social support are well established and the regio-
nal dispersion of per capita incomes is  not enormous, 
the main concern tends to be to avoid excessive dispa-
rities in unemployment.  By  contrast, for  much of the 
periphery of the Community, catching up  in terms of 
economic  development  has  been  seen  as  the  most 
immediate priority. There are, however, many interme-
diate positions, while the spatial focus ~f  attention _with-
in countries has shifted from time to time. Thus, m re-
cent years, urban problems have come more to the f?re 
in countries such as  France and the  UK.  Forestalling 
rural depopulation as well as general economic develop-
ment is considered important in Ireland, while econo-
mic development has been regarded as a means of con-
solidating the reform of political institutions in several 
of the Mediterranean countries. 
In some countries, there have also been specific consid-
erations to take into account. The tensions between the 
28 
two linguistic communities in Belgium are an obvious 
example,  having  been  exacerbated  by  the  relative 
decline of  the economy of  Wallonia in the last 15 years. 
Religious divisions endure in Germany as well  ~s ~n a 
highly publicized region like Northern Ireland. Stmllar-
ly, pressures for autonomy have been evident in Spain, 
as well as in some regions of France, the UK and Italy. 
Such differences in priorities have to some extent been 
reflected  in  policy  packages.  Some  countries  have 
favoured  regional  incentives to industry;  others have 
placed more weight on infrastructure development. The 
scale of commitments to spatially targeted policies has 
also fluctuated over time and in response to changing 
macroeconomic  circumstances.  This  diversity  in  the 
assessment  of  and  approach  to  cohesion  within 
countries makes it clear that a cohesion strategy for the 
1  990s will need to be carefully judged to accommodate 
a wide  range of objectives as  well  as to be flexible  in 
application. In addition to the problem of coping with 
the diversity of cohesion aims, the Community has to 
contend  with  the  double  problem  that  disparities 
between countries are greater than within countries, yet 
most of  the mechanisms used by countries are not avail-
able to the Community. This is made more poignant by 
the expectation that integration may exacerbate dispa-
rities,  emphasizing Community responsibility to take 
action. 2.  Measuring disparities and the role of 
current policies 
Before any progress can be made in formulating a new 
strategy for social and economic cohesion, it is essential 
to have a clear picture of  what it is that cohesion policy 
should target. Debate on cohesion has been clouded by 
confusion in the jargon, by disagreements on the choice 
of indicators to measure disparities and by conflicts in 
the aims of policy. This chapter looks at the problems 
posed in measuring cohesion and considers the extent to 
which the present mix of Community policies advances 
cohesion. 
2.1.  Concepts of convergence 
Considerable confusion surrounds the use, in the debate 
on cohesion, of the term 'convergence'. This has arisen 
partly because of differences in emphasis on what the 
most important issues are for economic integration, but 
also because of  a lack of  understanding of  what different 
concepts imply. For present purposes, at least five defi-
nitions of convergence can be distinguished: 
(i)  harmonization of inflation rates and other macro-
economic indicators as  a  prerequisite of a  single 
currency (nominal convergence); 
(ii)  coordination  of budgetary  and  other  policies  to 
ensure that these do not put undue strain on mon-
etary policy under EMU (policy convergence); 
(iii) narrowing of gaps  in disposable incomes. It may, 
further, be appropriate to adjust for differences in 
levels  of social  provision,  since  the latter clearly 
affect the standard of living (real convergence); 
(iv)  structural adaptation which produces more closely 
related structures of  economies in different parts of 
the EC economy, thereby diminishing vulnerability 
to external shocks (structural convergence); 
(v)  increasing similarity in various behavioural pheno-
mena  such  as  savings  ratios,  systems  (formal  or 
informal)  of welfare  support or the  character of 
industrial relations (behavioural convergence). 
These various forms of  convergence are germane to dif-
ferent  aspects  of economic  integration  and cohesion. 
The first two are essentially concerned with the mechan-
ics of integrating previously separate economies. Thus, 
an approximation to  nominal convergence  is  seen  as 
desirable from the point of view of making the transi-
tion to EMU as painless as possible. If economies with 
very different parameters for the relevant macroecono-
mic  variables  were  to try  to  integrate,  the  shock  in-
volved in adapting would be more pronounced. Similar-
ly,  once  an  economic  or monetary  union  has  been 
achieved, the scope for divergent budgetary policy will 
be limited. Policy convergence is, therefore, vital if the 
internal  balance  of an  EMU  is  to  be  maintained, 
although it has to be  recognized (as  Begg  and Weale, 
1990, argue) that this does not call for complete equiv-
alence on fiscal stances. 
Real convergence relates directly to cohesion since it is 
a measure of the relative well-being of different parts of 
an EMU. However, it is neither an essential precondi-
tion for an EMU, nor a necessary outcome of  one. If  it is 
accepted that economic cohesion implies a narrowing of 
disparities in command over real  resources,  then the 
test  of cohesion  is  whether  or not  real  convergence 
occurs, irrespective of the institutional framework with-
in which it operates or the values of nominal variables. 
In  the  neo-classical  approach  to  economic  analysis, 
there is a presumption that the long-run trend will  be 
towards  convergence  because  markets will  ensure  an 
efficient allocation of resources. The empirical picture, 
however, is less clear, not least because the substantial 
net fiscal flows within a nation State (as the MacDougall 
Report, 1977, shows) play a considerable part in reduc-
ing ex ante disparities. 
Research on the USA (Barro and Sala-i-Martin,  1990) 
suggests that the gap between rich and poor States, in 
terms of both per capita income and product, has tend-
ed to narrow in the long term, though at a slow rate. The 
research finds that migration of labour towards areas of 
capital abundance has played a part in bringing about 
convergence of  income levels. In the long term, the same 
authors (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991) reach a similar 
conclusion about the European economy,  although as 
the discussion later in this chapter shows, the results are 
far from unambiguous. 
Structural and behavioural convergence are important 
because they exert a major influence on the long-term 
scope for real convergence to be achieved and sustained. 
If parts  of an  EMU  are  very  different  in  these  two 
respects,  common macroeconomic  policies  will  affect 
them differently. This, indeed, has been used as an argu-
ment by separatist movements to justify disintegration. 
Given  the  considerable  divergences  in  structure  and 
behavioural parameters amongst the regions of the EC, 
it can be argued that progress towards sustainable, long-
term cohesion will require action to bring regions more 
into line with one another. 
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The  most  widely  used  measure  of relative  economic 
advantage  among  nations  is  gross  domestic  product 
(GDP) per capita. It indicates the average annual value 
of goods  and  services  produced  by  each  inhabitant. 
Comparisons of  GDP across regions and countries pose 
problems because prices vary and may be expressed in 
different currencies. If no account is taken of different 
absolute and relative prices, then exactly the same activ-
ity  could  be  measured  differently.  Unfortunately, 
regional  price  indicators  are  not  available  for  all 
countries  in  a  harmonized  form.  However,  national 
price  data are  readily  available,  so  that,  rather than 
making  comparisons  using  nominal  exchange  rates 
(which may fluctuate for reasons unconnected with rela-
tive price movements), it is possible to use purchasing 
power  parity  ratios  as  an  alternative.  These  weight 
together  components  of national  spending  in  a  way 
which  gives  a  more  directly  comparable  measure  of 
changes in the purchasing power of GDP (see Summers 
and Heston,  1991 ).  If we  try to compare standards of 
living in different parts of the EC, it may, in principle, 
be better to use measures of real spending power rather 
than GDP, though these are more difficult to obtain on 
a harmonized basis. 
For EC regions, GDP per capita is also available (disag-
gregated  to  Level  2  of  the  NUTS  classification), 
although  for  many countries  the  lack  of harmonized 
regional  price  data  makes  it  difficult  to  assess  the 
growth of real GDP per head in the regions in terms of 
purchasing  power.  GDP  measures  a  region's  output 
rather than income, the difference arising from  inter-
regional payments and transfers. A net inflow will raise 
a  country's  gross  national  product  (GNP)  above  its 
GDP. Conversely, in countries such as  Ireland, facing 
high debt service charges and profit repatriation, GNP 
has recently been considerably below GDP. The degree 
of income  inequality revealed  by  either measure  will 
generally tend to rise the more narrowly defined is the 
region across which it is averaged. 
There are other problems due to statistical methodol-
ogy.  For example, the Groningen region of the Nether-
lands appears to have one of  the highest average incom-
es in the Community, but this is because gas production 
is treated statistically as being part of the output of the 
region. In reality, because most of  the value-added flows 
to other regions rather than being retained as regional 
income, the region's income is below the Dutch average. 
Certain smaller city-regions such as Hamburg or Brus-
sels owe their high per capita GDP partly to the fact that 
inward commuters generate a proportion of  the region's 
output, but are not counted in the resident population 
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which is the denominator for the per capita income cal-
culation. Although these particular problems are taken 
into consideration by  the Commission in designating 
regions for assistance, they illustrate the complications 
that arise in making use of indicators which are appa-
rently objective. 
A more intractable problem, especially in certain less-
favoured regions, is the extent of unrecorded economic 
activity. The informal or 'black' economy- most pro-
minent in construction and the services sector where 
cash transactions replace formal invoicing- is recogniz-
ed to contribute substantially to income, and is comple-
mented in some regions, notably in parts of the Mezzo-
giorno, by illegal activity such as drug dealing, gambling 
or prostitution. Average GDP also fails to capture those 
elements of living  standards not  revealed  in  income 
flows, such as home production and barter (especially in 
rural regions) and external costs of production. Ideally, 
a measure of retained value-added, which captured the 
rewards from  output retained in the region would  be 
more revealing than GDP. 
A  measure  of economic  welfare,  such  as  disposable 
income, rather than GDP (an output indicator) may be 
a better means of signalling relativities which bear on 
cohesion. This would raise greater problems of  measure-
ment, but would offer a more convincing indicator of 
need as it would signal the real resources a region has at 
its  disposal.  Such  an  indicator might  be  constructed 
from  income  surveys  or from  the  results  of market 
research studies aimed at identifying variations in con-
sumer  spending  power.  Indeed,  since  monitoring  of 
cohesion is bound to require information on economic 
welfare, there is a case for regular surveys to be conduct-
ed under the auspices of Eurostat. 
Differences in income levels are not the only indicator 
to have been used to measure the gaps between different 
parts of the Community. Labour market indicators are 
commonly used as an alternative to income or GDP in 
signalling regional disparities. The most obvious is the 
unemployment rate, although the use of this is compli-
cated by variations in methods of measurement and by 
social or institutional factors, in particular the presence 
in some regions  of agricultural  underemployment.  In 
Galicia, for example, the apparent unemployment rate 
is held down by the custom of absorbing labour in fam-
ily-run smallholdings, in contrast to Andalusia where, 
with agriculture  dominated by  large  landowners,  dis-
placed workers have no such cushion to fall  back on. 
Migration also tends to mitigate unemployment rates, 
yet has to  be  seen as  a labour market response to an 
imbalance between  labour supply and  demand.  Such imbalances arise  in  some  areas  because  of job losses 
(including many of the Objective 2 regions), but result 
more from natural increases in the working population 
in areas like Ireland. 
In the 1980s, the Commission attempted to amalgamate 
income and labour market disparities by  creating the 
'synthetic index', a composite indicator made up of  four 
components: 
(i)  GDP per head of population in PPS (25% weight); 
(ii)  GDP per employed person in Ecus (25% weight): 
(iii) n unemployment rate adjusted to take account of 
underemployment in agriculture (  40% weight); 
(iv)  Estimated employment shortfall  due to  projected 
labour force growth ( 10% weight). 
This index, itself a refinement of a similar earlier com-
posite, was discontinued by the time of the fourth per-
iodic  report  (Commission  of the  European  Commu-
nities 1991 b) because of  political ambiguity about what it 
measured and questions over the reliability of the data. 
Many other characteristics of regions can be considered 
to  bear on  cohesion.  Peripherality,  for  example,  not 
only  puts  a  region  at  a  competitive  disadvantage 
because of higher transport costs and access difficulties, 
but  also  creates  psychological  barriers  which  inhibit 
cohesion. Obstacles to internal communication (mount-
ainous terrain, the need for sea-crossings to islands) can 
mean that a larger investment in infrastructure is need-
ed to attain the same level of  service. In remote, sparsely 
populated rural areas, such as North-West Greece or the 
Highlands and Islands of Scotland, such problems are 
especially acute. 
An altogether different approach to cohesion would be 
to look at the relative social condition of regions. This 
may be assessed by a number of measures of per capita 
input (e.g. public expenditure on health and education), 
intermediate output (e.g.  number of doctors per 1 000 
inhabitants,  length  of compulsory  schooling)  or final 
output (e.g.  life  expectancy,  incidence of health prob-
lems, flow of  educational and vocational qualifications). 
Measures of consumption, such as the ratio of cars and 
household machines to population, are also available at 
regional  level.  These  sometimes reflect  differences  in 
preference or in provision of substitute goods (e.g.  pub-
lic transport and marketed household services), but they 
also indicate the household distribution of income and 
wealth not fully  captured in average GDP figures.  On 
the whole,  the 'output' measures are preferable,  since 
regions may have different mixes of private and public 
social-service spending, and different efficiencies of ser-
vice  administration.  They are also  easier to  compare 
across regions, although data are not always available in 
the detail required. Again, surveys could be used to col-
lect  harmonized data without undue cost,  since  these 
are indicators that change relatively slowly. 
2.3.  How cohesive is the Community? 
Although  there  has  been  progress  in  the  long  term 
towards real convergence in Europe, it has been observ-
ed  that the  broad  pattern of disparities in  per capita 
GDP in the European Community has fluctuated in line 
with variations in the overall economic performance of 
the EC. Thus, in the period up to the mid-1970s, a per-
iod of  comparatively rapid growth for the EC, there had 
been a trend towards convergence, with the less prosper-
ous  regions  gaining  ground.  In the  following  decade, 
when there was a marked slowdown in growth, disparit-
ies were aggravated (Commission of  the European Com-
munities, 1987). Since the mid-1980s, however, at least 
some of  the less favoured parts of  the EC have again had 
more  rapid than average  economic  growth  (Commis-
sion of the European Communities,  1991 b;  Larre and 
Torres,  1991 ),  although Greece appears to  have gone 
backwards. 
Figures 1 to 3 provide snapshots of levels and rates of 
growth of income, and the rate of unemployment, key 
indicators of con  vergence.  Figure  1 (see  p.  14)  shows 
clearly  that  it  is  core  regions  of the  Community that 
have  the  highest  income  while  the  periphery  lags 
behind.  Unemployment,  by  contrast,  exhibits a  more 
varied  spatial  pattern,  with  high  rates  in  traditional 
industrial areas as well as in lagging regions of  Spain and 
Italy. 
The two static economic indicators - GDP per capita 
and the percentage of the labour force  unemployed -
tend  to  reveal  the  same  favoured  and  less  favoured 
regions, though Greece and Portugal are major excep-
tions.  However,  the  highest-income  regions  do  not 
always  record  the  lowest  unemployment,  perhaps 
because they enclose large urban regions which tend to 
attract unemployed migrants from other regions.  High 
total unemployment levels often accompany extremely 
high levels of  youth (below age 25) unemployment: 67% 
in the Calabria region of Italy, and nearly 50% in the 
Andalusia region of Spain. However, as  noted earlier, 
high  unemployment in other regions may be partially 
absorbed  as  underemployment.  Figures  on  long-term 
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another source of  great concern within the Community. 
Income growth is  much more variable, with Spain and 
Portugal showing well in the late  1980s, in contrast to 
Greece  and  the  Mezzogiorno.  As  a  rule,  the  rate  of 
growth of the Member State tends to be the main deter-
minant of  regional growth, though Figure 3 suggests that 
the assisted  regions  in  many countries have  failed  to 
keep pace with the rest of the respective country. 
Rather less attention has tended to be given to indica-
tors of change  in determining eligibility,  though they 
entered  into  the  designation  of Objective  2  regions. 
Some  forthcoming  developments  can  be  expected  to 
generate rapid relative changes and will have to be taken 
into account in a strategy for cohesion. Time-lags in the 
publication of data can make it difficult to identify fast-
-moving changes and thus delay a policy response. This 
highlights  the  fact  that  some  of the  more  awkward 
political problems that arise in establishing criteria for 
the allocation of assistance come from  disagreements 
over the choice and method of  calculation of indicators. 
Figure 2: 
Unemployment rates in the Community,  1990 
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2.4.  Existing Community policies 
All  the  Member  States  have  some  form  of explicit 
regional policy (for a description, see Yuill et al.,  1991; 
and for an evaluation of their effectiveness, PA Cam-
bridge Economic Consultants, 1990). Regional disparit-
ies are also affected by Community expenditure and by 
the incidence of  other Community policies such as com-
petition  policy  or  external  trade  agreements.  The 
regional impact of these Community policies has been 
comprehensively examined in the study for the Euro-
pean  Parliament  by  DIW (Franzmeyer  et  al.,  1991 ). 
This study measured the extent to which various Com-
munity policies contributed to a redistribution of wel-
fare  towards  less  favoured  regions,  concluding  that 
although some instruments were effective in redistribut-
ing, others had a perverse effect. 
The Community instruments which generate flows  of 
expenditure in the attempt to overcome regional econo-
mic imbalances are the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity (ECSC),  the European Social Fund (ESF),  the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the 
Guidance Section of the European Agricultural Guid-
ance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) which is designed 
to assist  rural restructuring. Loans for economic deve-
lopment  purposes,  targeted  predominantly  at  less 
favoured regions, are provided by the European Invest-
ment Bank (EIB) and the New Community Instrument 
(now  largely  replaced  by  additional  EIB  lending  to 
SMEs). 
The Brussels Summit in early 1988 agreed a doubling of 
the  structural  Funds (ERDF,  EAGGF-Guidance  Sec-
tion and ESF)  to ECU  14  billion (at  1988  prices)  by 
1993, at which time they will comprise around 25% of 
the Community budget and 0.3% of Community GDP. 
Table 1 shows the planned allocations from the struc-
tural Funds over this period, and the proportions going 
to the six stated objectives. 
The 1988 reform also brought in concentration of assis-
tance on more clearly defined regions, a shift from indi-
vidual projects to integrated programmes in recipient 
regions. In addition, a number of programmes of Com-
munity interest have been initiated. Amongst these are 
the  integrated  Mediterranean programmes (set  up  in 
1985)  which  include  an  additional  contribution  for 
these regions,  as well  as  coordinating structural Fund 
and  EIB  assistance;  programmes  aimed  at  specific 
objectives,  such  as  STAR (telecommunications  infra-
structure  and  services),  Rechar  (aid  to  coal-mining .f 
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GR,  UK:  1981-1988. Stride (help for research and technology development). 
Pedip is  a programme aimed at assisting the develop-
ment of industry in Portugal. 
Table 1: 
Structural Fund instruments and allocation, 1989-93 
Pro- billion  portion  Objective  Instrument  ECU  (o/o) 
63  1 Lagging regions  All funds  38.3 
12  2 Declining regions  ERDF, ESF  7.2 
12  3 Long-term  ESF  7.5 
unemployment 
4 Youth employment  ESF 
6  Sa Agricultural adjustment  EAGGF  3.4 
5  Sb Rural development  All  funds  2.8 
2  Other  1.1 
Total  60.3 
Some of the main conclusions of the DIW study are: 
(i)  in 1990, 63% of the Community budget was spent 
on agricultural policy (59% on guarantee payments 
and 4% on guidance).  The direct expenditure on 
agricultural support has, by and large, exacerbated 
rather than reduced disparities. The impact of the 
CAP  on  price  levels  also  has  to  be  considered, 
because the outcome of guarantees is  to  increase 
the price paid by all consumer-s. If higher prices are 
taken into account, as well as the flows of  guarantee 
payments, the discohesive effect  on disparities  is 
reinforced; 
(ii)  the structural Funds do act to reduce disparities in 
income, and to the extent that they raise levels of 
investment  in  less  favoured  regions,  assist  long-
term economic development. DIW note, however, 
that only some 60% of appropriations were actual-
ly  paid  out,  with  substantial  variations  between 
Member States in this respect; 
(iii) EIB loans are judged to be equalizing in their effect, 
whereas  ECSC  reconversion  loans  and  interven-
tions favour the Northern countries and thus tend 
to widen disparities between Objective  1 regions 
and  the  rest  of the  Community  (though  as  the 
ECSC loans are deliberately targeted at Objective 2 
regions, DIW's conclusion, by looking at the overall 
effect on distribution throughout the Community, 
does not take account sufficiently of  the diversity in 
the aims of  policy). DIW make the additional point 
that assistance from  Member State policy to coal 
and steel industries has tended to work in the same 
way, although it is being challenged in EC competi-
tion policy. 
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Figure 4:  Growth of the Community budget, 1988-92 
(based on the financial perspective)  : 
70r---------------, 
65  ECUs  , 
-; 
6C 
/ 
1988  ECUs, 
/ 
1988  1989  1990  :991  1992 
Year 
2.5.  Current EC fiscal flows 
Following the reforms agreed in 1988, the EC budget is 
now cast  within a  five-year  medium term framework 
known as the 'financial perspective', running from 1988 
to 1992. This is intended to set a ceiling for calls on own 
resources/  and  allows  for  real  growth  of 3.9%  per 
annum (10% per annum in cash terms) in the budget. 
Figure 4 shows the planned growth of the budget. This 
will take the budget from 1.15% of Community GDP in 
1988 to 1.2% by 1992. A new financial perspective will 
have to be negotiated soon for the subsequent period. 
Figure 5:  Income and expenditure of the 
Community Budget 
(% shares of the Member States) 
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1  Revenue raised in Member States which is directly hypothecated 
to the  Community budget.  The three  resources  are:  (1)  agri-
cultural levies imposed on extra-Community imports; (2)  cus-
toms duties; (3) the proceeds of 1.4% of harmonized VAT rec-
eipts. A fourth resource based on Member State GOP may be 
called upon if the first  three resources  do  not yield  sufficient 
revenue to cover agreed expenditure. As the DIW (Franzmeyer et al., 1991) report has already 
made clear, the incidence of EC policies, including the 
aggregate impact of  Community expenditure is not con-
vincingly pro-cohesive, largely because of the distorted 
pattern of agricultural guarantee payments.  Figures  5 
and  6  show  a  crude  breakdown  of the  income  and 
expenditure by country in the 1989 budget. The data for 
income are the Commission's calculations of the own 
resources raised in each Member State. The expenditure 
figure is the identifiable expenditure by the Community 
in each Member State, and consists mainly of spending 
by the CAP and the structural Funds. 
Figure 6: Ratio of 'Member States' 
contributions to receipts 
(% of the Community budget, 1989) 
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The total for expenditure is about three-quarters of the 
income. This is  because some money is  not spent on 
Member States (for example, foreign  aid), while some 
goes  on  administration  and  a  proportion,  in  1989, 
remained unspent. Because so much of  the spending on 
administration occurs in Belgium and Luxembourg, the 
figures  for  these  countries  must  be  expected  signifi-
cantly  to  understate  the  true  position  for  these  two 
Member  States.  However,  the  two  charts  provide  a 
reasonable,  if crude, measure of net benefit from  the 
Community budget. Figure 5 shows that, on the whole, 
the  least-favoured  countries  contribute  considerably 
less than they receive from the Community budget. To 
this extent, the budget does promote cohesion. Howev-
er, because of agricultural payments, Denmark and the 
Netherlands,  two  of the  more  prosperous  Member 
States are substantial net beneficiaries. In an attempt to 
standardize for differences in the level of  contributions, 
Figure  6  shows  the log  of the  ratio  of each  Member 
State's contribution to its receipts. This form of  present-
ation means that the size of the bar for the respective 
Member State shows the degree to which it is a net bene-
ficiary.  For Ireland and Greece, the calculation reveals 
that the EC budget is  acting in a strongly procohesive 
manner,  and  does  so  less  emphatically  for  Portugal. 
However, the fact  that Denmark and the Netherlands 
are greater net beneficiaries than Italy or Spain suggests 
that cohesion could be improved by a redirection of the 
budget. Illustrative calculations of  what a redistribution 
might achieve are presented in Chapters 4 and 6. 
2.6.  The example of German unification 
The  unification  of  Germany  in  1990  provides  an 
instructive case study of the integration of economies 
with large  disparities in  incomes,  structure and beha-
vioural characteristics.  Although political  imperatives 
were obviously paramount in the manner and pace of 
the unification, the magnitude of the economic prob-
lems facing the five new Lander suggests that there may 
well be lessons for the EC . 
By the spring of 1991, 30% of the workforce was unem-
ployed  or working  on  short-time  schemes.  Industrial 
output had fallen by half  in just a year, and it is expected 
that for the second consecutive year, the fall in the GDP 
of the former GDR will be 15 to 20 %.  In a new assess-
ment of the German economy the OECD ( 1991) notes: 
'In the event, the full and abrupt exposure of the struc-
turally weak Eastern German economy to competition 
both from Western Germany and from abroad in com-
bination  with  strong  pressure  for  wage  convergence 
have resulted in  a  virtual collapse of production and 
employment in the five new Lander.' 
According to Akerlof et al.  ( 1991 ),  there are two main 
reasons for the depression affecting the former GDR. 
First,  the  exchange  rate  at  which  German  monetary 
union occurred has put a price-cost squeeze on firms 
because of the wages paid to workers. Second, demand 
has shifted away from Eastern goods, both because of a 
shift from Eastern to Western goods by Eastern consum-
ers, and because of falling demand from CMEA coun-
tries. The shift in consumption was partly because of  the 
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ly  expensive, but also  arose from  the  perception of a 
quality  gap  between  Eastern  and  Western  products. 
There was, though, less of a consumption boom in the 
East than had been expected in some quarters. A third 
factor  mentioned  by  the  OECO  and  highlighted  in 
research carried out by the Technical University of Ber-
lin  for  this  study  is  administrative  and  institutional 
problems. 
In assessing the  relevance  of the  German example  in 
understanding how economic integration might  affect 
the Community, it is useful, first, to consider the extent 
to which it provides a model for what might happen in 
the EC as a whole. The changes in Germany consisted of 
an immediate shift from two entirely separate and quite 
different economies and political systems into a single 
political and economic entity (in this context, the short 
delay  between monetary union and full  unification is 
immaterial). This differs radically from what is in pros-
pect for the EC in three crucial respects: 
(i)  it  is  inconceivable  within sensible  time horizons 
that the Community will become a single political 
unit as  in  Germany, so  that Member States will 
continue to play a central role in policy; 
(ii)  the transition will be protracted and will proceed by 
stages; 
(iii) systems of income support on the scale available to 
the new Lander will not be in place. 
The  scale  of the  economic  problems  facing  the  new 
Lander also  has  to  be  highlighted.  Although,  in  the 
language of Section 2.1,  nominal and policy converg-
ence were attained virtually overnight, while real con-
vergence is  being advanced by transfers, the economic 
problems  facing  the  new  Lander centre  primarily  on 
changing its economic structure and behavioural char-
acteristics:  what we  have called structural and behav-
ioural convergence.  Since this  includes  building up a 
market economy virtually from scratch, it is very diffe-
rent in degree from the challenge faced by the Member 
States. Compared with the magnitude of the challenges 
in Germany, EC integration is more modest in its ambi-
tions and starts from a more auspicious position. 
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In Germany, apart from the overriding political objec-
tive of consolidating the unification, an important aim 
of  policy has been to slow the outflow of  labour from the 
East, both to avoid political and social problems and to 
limit economic disruption. This has required a vast flow 
of transfers  from  West  to  East  in  order  to  provide 
income support. Although capital inflows have occurred 
and emigration has been persistent, neither factor flow 
has been sufficiently large or rapid to prevent the rise in 
unemployment, and it is now clear that structural action 
will  take  a  considerable  time  to  work.  Transfer pay-
ments have, therefore, been the principal policy instru-
ment used to assure  social and economic cohesion in 
Germany, though  the growing political unrest  associ-
ated with rising unemployment in the East (and resent-
ment of  the fiscal burden in the West) demonstrates that 
use of  such payments is not a recipe for social and polit-
ical  harmony,  even  if standards  of living  are  safe-
guarded. 
The fiscal capacity of the new Lander has been subject-
ed to a double squeeze, from declining receipts and ris-
ing  demands.  Public  transfers  from  the  West  have, 
therefore been crucial. In 1990, these amounted to OM 
45  billion, and are expected to be around OM 100 bil-
lion in 1991, about half of  which has gone on infrastruc-
ture, the rest on income support. To put these numbers 
in perspective, this is roughly the same order of magni-
tude as the entire EC budget for 1991. Subsidized credit 
programmes have also been substantial. 
Akerlof et  al.  reach  the  interesting conclusion  that a 
sensible  short-term  policy  response  now would  be  to 
introduce a wage  subsidy. They argue that this would 
not only have a low budgetary cost, since there would be 
lower outlays from other budget heads, but would also 
be  'self-eliminating' because it  would foster economic 
development.  Longer-term,  economic  regeneration  is 
the obvious way forward, but since the capacity of resi-
dents of the East to generate  the savings that will  be 
needed to restructure is weak and falling, investment in 
the East will necessitate substantial capital imports. In 
addition, major efforts will be needed to improve pro-
ductivity,  business  organization  and  the  legal  and 
regulatory framework. 
For EMU, the main lesson from the German experience 
is that if the pace of integration is too rapid, the prob-
lems must be expected to be more intense. Integration 
may  cause  significant  dislocation  in  regions  where 
major structural change is required in order to fit  into the  integrated  economy.  In  the  short-term,  this  may 
engender a rise in unemployment as well  as  making a 
proportion of the capital stock redundant. If this hap-
pens and there are low social and political barriers to 
mobility, migration may accelerate. A key point to note 
about such a scenario is that the problems arise before 
the benefits begin to flow. 
For this reason, cohesion policies have to be a priority 
from the outset and should be implemented early in the 
process of  integration. In Germany, it has become abun-
dantly  clear  that  structural  policies  are  not  enough, 
hence the scale of the transfers to support current con-
sumption. However, developments in Germany are so 
different in character that the parallels are limited. 
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During the 1990s several developments which are cur-
rently in the pipeline caq be expected to affect cohesion 
in the EC. Many of these, such as the advent of the sin-
gle  market or the accession of East Germany are well 
documented,  though  not  necessarily  properly  under-
stood. The prospective impact of  EMU or of  a widening 
of Community membership is  rather more speculative 
since the eventual terms of any agreements can only be 
guessed. These factors have in common that they will 
cause structural changes in markets and in supply rela-
tionships between different regions of the Community. 
Various additional factors will come into play in paral-
lel with these already mentioned to affect cohesion. The 
various influences on cohesion are summarized in Fig-
ure 7, which sets out a framework for understanding the 
factors that will affect it in the 1990s. 
Figure 7:  Influences on cohesion in the 1990s 
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All four factors in the figure have endogenous as well as 
exogenous elements to them. The way in which the pro-
cess of integration is  found to operate will  itself affect 
further political developments, the nature of economic 
restructuring, the process of innovation and the degree 
to which the population decides to relocate.  What we 
can hope to do at this stage is  isolate those exogenous 
factors which will affect the 1990s whatever happens in 
the process of integration and then discuss  the likely 
range  of influences  that are  not  independently  deter-
mined.  Thus,  although  the  political  and  economic 
changes being discussed by the two intergovernmental 
conferences are bound to be at centre-stage in the future 
of the Community, they are by no means the only pros-
pective political developments that will affect cohesion. 
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How events in Eastern Europe unfold (graphically illus-
trated  by  the  troubles  in  Yugoslavia  and  the  Soviet 
Union), the resolution of the  Uruguay Round, or the 
emergence of new  topics,  such as  concern for the en-
vironment, on the political agenda are examples. 
These will  be complemented by and will  engender an 
assortment of economic trends. Any GATT agreement 
can be expected to usher in new competitive conditions 
for the textiles and agricultural sectors, with dispropor-
tionate  effects  on  certain  regions.  In  many  regional 
economies, the growth of the services sector will conti-
nue  to  be  a  central  feature.  In  parallel,  as  business 
adapts to the fact of  a single market in Europe, the tend-
ency  for  businesses  to  reorganize  on a  pan-European 
basis will be reinforced so that the competitive attribut-
es of different locations will come under scrutiny. This 
will interact with the underlying trend in the corporate 
sector for a spatial separation of functions within orga-
nizations:  some  regions  are more attractive for  back-
-office  functions;  others  offer  better  conditions  for 
R&D. 
A shift towards high-technology manufacturing process-
es  and more  research-based  activity will  alter labour 
demand, putting a premium on skills and higher qualifi-
cations. As a result, a Europe-wide labour market is like-
ly in key occupations. Labour supply will be affected by 
demographic changes, notably the ageing of the popula-
tion  in  many  Northern  countries,  but  also  by  social 
changes  such  as  the  increasing  participation  rate  of 
females.  Migratory flows  will  affect the availability of 
different types of  labour and will also have social conse-
quences which enter into the cohesion debate, especially 
if racial tensions are exacerbated. 
The  current  discussions  in  the  intergovernmental 
conferences under the heading of political union can, 
themselves, be seen as part of  the process of  cohesion by 
ensuring that the issue of  cohesion is sufficiently promi-
nent on the Community's agenda. The effect of econo-
mic  integration  on the  standard of living  or level  of 
unemployment in a region is likely to be viewed diffe-
rently by  the  local  population from  changes  that are 
largely the result of local actions and decisions. Even if 
the eventual policy response is the same, it is important 
to have the recognition by the Community that it, rather 
than national or regional government, is the appropriate 
tier of government to assume responsibility where nec-
essary. How such decisions are arrived at, or are seen to 
have  been  arrived  at,  affect  their legitimacy  and  are 
important arguments behind the principle of subsidiar-
ity.  The justification for subsidiarity is  in part a ques-
tion of economics,  involving efficiency and the treat-
ment  of externalities.  But  the  major justification  for moving  responsibility  to  the  lowest  possible  level  of 
government  in  circumstances  where  the  economic 
arguments are relatively unaffected by  the decision is 
that locally agreed actions tend to be more popular and 
generate  an  increased  chance  of  an  enthusiastic 
response and a wish to participate. 
This chapter looks  first  at how the single  market and 
EMU are expected to affect cohesion, then goes on to 
discuss a range of  other significant factors. It starts with 
a discussion of demographic change and migration and 
goes  on to cover several of the other topics shown in 
Figure 7. 
3.1.  From the  single  market  to  economic 
and monetary union 
The  acceleration of the pace  of economic  integration 
that will follow from the advent of  the single market and 
progress towards EMU will be critical in shaping cohe-
sion. Economies which have been able to shelter behind 
protective barriers such as preferential public procure-
ment will face new competition, while the competitive 
advantages of  alternative locations will be more careful-
ly  scrutinized. Monetary union entails fixed  exchange 
rates and ultimately a single currency. There will, even-
tually,  be  a  single  monetary  policy  for  the  Member 
States  and  constraints  on  the  use  of fiscal  policy. 
Behaviour will be affected by the change in the currency 
regime  and by  the changes  in macroeconomic policy 
that accompany it. On the whole, it is assumed that the 
effect will  be  to exert a tighter fiscal  discipline which 
will  make it more difficult for countries to use  deficit 
spending to respond to internal imbalance. 
Assessments of  how the completion of  the internal mar-
ket  will  affect regional disparities have generally con-
cluded that favoured regions would have more to gain 
(at least in the short to medium term) than the periphe-
ral or other weaker regions (see, for example, the report 
ofNam and his colleagues at IFO to the European Par-
liament,  1991 ).  There are  bound to  be  exceptions  to 
this,  not  least  because  the  way  in  which  investment 
flows will adapt to the new circumstances is hard to pre-
dict. It is important to emphasize, however, that com-
pletion of the internal market is an incremental process 
in  which  many of the  main  measures  are  already  in 
place, while the effects of others will only filter through 
gradually.  This  distinguishes  it from  monetary union 
which, if and when it comes, will be more in the nature 
of a 'Big Bang', although once it is agreed that a mone-
tary union will  occur, there is  sure to be an extended 
transition as economic agents adjust their behaviour in 
anticipation  of the  change  of regime.  Moreover,  the 
point of stage two of the Delors Plan is  to engineer a 
gradual  nominal convergence  so  that when  monetary 
union actually occurs, the 'bang' will not be as big as it 
might be. 
Centripetal and centrifugal forces will also apply in rela-
tion to EMU, and will be reinforced by convergence in 
certain  macroeconomic  indicators  such  as  inflation 
rates and thus in the stance of macroeconomic policy. 
Countries like Greece, Belgium and Italy which current-
ly have substantial budget deficits, will have to imple-
ment large shifts in their fiscal stances in order to con-
form to the disciplines of  EMU. For such countries, the 
burden of adjustment will, thus, be relatively greater. If 
this means a prolonged period of slower growth while 
budgetary positions are brought into line, it could result 
in a widening of  disparities. Although the mechanism in 
this case is  macroeconomic, the incidence of cohesion 
problems may be felt in particular regions. 
3  .1.1.  The single market 
There is a widespread faith that once impediments to 
the free movement of  goods, services, labour and capital 
are removed, regions will specialize according to their 
comparative advantages, and that all  regions will thus 
gain from the single market. Under this scenario, there 
would be an upsurge in interregional trade and speciali-
zation,  because  barriers  holding  it  back  would  be 
removed.  Less  favoured  regions  would  gain  because 
their lower relative wages would attract external capital 
investment, especially  in labour-intensive production, 
and improved infrastructure and lower transport costs 
would  widen the markets they could supply competi-
tively.  In  principle,  labour  mobility  would  also  be 
enhanced since higher wages  in areas of capital abun-
dance would attract workers to migrate. 
An alternative viewpoint is that the competitiveness of 
regions will come under the microscope and that those 
which are shown to be most competitive will gain at the 
expense of the less competitive because the latter's pro-
tection has been removed. This could happen as a result 
of economies of scale or the capacity for the strongest 
firms to achieve dominant market positions - outcomes 
that are assumed away under the 'neo-classical' theory 
which underpins the comparative advantage approach. 
Since existing disparities tend to reflect inherited and 
current  characteristics  of  regions,  there  are  good 
grounds for believing that integration will reinforce the 
competitiveness of strong regions and undermine that 
of  weaker regions, notably those on the periphery of  the 
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motion and thus run counter to cohesion objectives. 
The study by Nam et al. (1991) for the European Parlia-
ment explores the inherent competitiveness of the lag-
ging regions through a survey of  business and concludes 
that only four such regions - Valencia, Murcia, Abruzzi 
and Molise - have potentially good development pros-
pects.  Seven  further  regions  have  'open'  prospects  -
national centres in Greece and Portugal, Puglia, Anda-
lusia, Canary Islands, Northern Ireland, Ireland-while 
the other Objective 1 regions have problems which are 
likely to worsen. It is immediately apparent that there is 
a strong correlation between the extent of existing dis-
parities and the expectation that problems will worsen; 
all the regions in the bottom 1  0 % of the EC in terms of 
income per head are in this 'tending' to worsen category. 
The position for Objective 5b and 2 regions, according 
to this analysis, is much more promising. The majority 
have potentially good prospects and only two in the case 
of  Objective 5b-Highlands and Islands and rural Wales 
-and four in the case of Objective 2- Basque country, 
Cantabria, Lorraine and North-East Wales- have prob-
lems which are likely to worsen. Part of the problem is 
that the comparative advantage of many of these disad-
vantaged regions lies in industries like clothing and food 
whose prospects are not good;  in the case of clothing, 
because of the threat from the developing world as the 
barriers under the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) are 
dismantled, and in the case of food, because of the way 
the industry is restructuring towards the more modern 
technically advanced and high quality products. Thus, 
even if they are successful in attracting investment in 
industries where low cost is an advantage, they are then 
disproportionately exposed to exchange rate and other 
costs,  giving  them  asymmetric  adjustment  problems. 
This emphasizes their structural divergence rather than 
leading to greater convergence. 
If the pattern of integration of recent years is  a good 
guide, much ofthe growth encouraged by 1992 will be in 
intra-industry trade- the two-way flow of intermediate 
and final goods and services between regions of similar 
industrial structure. These are markets from which most 
disadvantaged regions will  be  largely excluded if they 
continue to specialize in existing traditional activities 
such as textiles, heavy industry or agri-business. Faster 
growth in better-off regions, based on trade creation be-
tween their industries, may increase the derived demand 
for other regions' products, but it will not directly assist 
them unless they can change their industrial structures 
relatively quickly. 
40 
The EC Commission's own assessment of  the impact of 
the  internal  market  (Buigues  et  al.,  1990)  tends  to 
favour the intra-industry scenario. The study examines 
the prospects for each country in 40 industrial sectors 
judged to be particularly sensitive to completion of the 
internal market. It paints a mixed picture of the imme-
diate prospects for the four less favoured countries. Ire-
land, with only a small proportion of employment in 
sensitive sectors which are reckoned to be uncompeti-
tive, has little to gain or lose. It is also argued that, as a 
small  market  where  transport  costs  restrict  foreign 
access, Ireland has a natural protective barrier, although 
this is clearly also a problem for Irish exporters. Spain 
and Portugal have most of their employment in indus-
tries  unaffected  by  the  single  market  or competitive 
within it, but their external trade is in deficit and areas 
of strength are in labour-intensive or commodity-based 
industries where demand growth will be slow and extra-
EC competition intense. Greece has a high proportion 
of employment  in sensitive  industries which  are cur-
rently heavily protected and inefficient and it is again 
competitive only in slow-growing markets. 
In the service sectors most affected by the single market, 
there is  likely  to  be  a  trade-off in the  effects  on the 
Objective 1 regions. Financial and business services, for 
example, will almost certainly become more efficient as 
a  result  of competitive  pressures,  thereby  providing 
users of these services with better quality at lower cost. 
But there may be a shakeout in some of  the less compe-
titive financial entities which will lead to job losses (PA 
Cambridge Economic Consultants, 1990). It is  not yet 
clear what proportion of  the output of  these hitherto lit-
tle-traded  industries  is  actually  tradable  in  practice. 
Although headquarters of major service organizations 
have been relocated out of the main centres of popula-
tion in the higher income Member States to exploit the 
lower location costs that modern IT systems permit, it is 
not yet clear that they would take one step further and 
relocate in other countries where problems of language 
are added. 
Although Greece, Spain and Portugal have been granted 
some derogations which will delay the impact of  the sin-
gle  market on some of their less-developed industries 
(notably financial services), other policy instruments to 
be abandoned as the single market is completed are of 
great importance to disadvantaged regions. In particu-
lar, preferential public purchasing has been used to pro-
vide stable and 'high-quality' demand to new industries, 
and subsidies used  to help firms  grow,  modernize or 
restructure. For Objective 2 and 5b regions, the issues are rather dif-
ferent. As the fourth periodic report notes, they do not 
at first  sight  appear to be vulnerable to restructuring 
induced  by  1992,  because  their  markets  are  already 
open (Commission of  the European Communities, 1991 
b). However, these regions still have relative concentra-
tions of declining or slow-growing sectors and of medi-
um-sized firms ripe for rationalization. A notable prob-
lem for the Objective 2 regions in dealing with the sin-
gle market will be their poor record in innovation which 
is the legacy of  earlier decline. Some of  these regions will 
also  be  affected by the opening up of public procure-
ment for equipment for utilities (Cegos-Idet,  1989). 
In  the  financial  and  business  services  sectors,  few 
Objective  2  regions  possess  major  financial  centres, 
though  there  are  several  second-tier  centres  in  these 
regions.  Agglomeration economies will,  however,  tend 
to concentrate major financial entities in leading inter-
national centres, posing a further threat to the Objective 
2 regions. Again, the challenge they face is how best to 
move towards new specializations. 
Diffusion  of the  gains  from  the  single  market  will 
depend partly on patterns of investment, so that inward 
investment will be an important element in cohesion. It 
produces  benefits  both  as  an  immediate  source  of 
employment and income and as  a means of acquiring 
new technologies and labour skills useful in the longer 
term.  Such  fixed  investment  may  take  the  form  of 
'green-field' developments, or of acquisition of (or joint 
venture with) a local enterprise which results in capital 
input from outside. As well as investment by European 
firms spreading or relocating their activities, there has 
been substantial investment by Japanese and American 
companies seeking to position themselves for the com-
pletion of the single market. Both trends seem likely to 
continue, Japanese firms, in particular, having targeted 
certain activities for expansion in Europe, with plans to 
extend their location to more Member States. 
In attracting  inward  investment,  lagging  or declining 
regions generally suffer from an undersupply of 'hard' 
infrastructure (short- and long-range transport, commu-
nication, energy) and 'soft' infrastructure (human capi-
tal,  cultural and leisure facilities).  This has left  them 
with an under-representation of large internationalized 
companies  and  an  over-representation  of  localized 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which will 
face the strongest competitive and takeover threats after 
1992 (IFO, 1991 ). There is, however, evidence of mar-
ked differences between different regions in their attrac-
tiveness  to  inward  investment.  Amongst  Objective  1 
regions,  Ireland, parts of Spain and Portugal seem to 
have been more successful than Greece or the South of 
Italy.  Some of the Objective 2 regions  such as  South 
Wales have benefited more than others. 
The 1992 programme is a complex process of  legislative 
change, which will induce behavioural change as well as 
responses by regulatory institutions and the regulated as 
the system evolves. Six years after the programme was 
announced, most of the changes are still to take place 
and initial evidence reveals relatively little about what 
is likely to happen. Mayes et al. (  1991) who undertook a 
study of manufacturing industry across the whole of  the 
Community as  a follow-up  to  the work on individual 
countries by  Buigues  et al.  ( 1990)  found  that, on the 
whole,  the  expected  changes  to  costs  and  behaviour 
were much less than might have been expected from the 
theoretical analyses in the Cecchini Report and its relat-
ed studies (published in European Economy, No 35 and 
'The costs of non-Europe').  This was  in  part because 
some legislative changes had not yet occurred, like tax 
harmonization, in part because responses were yet to be 
observed, like changes in public purchasing behaviour, 
and in part because technical cost reductions were not 
available in practice, either because of the pace of tech-
nical change (as in engineering) or because of sunk costs 
(as in the case of railways,  where tunnels and bridges 
would  have  to  be  replaced  to  achieve  full  standard-
ization). 
This does not mean that rapid changes were not occur-
ring (at least in some branches) in European industry, as 
indicated by  the mergers  and acquisitions boom,  for 
example, but that many of  these changes were driven by 
wider global considerations. In this context, therefore, 
there was no indication that the relative position of the 
disadvantaged regions would play much role in deter-
mining company strategy.  The trend towards concen-
tration both of  ownership and activity was clear and this 
focused on existing industrial areas rather than on the 
less favoured regions. The scale of change offers some 
hope for some Objective 2 regions but in general the 
prospects  in  manufacturing  are  not  encouraging  for 
cohesion as a result of the single market. Unfortunately 
Mayes et al. ( 1991) do not cover services and a smaller 
parallel study for the Commission will not be completed 
for some time. 
The  single  market  will  open  up  opportunities  where 
none previously existed because of regulatory barriers. 
It will change the scope of  opportunities by altering rela-
tive prices and relative costs and will enable factors to 
move as well as products. On the whole, the removal of 
effective prohibitions will tend to work against the less 
favoured regions because they are not the best sources 
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therefore shift towards the more general pattern of  com-
petitive products, for example. Relative price shifts may 
be more minor than hoped for and, as Nam et al.  sug-
gest, inward flows of private capital in an open market 
seem to offer only a limited opportunity and one which 
tends to be concentrated in just a few areas. 
One  might,  therefore,  expect  that  the  market  might 
equilibrate the other way  round by  labour moving to 
where it can get better rates of  return, now that the diffi-
culties are being reduced with the mutual recognition of 
qualifications, the ability to move families as well as the 
employed person through transferability of  benefits and 
eligibility for benefits in the new location. However, this 
does not seem to be the case except where the economic 
disparities are extreme or the cultural and language dif-
ferences small- the best known examples being Ireland 
to the UK and East to West Germany. In  so  far as the 
social dimension of the completion of the internal mar-
ket leads to increased wage  and non-wage labour costs 
in the low cost areas, this may discourage the movement 
of capital somewhat, thereby exacerbating the problem 
of providing employment but increasing the incentive 
to move.  In  general,  the  movement  of labour,  ceteris 
paribus,  might  be  thought  to  ease  problems  of low 
income and high unemployment, but the general tend-
ency is for the more qualified and productive to move, 
thus  increasing  dependency  ratios  in  the  areas  they 
leave from and decreasing rather than increasing aver-
age incomes. It is thus perhaps fortunate that this side of 
the completion of the internal market seems to be hav-
ing little impact. 
In some respects, the absence of migration can be seen 
as an indicator of cohesion. However, given the great 
impediments to migration, it is not a convincing indica-
tor and since major changes would be a signal of severe 
rather than marginal problems, it is also a bad indicator 
to use, as it is biased and masks the extent of the pro-
blem. 
3.1.2.  Economic and monetary union 
Four major forms of  impact on regional cohesion result-
ing from EMU can be readily distinguished: 
(i)  microeconomic costs and efficiency gains; 
(ii)  macroeconomic costs and benefits from increased 
stability and reduced adjustment mechanisms; 
(iii)  the reform of public finance; 
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(iv)  transition costs. 
Taking these in turn, there is common agreement that 
there will  be cost and efficiency gains throughout the 
Community as  a  result  of EMU because  transaction 
costs will be reduced where foreign exchange is no long-
er required. There will no longer be the need to hedge 
against currency fluctuation within the EC, which will 
also  reduce  costs.  Furthermore,  since  one  cause  of 
uncertainty is reduced we can also expect an increase in 
investment in the future which will tend to increase the 
rate of  growth in the Community thus providing a dyna-
mic gain rather than just a step improvement in costs. 
These remarks assume that EMU goes the full distance 
to the adoption of the ecu as  the single currency. If it 
stops short at 'fixed' exchange rates, leaving open the 
possibility  of future  exchange-rate  changes,  the  costs 
will be higher because currencies would still need to be 
exchanged and the credibility of the scheme enduring 
will be lower. The result will be larger interest rate pre-
miums for the weaker States with consequent changes in 
their macroeconomic policies. 
These efficiency gains are very much on a par in concep-
tual  terms with the gains from  lower transport costs, 
decreased bureaucracy and lower cost of  capital likely to 
stem from the single market, which also provides bene-
fits  for  enterprises and consumers in all  regions  with 
both static and dynamic elements to them. The extent of 
the benefits in each region will depend upon the pattern 
of their transactions - the larger  the  proportion that 
involves  other Community currencies  the greater the 
gain. The Commission's assessment of the benefits in 
'One market, one money' (Commission of  the European 
Communities,  1990b)  suggests  gains  to  individual 
Member States in the range 0.1  to over 1 % of GOP, 
with an EC average of 0.3 to 0.4 %. 
One implication of these changes is that, with a single 
financial  market,  the  least  favoured  regions  actually 
have most to gain as their ability to raise funds locally 
will have been weakest. However, it is by no means clear 
what will  happen to the capital account of regions in 
EMU.  Most  analysis  restricts  itself  to  the  current 
account and to inward direct investment. If prospects 
seem better in stronger regions,  then portfolio capital 
will  tend  to  flow  out  if  investment  barriers  fall. 
Although  this  will  be  offset  by  the  resulting  income 
flows in the longer term, it will exacerbate the short-term 
adjustment problems. In the same way, iflending is seen 
to be riskier in the less favoured regions, both the avail-
ability and terms of credit will be constrained. Opening 
up may give access to new sources of finance but it also 
makes the operation of favouring local businesses more difficult. There have been complaints in Germany, for 
example, that local banks are turning towards the lure of 
international opportunities at the expense of the per-
ceived role of assisting the local market. Thus, although 
there is a clear general microeconomic benefit, it is not 
clear  whether  the  relative  benefit  for  less  favoured 
regions will be positive or negative. 
To set against these microeconomic benefits there are 
technical costs of change. For example, it has been esti-
mated that it  might take  10  years  of full-time  use  of 
available minting capacity if the Communities' coinage 
is to be changed. In the transition period, it will be nec-
essary to run in the new accounting systems in parallel 
and vending machines might need to be modified.  In 
general these transition costs come first  and the gains 
from longer-term cost reductions second. Similarly, one 
of the  less  trumpeted  findings  of the  'Cost  of non-
Europe'  research  that  fed  into  the  Cecchini  Report 
( 1988)  was  that  there  would  be  some  initial  loss  of 
employment before the dynamic gains emerge. This jux-
taposition of short-term costs and longer-term benefits 
is, in itself, an anti-cohesive pattern since the ideal pat-
tern  for  improved  cohesion  is  continuing  favourable 
movement  which  demonstrates  that  the  changes  are 
beneficial.  If there  is  a  perception  that  integration 
imposes costs, however short-lived, the political consen-
sus for the change may be threatened. For these reasons, 
there  are  discussions  afoot  for  reducing  the  costs  of 
ECU transactions at an early stage of the transition. 
These  microeconomic  costs  and  benefits  are  not, 
however, the main focus of  concern about the impact of 
EMU on cohesion. They are relatively small in size for 
most enterprises and few  suggestions have been made 
that  they  will  increase  regional  disparities.  It  is  the 
macroeconomic  aspects  which  attract  attention.  The 
particular form of management of EMU proposed for 
the Community will have the control of price inflation 
top of its agenda. Optimists expect European inflation 
to converge on the lowest current rates. However, even 
pessimists  recognize  that there will  be  major falls  in 
inflation for those countries with higher rates. The com-
mon feature of both positions is that EMU entails con-
siderable  convergence  of nominal  magnitudes  in  the 
economy. Indeed, given the way the EC  appears to be 
intending to implement EMU, Member States have to 
demonstrate  considerable  convergence  to  a  common 
level before the final two  stages of implementation of 
the new system can be  put in place.  In particular, the 
extent to which governments borrow, and the scale of 
external deficits, will have to be made consistent with 
the common target of low inflation. 
Achieving this convergence will pose considerable prob-
lems  of adjustment  for  some  Member  States,  since 
reducing inflation, borrowing requirements and exter-
nal deficits, and stabilizing debt all usually entail defla-
tion. Slowing growth in States already well below aver-
age  Community levels  of GOP  can  only  exacerbate 
short-term disparities,  even  if it is  a  prescription for 
long-term  convergence.  Because  voter  preferences 
reflect short-term as well as long-term wishes, this could 
have a major impact on cohesion and might well  call 
into question the achievability of EMU for  the entire 
Community in the foreseeable future. 
This degree of nominal convergence has no real coun-
. terpart. Real variables such as GOP per capita and the 
rate of economic growth are not likely to be included in 
the measures of  convergence and, furthermore, it is clear 
from  previous  work  (e.g.  MacDougall,  1977;  Delors 
Report,  1989) that many existing federal  and  unitary 
States operate with far higher discrepancies in real varia-
bles. There is thus not only no requirement to have real 
convergence to reach EMU, but there is no direct econo-
mic  link  which  would  suggest  that  the  one  tends  to 
induce the other. Indeed, as we have already noted, the 
transition to EMU may entail a widening of  existing dis-
parities and the operation of common policies  could 
result in their continuance. 
As a rule, the higher the current inflation the greater the 
expected fall. It is generally accepted that unpredictable 
inflation is  undesirable as  it redistributes inequitably 
between  sectors  in the  economy  and  that  since  total 
indexation is  difficult  to achieve  and  likely  to cause 
instability, that convergence on a low rate of inflation is 
generally desirable. In this case, therefore, less favoured 
regions which lie within countries with current inflation 
problems can be expected to experience some sources of 
gain  relative  to  those  whose  countries  have  already 
lowered their inflation rates satisfactorily. They would, 
so to speak, be able to remove a nominal disparity and 
as a result experience an opportunity for extra activity 
which could help remove the real disparities. 
Some economic models posit even greater gains, as they 
treat inflation as a cost and argue that inflation inhibits 
economic growth (particularly as a result of the econo-
mic policies commonly used to control it). This view is 
not universally shared. Some feel that the great empha-
sis on keeping inflation down actually imparts a defla-
tionary bias to the system, slowing the rate of growth. 
Even so, the equity and efficiency gains might outweigh 
the deflationary costs. Evidence set out in the National 
Institute Economic Review of November 1990 suggests 
that the deflationary costs for France and Italy of  trying 
to maintain their exchange rate with the DM within the 
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three-quarter million unemployed. This may be a tran-
sitional,  rather than a  permanent cost,  but that tran-
sitional period may be very long. Work currently in pro-
gress at NIESR indicates that this same finding applies 
to the other Member States. 
The particular mechanism for gain that most people see 
is that the risk premiums that borrowers in the weaker 
currency areas pay in their interest rates will be substan-
tially reduced. Evidence from existing monetary unions 
suggests  that they  will  not necessarily  be  eliminated. 
This fall in the cost of capital, added to those from the 
opening of  financial markets as part of  economic union, 
should stimulate the growth of the whole Community 
through increased investment. However, as  'One mar-
ket, one money' points out, real interest rates in higher 
inflation countries like Portugal and Greece have actu-
ally been below the average in the Community. As they 
manage to bring down their inflation rates, greater con-
vergence of  real as well as nominal rates is likely, it is far 
from clear for these two States, whose regions tend to be 
the most disadvantaged in the EC, that the interest rate 
effect will be positive. 
As Mr Karl Otto Pohl, the former Chairman of  the Bun-
desbank, has observed, a single interest rate may be bad 
for less favoured regions. On the one hand, they may be 
able to operate with lower real rates and, on the other, 
they may be able to weather adjustment problems more 
easily by allowing rates to vary. By this argument, EMU 
would not be  suitable for  such regions  until they had 
achieved sufficient behavioural convergence with their 
more favoured partners. (These remarks are of course 
only yet another way of saying that the EC may not yet 
be an optimal currency area.) If  EMU still goes ahead 
because of  the extent of  benefit for those that have read-
justed, then the consequential requirement to compen-
sate those who have not achieved this 'behavioural con-
vergence' will be high on the agenda. 
The Commission also  argues that increased monetary 
stability  is  likely  to  lead  to  increased  real  stability. 
Increased stability helps people plan for the future with 
more certainty, reducing the need to hold precautionary 
reserves for unexpected fluctuations, hence also contri-
buting to the growth process. Such an expectation would 
be disputed by those who believe that there are under-
lying cycles to economic behaviour. In such a case coun-
ter-cyclical policy, rather than stable policy, may tend to 
produce the best  result.  It  is  difficult  to produce evi-
dence to resolve this difference of  opinion. The improv-
ed growth path of the second half of the 1980s is cited 
by some as is the better relative performance, over an 
extended period, of  Germany whose monetary regime is 
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in a large part the model for the proposed European sys-
tem. 
We thus observe two potential adverse effects on cohe-
sion. If  there is a deflationary bias, then average unem-
ployment will tend to be higher - that in itself lowers 
cohesion  between  the  employed  and  the  rest  of the 
population. Secondly, unemployment tends to rise most 
in the weakest areas, hence exacerbating existing dispa-
rities. Of course EMU may decrease unemployment if 
its favourable effects on output exceed those on produc-
tivity  and  if increased  real  incomes  diminish  labour 
supply. 
However, the major macroeconomic worry is that EMU 
restricts the ability of disadvantaged regions to adjust. 
In most economies, labour markets are slow to adjust. 
Hence if there is a shock to the system, say in the form 
of an increase in oil prices, other markets will overact-
just in  the short-term until the labour market catches 
up. If  the required adjustment is a fall in real wages then 
this can be assisted by a short-term fall in the exchange 
rate and some extra inflation. 
This will  only work for a larger monetary union if all 
parts of it require the same degree of exchange-rate and 
inflation adjustment. A monetary union enforces a con-
siderable  degree  of inflation  and  price  convergence. 
Because goods and people can move freely and all prices 
are expressed in the same currency, arbitrage and mi-
gration will limit differentials. Such nominal converg-
ence does not necessarily improve cohesion because it 
may entail wide differences in real incomes and unem-
ployment for its achievement. 
Two other forms of  convergence also have to be consider-
ed in this context. The first is structural convergence. If 
the economic structure of  regions differs, with some spe-
cializing in  particular industries,  and  some  based  on 
natural resources, they respond differently to the same 
shock. For example, fishing quotas have a disproportion-
ate  effect  on  regions  employing  deep-sea  fishermen. 
The difference most frequently pointed out is that be-
tween oil producers and oil importers in response to an 
oil-price shock. 
The second component is behavioural convergenoe. As 
a result of long-standing traditions and cultures, people 
and organizations respond differently to the same cir-
cumstances.  Family support in adversity is  greater in 
some parts of the Community than in others, while the 
propensity to save windfall gains varies, etc. The study 
of French and Italian wage and price formation in the 
National Institute Economic Review of  November 1990 cited above shows how slow labour markets may be to 
converge. Taken together, these two components of  con-
vergence mean that, despite the regulatory framework 
of an EMU, outcomes are not uniform. The restrictions 
on policy intervention and response mechanisms that 
follow  from  EMU  will,  therefore,  have  the  greatest 
impact on those  regions  which  differ  most  from  the 
Community average  in terms of structures and beha-
viour. This tends to apply to the regions which are cur-
rently least favoured. 
Research at NIESR published in A strategy for the ECU 
(NIESR,  1990) suggests that as  time passes and inte-
gration increases, the differences in response to shocks 
among the main Member States are diminishing. Ten 
years ago  the response of the UK and Italy to an oil-
price shock was very different from that of France and 
Germany, making the extra flexibility of an adjustable 
exchange rate well worth having.  Now, as  the import-
ance of oil production has diminished and trade with 
Europe has increased, these economies are much more 
similar.  The NIESR results  suggest  that by  the  mid-
-1990s the differences among the Member States will be 
such  that  the  benefits  from  having  an  adjustable 
exchange rate would be too small to provide a realistic 
reason for rejecting EMU on these grounds given the 
microeconomic  gains.  There  might,  nevertheless  be 
other grounds for questioning the gains from EMU, for 
instance if the costs of transition are too high. 
However, all this analysis refers to Member States and 
indeed  only  to  some  of them  directly.  In  countries 
where there are significant internal disparities, the less 
favoured regions have already had to cope with being 
part of  an economic and monetary union. Despite contin-
uing  regional  disparities  this  has  generally  proved 
acceptable in EC Member States. Cohesion thus seems 
to exist in most of those cases.  It must be recognized, 
though, that public finance transfers from favoured to 
less favoured regions within Member States will already 
have mitigated the degree of disparity. 
The question,  therefore,  is  whether regions  currently 
less  favoured  within a  Member State's  EMU will  be 
more  or  less  disadvantaged  by  joining  an  EC-wide 
EMU. That is clearly difficult to answer. If the region's 
characteristics  are  more  similar  to  the  Community 
norm than is its Member State then it may gain. If  it is 
even less  like  it then the forces  of divergence will  be 
enhanced. On the whole, regions which are most dissim-
ilar also tend to be the least favoured. As  a result, the 
adverse effects of EMU are likely to be greatest for the 
less favoured regions in less favoured Member States. 
By contrast, some of the relatively advantaged regions 
ed Member States, because they are joining a monetary 
union where the stance of policy may suit them better, 
may be net gainers, providing a twist to the process of 
cohesion. 
Within Member States, the less favoured regions tend to 
run substantial balance of  payments deficits and, in effect, 
run  substantial  fiscal  deficits  for  their  local  admin-
istrations  because  local  funds  are  supplemented  by 
central government revenues. Furthermore, the tax and 
benefit system as a whole redistributes from the richer 
to the poorer reducing the problems of supporting local 
incomes from local resources. 
According to the MacDougall Report ( 1977), taxation 
and public expenditure reduced regional inequalities in 
per capita income  in the countries studied by  about 
40 % on average. Within EMU for the Community as a 
whole, a similar form of behaviour is not available to 
Member States. States will not be permitted to run large 
and persistent deficits in order to obtain 'involuntary' 
transfers from the rest of the Community and the con-
tributions from the richer to the poorer within the Com-
munity budget may in future not extend much beyond 
current levels which amount to around 3 to 5 % of  GDP 
in recipient countries. This falls far short of the 2 % of 
Community  GDP the  MacDougall  Report  estimated 
would have to be transferred from the six richer to the 
three poorer Member States for the latter to achieve that 
40 % reduction in disparity for their income per capita. 
Table 2:  Main indicators of nominal convergence 
problems in the Community, 1991 
Source: Commission services, forecasts  May  1991. 
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tion and high deficits with a twin problem. Not only do 
they have to reduce the deficit, but the degree to which 
they have been able to use inflation as an implicit form 
of tax is greatly reduced (this latter mechanism is often 
referred to as seigniorage -the  government does not pay 
interest on currency and compels banks to have compul-
sory  reserve  deposits on which below-market rates of 
interest are paid). 
According  to  'One  market,  one  money',  the  average 
level  of  seigniorage  among  lower  inflation  States 
(including  the  UK)  was  0.5 %,  over  1 % in  Italy,  in 
Spain 1.5 %,  Portugal nearly 2.5% and Greece nearer 
3 %.  These  same four  States have the highest  budget 
deficits  in  the  Community  combined  with  current 
account balance of  payments deficits, as shown in Table 
2. Greece is clearly in the worst position with the highest 
inflation,  largest  internal and  external  deficits  and  a 
fairly  substantial debt ratio.  Although Portugal is  the 
only other country with inflation exceeding 10 %,  it is 
Italy which has the second most difficult public finance 
problems. Reducing the deficits and the consequent loss 
of seigniorage levels will  require deflation, on a major 
scale in Greece, to a lesser extent in Portugal and Italy. 
There must be  some  small  concerns for  Spain but in 
general these nominal convergence problems are focus-
ed on Greece, Portugal and Italy. 
To  some  extent  this  is  a  transitional  problem.  Once 
inflation rates  are  reduced,  borrowing costs  for  these 
countries  will  fall,  assisting  the  balancing  of  their 
budgets.  But  from  a practical  point of view,  this  is  a 
non-trivial problem, because the lower the income of a 
region, the larger a proportion of its GOP has to be used 
to provide any given level of public services. Increasing 
the rate of  taxation may be difficult to achieve political-
ly  and cutting services  may  reduce  cohesion.  The se-
quence will only be possible if the rate of  growth is suffi-
ciently fast  that rising incomes can be used to provide 
the extra expenditure without any  need  for  unaccept-
able cuts in public services.  It is,  consequently, impor-
tant to  ascertain  the  overall  effect  of economic  inte-
gration on the regional incomes of the Member States 
with the greatest adjustment problems in order to assess 
the impact on their fiscal capacity. 
As an illustration, although the Greek deficit is large in 
comparison to Greek finances it is only 1.8 % of the EC 
budget and hence a problem of a magnitude that could 
be dealt with as part of a period of transition. The Ital-
ian deficit on the other hand, though only two-thirds as 
big in relation to Italian national income, is much larger 
compared with the Community budget (18. 7 %).  This 
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easily be met from EC resources and thus requires con-
siderable internal action if it is to be reduced to·accept-
able levels. 
The problem can, of course, be looked at the other way 
round. Ireland is an example which shows that a coun-
try which is classified in its entirety as a less favoured 
region of the EC can adjust to be in a position to be a 
full member of the EMU. It is other aspects of conver-
gence which hinder the process, and not just income and 
unemployment disparities. It does, however, seem clear 
that the process of adjustment to being able to be a full 
participant in EMU must make the problems of cohe-
sion worse  for  Greece and Portugal and probably for 
Italy and Spain as well.  The benefits are promised for 
the longer term. 
Such a structure of  change is unlikely to be appealing, as 
the costs become obvious before the benefits. This will 
be particularly clear if  the length of  the transition period 
is  not fixed  and is  dependent upon successful adjust-
ment. The harder the task, the less the credibility that 
any government has in its commitment to achieve the 
objective. The less  the credibility, the harder the task 
because inflation and exchange risks will remain, with 
adverse consequences for the costs of  borrowing and the 
stimulation of growth. It is, therefore, no surprise that 
countries with adjustment difficulties to EMU are seek-
ing direct offsetting measures to assist cohesion. With-
out such offsets, moving to EMU is a much more diffi-
cult political task. 
It is for such reasons that some countries are suggesting 
that EMU should progress at more than one speed, with 
those who have achieved the necessary convergence for-
ming the union first. However, this in itself is anti-cohe-
sive  because  those  who join get  the cost  and growth 
benefits, thereby widening disparities and making the 
adjustment for the second tier of countries more diffi-
cult  to  achieve  - and  simultaneously  increasing  the 
pressure on them to do  so.  Creating a two-tier Com-
munity, though, is itself anti-cohesive. Until now it has 
been possible to rely on the fact that Spain, Portugal and 
Greece have transitional arrangements as part of their 
accession  Treaties  but  this  process  is  attenuating. 
Extending it, particularly if  this involves older members 
of the Community, will reduce cohesion at the national 
level, not just on a regional basis. EMU is thus a key fac-
tor in the debate about cohesion in the 1990s. 
3.2.  Other influences on cohesion 
Although it is correct to emphasize the impact on cohe-
sion of changes brought on by completion of the inter-nal market and major policy initiatives such as EMU, it 
is important not to lose sight of additional, if less dra-
matic,  ingredients  shown  schematically  in  Figure  7. 
This section considers how some of these can be expec-
ted to impinge on cohesion. 
3.2.1.  Population growth and migration 
Demographic trends are mostly predictable and slow-
acting, but can nevertheless exert a profound influence 
on social and economic change. Differences in natural 
rates of  increase in the population are the main determi-
nant of relative regional growth in labour supply, with 
higher  rates  of growth  in  many of the  less  favoured 
regions. It is often this relative increase in the working 
population as much as the pace of  job creation that gives 
rise  to  the  labour  market  imbalances  which  cause 
high unemployment and emigration. The composition 
of  the population not only shapes the character of  differ-
ent regional societies, but can also affect income levels. 
Where  there  is  a  large  dependent  population,  the 
income  of the  economically  active  has  to  be  shared 
more widely, diminishing per capita values unless there 
are net transfers from other regions. Demography con-
sequently plays a central role in determining the magni-
tude of interregional transfers and migration, so that it 
has to be seen as a critical factor in cohesion. 
Imbalances in employment opportunities in  the Com-
munity, with jobs being created faster in the favoured 
regions,  while  working  population grew  faster  in  the 
lagging regions, has in the past been offset by  internal 
migration.  In  the  1960s,  this  was  effective  both  in 
reducing unemployment in the weaker regions and in 
transferring income to them through migrants'  remit-
tances.  Although  economic  growth  and  low  natural 
population growth in the better-off regions may recreate 
these  conditions  in  the  1990s,  technological  change 
means that fewer jobs will be created there, and these 
will  mostly have higher skill  requirements.  Migration 
will therefore be a less effective adjustment mechanism. 
Past experience also shows that significant social costs 
can arise from relying on migration to correct economic 
imbalances. 
In Northern Europe especially, there is increasing con-
cern about 'ageing' of the population, as birth-rates fall 
and life expectancy increases. By the year 2000, median 
age in the EC will be 37.7 years, compared with 32.7 in 
1980 (Forward Studies Unit, 1991), though with big dif-
ferences  between  countries, ranging from  29.9  in Ire-
land to 40.7 in (West) Germany. Ratios of dependency 
of  the retired population (population aged over 65 rela-
tive to working population) are  rising in all  Member 
States except Ireland. Three causes of ageing have been 
distinguished: 
(i)  declining fertility rates, reducing the proportion of 
children in the population; 
(ii)  longer life expectancy increasing the share of the 
elderly; 
(iii)  population bulges from previous 'baby-boom' gen-
erations  becoming  older,  resulting  in  a  bigger 
weight for the groups in question. 
The situation is not uniform across the EC.  Birth-rates 
are above the EC average in France, Ireland, the Nether-
lands, Portugal and the UK, and below it in Denmark 
and Germany.  Within each country,  they tend to be 
above average in the lower-income regions.  However, 
lower-income regions also have shorter life expectancy-
an important indicator of social deprivation- so some 
poorer regions show an above-average death-rate as well 
as an above-average birth-rate. Social trends such as ear-
lier retirement or longer education reinforce the dem-
ographic effect on the proportion of  economically active 
in  the population. The relative rise in the number of 
retired or inactive citizens will  require increased fund-
ing of social and pension provision from a diminishing 
tax-base.  More positively, it will  help to reduce youth 
unemployment,  improve  the  chance  to  work  beyond 
retirement age  for those who want it, and improve the 
prospects for women to find employment or return to it 
after  career  breaks.  A  further  consideration  is  that 
labour 'supply' for the voluntary sector becomes greater. 
Different sorts of migration flows can be expected to al-
ter the  population map in  the  1990s.  Labour market 
imbalance is,  as noted above, one of the main reasons 
for migration. If the pattern of growth in  the EC  is  as 
predicted in Section 3.1, economic integration will rein-
force  the existing trend of migration from  lower- into 
higher-income countries and regions.  In the past, such 
migration may have had positive effects.  Rural-to-ur-
ban migration has the potential to raise labour produc-
tivity in both regions if there  is  underemployment in 
agriculture and scale economies in industry. Migration 
from labour-surplus to labour-shortage regions may nar-
row  wage  and  unemployment  differentials.  But  the 
effects can also be negative. Economically, migration by 
the younger, more highly-skilled population can create 
downward income multipliers and reduce the savings 
rate. It is estimated, for example, that 30 % of  graduates 
of Irish universities emigrate within one year of finish-
ing their courses. In the destination region it can cause 
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sion resulting in discrimination against migrants. 
It is important, moreover, to distinguish between long-
distance and intra-regional migration. Greece, the Mez-
zogiorno, and parts of Spain are witnessing population 
shifts  from  agricultural  communities  towards  urban 
areas which are already congested and have badly over-
stretched infrastructure. The migrants are typically dis-
placed agricultural workers or youths who see no econo-
mic future on the land. In cities like Naples, where few 
job opportunities exist,  the consequences are  self-evi-
dent.  Economically  stronger host  regions  could,  con-
ceivably,  accommodate migrants with  less  stress,  but 
there  are  obstacles  which  have  resulted  in  most  mi-
gration now being intra-regional moves. 
A wholly different kind of migration occurs for, essen-
tially,  social reasons.  Regions  with agreeable climates 
(for example, parts of Spain) are proving attractive to 
wealthy retired people.  Such  moves also occur within 
regions. The comparative decline of  the largest cities in 
many  Northern  countries  has  been  occasioned  by  a 
combination  of residential  choices  and  changing  lo-
cation  demands  by  producers.  As  Cheshire  and  Hay 
( 1989) have shown, the trend has been away from urban 
cores, first to suburban areas of  large conurbations, then 
subsequently to smaller urban centres.  This  not  only 
moves spending power but also has effects on the host 
and origin communities. Local social cohesion can be 
affected where the well-off immigrants clash with the 
indigenous population, notably over housing costs.  In 
areas  which  lose  the  wealthy,  there  can  be  adverse 
effects  on  the  local  tax  base  which  accentuate  depri-
vation. The lack of mobility of socially disadvantaged 
residents 'trapped' in urban ghettoes,  as  identified in 
France, is a potential outcome. From a number of per-
spectives,  therefore,  it  is  apparent that social and de-
mographic shifts in  urban areas need to be  examined, 
and there is increasing recognition that greater account 
needs to be taken of cohesion problems in urban areas. 
3.2.2.  Extra-EC immigration 
As a wealthy economic area, the EC is an attractive des-
tination for migrants from other parts of  the world. Tra-
ditionally, it was colonial ties (France and the UK) or 
labour  shortages  (Germany)  that  gave  rise  to  this 
immigration, but, in recent years, emigrants have been 
moving to other countries as  well,  for  example,  Italy. 
Most  Community  countries  have  been  experiencing 
small  net  immigration;  the  exceptions  being  Ireland 
which  has  had  a  net  loss  of population  and  France 
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which has had no net gain. Migration into Luxembourg, 
Germany (West) and Denmark has been especially heavy, 
at  1986  rates of 5.3 %,  3.2% and 2.2% respectively. 
This reflects both the 'pull' of  relatively high living stan-
dards in these countries and their relative openness to 
immigration. 
Fears of  a sharp increase in external immigration centre 
on the eastern border with the former centrally planned 
economies, and the southern border with North Africa. 
Eastern  Europe  is  currently  experiencing  economic 
hardship  due  to  restructuring  and  (especially  in  the 
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia) serious internal political 
conflict.  Applications  for  refugee  status  to  Germany 
have risen from under 50 000 in 1984 to nearly 200 000 
in 1990, a figure which excludes ethnic Germans (who 
are accepted automatically) and those who enter illegal-
ly  (Aeppel,  1991 ).  Italy and Greece  have  also  experi-
enced  recent  well-publicized  influxes,  especially  from 
Albania  and  Yugoslavia.  Much  of  Eastern  Europe 
appears to be experiencing a 'demographic decline' sim-
ilar to that in the north of  the Community, but employ-
ment prospects for its younger, often skilled workforce 
are  temporarily  very  poor.  Immigration  from  North 
Africa and the Maghreb, a response to rapid population 
increase and limited work opportunities in these areas, 
concentrates initially on the southern entry points of 
Italy and Spain. These are areas where unemployment is 
already  high,  and  living  standards  below  average, 
making a large-scale influx more difficult to absorb. 
Migrants are often willing to work for  comparatively 
low wages and under inferior conditions, and some are 
comparatively  well-trained.  As  a  result,  they  are 
frequently prepared to take jobs in regions where  the 
'reservation wage' - the minimum wage needed to per-
suade someone to take a job - of  the indigenous popula-
tion is high (as it is said to be in parts of  the Mezzogior-
no  ).  Many industrial countries have encouraged immi-
grants in the past to help overcome anticipated labour 
shortages,  often according  them  'guest  worker'  status 
falling short of full citizenship, to provide flexibility in 
the event of a downturn. If  the growth projections from 
the completion of the single market are fulfilled,  it is 
possible that such migration could be mutually benefi-
cial. Some form of common screening will probably be 
necessary,  as  an  applicant  accepted  by  one  Member 
State is then free to move on to others in keeping with 
the principle of free  movement of labour in the single 
market. It might appear undesirable to create a second-
class category of labour with  restricted  rights of resi-
dence and such arrangements may prove more difficult 
to enforce. However,  as  with  migration  inside  the  Community, 
inward migration is a sign of  regional inequalities which 
could be corrected by other means. It is in the Commu-
nity's long- term interest to help improve the economic 
situation of the countries currently experiencing emi-
gration. This is already being done in Eastern Europe 
through bilateral arrangements, special financing facili-
ties  and the lending programmes of the EIB  and the 
European Bank for  Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD).  More will  also  need to be  done to help  the 
Community's southern neighbours, beginning with an 
improvement in their access to the European market. 
Extra-EC  immigration  is  an  increasingly  significant 
social  and political  issue,  as  recent  events  in  France 
demonstrate.  Racial tensions are apt to be  worsened, 
especially when a second generation of immigrant ori-
gin grows up. Education systems have to adapt to lin-
guistic and cultural demands, and there are frequently 
difficulties in integrating housing supply. Common con-
trols on immigration may put a brake on the numbers 
entering the Community, but would give rise to increas-
ed illegal immigration and associated social problems. 
For all these reasons, the prospective impact of increas-
ed migration on social cohesion is likely to be substan-
tial. 
More generally, it has to be accepted that migration, in 
many ways,  is  a problem to be solved in a strategy to 
achieve social cohesion, rather than an easy solution to 
economic imbalances. This highlights the fact that there 
is  often a conflict between what is  desirable from  the 
perspective  of ensuring  economic  cohesion  and  the 
attainment of social cohesion. 
3.2.3.  The changes in Eastern Europe and 
the potential peace dividend 
The pace and scale of change in Eastern Europe since 
1989 has exceeded nearly all expectations. For the EC, 
the transformation may well affect cohesion in a variety 
of ways.  On  the  one  hand,  the  opening up  of these 
countries  will  increase  the  range  of location  choices 
open to investors, possibly diverting resources from less 
favoured  regions  which  might otherwise benefit from 
the investment. In the same vein, if the better-off Com-
munity countries choose to assist in the regeneration of 
the  economies  of Eastern  Europe,  this  is  bound  to 
reduce investment in  the less  favoured  regions of the 
Community.  German  public  opinion,  for  example, 
seems to have become concerned that commitments to 
aid the new Lander and Eastern European countries is 
as far as the country should go. On the other hand, the 
diminution of tensions and the new access to markets 
creates  opportunities  for  complementary  economic 
development. 
The  disappearance  of the  strategic  division  between 
'East' and 'West' Europe, and the decline of the Soviet 
threat,  give  Community countries  an  opportunity  to 
reduce their total expenditure on defence significantly. 
The Community's growing economic strength and polit-
ical unity will give it new international responsibilities, 
but the defence requirements created by this should cost 
substantially less than the current total of  Member States' 
defence  expenditure.  The  Community  must  work  to 
achieve a rapid 'conversion' of military R&D and pro-
duction to  non-military uses.  Absence of this conver-
sion might create new problems of falling  output and 
employment in defence-related industries and regions. 
The challenge is  to realize the gains from  this reallo-
cation without causing intolerable structural impacts. 
Reduced defence expenditure will  also  assist the East 
European economies, not least the Soviet Union. Yet it 
is  clear that the scale of the problems these countries 
face is rising by the week.  Both the Polish and Czecho-
slovak presidents have recently made clear that the eco-
nomic difficulties they currently face  can only be con-
tained for a short period. Unless there is a fairly rapid 
improvement in their economic circumstances, the fear 
is  that these  countries will  revert to  totalitarian rule. 
Considerable  pressures  for  transfers  from  the  EC  to 
countries to the East are likely to arise on the basis that 
the EC is benefiting from the 'peace dividend'. 
3.2.4.  Widening of the Community 
Cohesion is bound to be affected if additional Member 
States join the EC. The acceptance of additional mem-
bers into the EC has been postponed by the Community 
until the single  market and associated measures have 
been successfully implemented. However, the success of 
current integration programmes will increase the attrac-
tion of the Community to those outside it. Prospective 
entrants fall into three groups: the EFT  A countries, two 
of which (Sweden and Austria) seem set to be the next 
members  of  the  EC;  liberalized  Eastern  European 
countries (Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugosla-
via); and countries to the south and south-west of the 
present Community, such as Turkey and Morocco. Var-
ious  reforms  of  the  Community's  institutions  will 
almost certainly need to be enacted before this can hap-
pen, but it is still worth considering the potential effects 
on cohesion of a widening of membership. These will 
include macroeconomic impacts, changes in patterns of 
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policy towards cohesion. 
The EFT  A countries are already convergent with the 
Community in both nominal and real terms, with GOP 
per capita significantly above the Community average. 
Negotiating difficulties can be anticipated on agricul-
ture,  which  is  at  present more  heavily  protected and 
subsidized in  most EFT  A countries than in the Com-
munity. Fishing rights may also be a problem, two of 
these countries being landlocked and two having exten-
sive coastlines. The Scandinavian countries are at the 
forefront  of reforms  to protect the  environment and 
ensure  'sustainability'  of industrial  processes  - for 
example,  by  cleaning  up  coal-burning  emissions,  re-
planting forests and running down nuclear programmes. 
Scandinavia also has a tradition of generous treatment 
for immigration, but there seems to be no reason why 
this should not fit the approach adopted by the EC as a 
whole. 
Accession of the Scandinavian countries and Austria, if 
not Switzerland, would mean more high-income coun-
tries in the Community, and should facilitate the raising 
of  more  money  for  cohesion-related  expenditure. 
Indeed, the possibility of EFT  A candidates being asked 
to contribute to a 'cohesion fund' has surfaced in preli-
minary discussion. Though there are signs that it may be 
changing, Scandinavia also has a tradition of generous 
welfare provision financed  by  relatively high personal 
and corporate taxation. This might provide an obstacle 
to entry, if the Community decides to standardize these 
taxes.  But  recent  work  commissioned  by  the  French 
Senate suggests that only indirect taxation is in need of 
greater harmonization (CEROP, 1990). 
The need for  Eastern European countries to upgrade 
their industry and agriculture  and construct an open 
financial system will require a longer adjustment to full 
Community membership, especially if  the single market 
is followed by monetary union in the later 1990s. But 
there is every reason, as part of  the Community's assist-
ance  to the Eastern economies,  to make  some of the 
benefits of  membership available much sooner - in par-
ticular,  preferential access  to the internal market and 
participation  in  Community  programmes  promoting 
technological,  educational  and  cultural  cooperation. 
Current assessments  of the  Czechoslovak,  Hungarian 
and  Polish  economies  suggest  that  full  membership 
might  be  possible  around  the  turn  of the  century. 
Though the prospects for Romania, Bulgaria, Yugosla-
via and Albania are less propitious, it is  vital that the 
Member States and the Community assist reform and 
restructuring in these economies, and political reform 
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where  national  cohesion  is  under threat.  The  conse-
quence  of not  doing  so,  already  witnessed,  may  be 
increased migration from these countries which creates 
problems both for the Community and for the human 
capital base of the countries left behind. 
Turkey is currently on a difficult but apparently success-
ful  path towards nominal convergence with the Com-
munity, which should assist the progress of  its real econ-
omy. However, it is  a long way from real convergence 
(GOP per capita, measured in current prices, is  about 
10% of  the Community average), and certain questions 
about its social and political situation remain unanswer-
ed.  A long  phase  of further  economic  consolidation, 
with Community assistance, seems likely to be needed. 
But Turkey's expanding trade with Europe provides an 
incentive  to work  towards  membership,  and its  geo-
graphical location would significantly widen the Com-
munity's southern frontier into the Middle East. 
The North African States will be of increasing concern 
to the Community because of  the likely increase in econ-
omic migration from  them. Even though membership 
is not feasible in the short term, considerable help could 
be given to these economies by improving access to the 
European market, particularly for agricultural and tex-
tile  products.  Greater  investment  and  technical  help 
would  also  be  in  the  Community's  own  interest,  by 
. improving  local  employment  opportunities  for  the 
expanding populations in this region. 
In terms of the outlook for divergences in living stan-
dards, there are various possibilities. The accession of 
some or all of the EFT  A countries would raise average 
Community  income,  and  might  sharpen  debate  on 
widening disparities in living standards, even if  absolute 
levels  were  unaffected.  On the other hand,  if low-in-
come countries join, there would be increased 'demand' 
for assistance, putting additional strains on the Com-
munity budget. Some regions currently classified as less 
favoured  would,  as  a  result,  risk  losing  their design-
ation.  As  one interviewee noted,  if Turkey became a 
member of  the Community, several regions in the Mez-
zogiorno would be lifted over the 7  5 % of Community 
average threshold, and thus not eligible for assistance. 
Yet there would have been no material change in the 
regions' circumstances. 
3.2.5.  German unification 
The experience of the union between  West  Germany 
and the former GOR raises a number of issues which 
are dealt with elsewhere in this report. First, there is the impact on the European economy of West Germany's 
heavy investment in modernizing the economies of the 
eastern Lander. In the short term, this has significantly 
reduced the country's external trade surplus, opened up 
a sizeable budget deficit and slightly raised its rate of 
inflation. It is likely that some of the fixed investment 
now being made in the east of the country would other-
wise have flowed into other EC countries, including dis-
advantaged regions. Clearly, to the extent that the for-
mer East German Lander are suffering serious econo-
mic, social and environmental problems, it is justifiable 
that additional resources should be channelled towards 
them. A critical question for the 1990s will,  neverthe-
less,  be  whether  or not  the  new  Lander have  to  be 
regarded as a problem requiring continuing Community 
action, in which case other regions which warrant assist-
ance may lose out relatively. 
In the longer term, unification will reinforce Germany's 
role  as  the  largest  economy  within  the  Community. 
There is optimism concerning the prospects for a fairly 
rapid reduction of inflation to traditional rates and for 
an  eventual  re-emergence  of its  trade  surplus  with 
renewed scope for capital export to other EC countries. 
Although the scale of current problems may have been 
underestimated initially, there appears to be little dan-
ger that unification will impede the continued growth of 
Germany or of the Community as a whole. 
A separate consideration is the effect on Germany's pre-
parations for economic and monetary union. This will 
be conditional mainly on the speed with which inflation 
in  the  Federal  Republic  is  brought  under  control. 
Although unification may take priority on the current 
political  agenda,  there  is  again  no  immediate reason 
why progress towards EMU should be seriously delayed, 
and it is possible that the current situation may accele-
rate nominal convergence by other member countries. 
The economic implications of German economic and 
monetary union for the Community's EMU also merit 
attention. East Germany has suffered in the short term 
from  the  competition  of higher-productivity,  higher-
quality producers, coinciding with a rise in unit labour 
costs and a loss of  the exchange rate as an instrument of 
adjustment. Although sustainable in the German case, 
this is  a scenario which the Community has sought to 
avoid by pursuing nominal convergence in advance of 
any moves towards a single currency, and by delaying 
full entry into the single market for particular national 
'infant industries'.  The general  implications of Euro-
pean EMU were  discussed in  Section 3.1.2. The Ger-
man experience has focused attention on the potentially 
dramatic effects of entry into monetary union (though 
other European countries, such as Ireland and Italy, had 
earlier  experiences  which  were  equally  instructive). 
Additional caution may now be observed over the Euro-
pean EMU process, but the timetable does not require 
significant revision. 
3.2.6. _Environment 
The environment is  increasingly being regarded as an 
integral component of  the quality oflife. The state of  the 
environment is consequently emerging as an additional 
dimension in which disparities need to be scrutinized in 
the search for  cohesion.  The  range  of environmental 
problems  now  claiming  political  attention  includes 
those  related  to  fossil-fuel  burning  (acid  rain,  global 
warming),  to  nuclear  materials  (low-level  radiation, 
accidental discharges), to hazardous and polluting chem-
icals  in  agriculture  and  industry  and  to  the  general 
destruction of  natural areas by industrial and residential 
development.  Badly-hit regions  in the EC  include the 
industrial areas of the former GDR between Halle and 
Leipzig (where soil and water are badly polluted), the 
Mediterranean coast (where sea pollution now threatens 
the fishing  and tourism industries) and the forests  of 
central Europe (damaged by acid rain). 
The character of policies to safeguard the environment 
will, itself, have an impact on competitiveness and thus 
on cohesion. Recently, the focus has been on the market 
approach to prevention of  environmental degradation-
raising the cost of environment-damaging activities, for 
example by taxing polluting substances or by auctioning 
discharge rights - over a policy of  direct control. This is 
bound to favour those firms best able to face additional 
operating  costs  or those  which  have  already  had  to 
adapt to stricter standards. At the same time, direct con-
trol  of polluting  activities  sometimes  harms  existing 
producers, who have made unrecoverable investments 
which now fall foul of the rules, many of which will be 
long-established. 
The Commission is already working towards the setting 
of minimum  standards  for  environmental  care,  one 
reason being to prevent regions competitively dropping 
their standards in pursuit of inward investment- 'eco-
dumping'. Any centrally-organized initiatives for pollu-
tion control, either through regulation or through mar-
ket-based charges, must assess the progressivity of both 
revenue-raising  and  expenditure  and,  if  necessary, 
relieve the burden on disadvantaged regions which are 
required to take expensive remedial measures. 
The regional impact of current and proposed environ-
mental measures is difficult to assess. Taxation or direct 
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might be doubly progressive- the main burden falling 
on  higher-income  industrial  regions,  and  significant 
benefits going to lower-income regions which currently 
pay the external costs of pollution. However, many of 
the  problem  industries  are  located  in  Objective  2 
regions,  and  some  problematic  agricultural  practices 
result from the attempt to raise labour productivity in 
Objective  1 and  5b  regions.  Firms  in  disadvantaged 
regions are often less well placed to absorb higher pollu-
tion charges, or to make the investments to meet new 
quantitative controls.  A solution might be  to put the 
proceeds of a carbon tax or similar market-based mea-
sure into a new fund for the finance of environmental 
improvement in EC-assisted areas. 
3.2. 7.  Energy supply 
Energy  was  central  to  two  of the  agreements  which 
began the formation of the Community (the ECSC and 
Euratom Treaties), and its future supply and usage have 
important implications for EC economic and environ-
mental progress. Access to secure energy supply also has 
to be regarded as a fundamental economic and political 
objective, so that prospective developments in the ener-
gy  market can affect economic and political cohesion. 
The development of the North Sea area has provided 
the Community with a substantial source of hydrocar-
bon fuels in the medium term (to which the prospective 
accession of Norway would obviously add). 
The distribution of fossil fuels is, nevertheless, distinct-
ly uneven. The UK and Germany supply a large propor-
tion of  their coal needs, though both have virtually halv-
ed their output in the last 20 years and increased their 
imports of  cheaper coal from outside the EC. Spain also 
produces most of its own coal, and has been expanding 
output. The UK has  been a  net exporter of oil  since 
1980 and is close to self-sufficiency in natural gas, while 
the Netherlands has a substantial net export of  gas. Den-
mark supplied about half its own oil needs by the late 
1980s.  Despite  increasing  its  oil  and gas  output and 
moderating its consumption, the EC as a whole runs a 
substantial energy  deficit.  If there  were  to  be  further 
substantial fluctuations in oil prices, the effects on cohe-
sion could be considerable. 
Community energy  policy has three major tasks.  The 
first is to continue to reduce total energy consumption 
by introducing more energy-efficient industrial process-
es, switching to less energy-intensive industries, 'exten-
sivizing' agriculture, and conserving and recycling ener-
gy-using products. The second is to continue the devel-
opment of new (especially renewable) sources of ener-
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gy.  An  imaginative proposal (first put forward  at the 
1990 Dublin Summit) is for a European Energy Com-
munity linking the EC and the Soviet Union (or iU con-
stituent republics). Soviet output is limited by technical 
and infrastructure problems,  so  that a  programme of 
joint exploitation would not only open up new supplies 
to the West, but would also strengthen political ties and 
provide a source of revenue with which to finance econ-
omic reconstruction. 
The third task is more microeconomic in character: to 
overcome the geographical imbalance in energy supplies 
to households and businesses  in  order to  ensure that 
possible problems with the supply of  energy do not inhi-
bit regional development. The current imbalance usual-
ly shows up in cost, but sometimes (especially with elec-
tricity) the existence and continuity of supply is also a 
problem.  For  many  enterprises  in  disadvantaged 
regions, particularly in manufacturing, development of 
energy supply is as important as improvements to phys-
ical  infrastructure  and  telecommunications.  Some 
regions  which  lack  conventional  indigenous  energy 
sources  have the potential to develop water,  wind or 
other renewable sources, so a wider programme of  ener-
gy exploitation would be better adapted to developing 
their potential. 
3.2.8.  Transport 
As  with  energy,  transport presents both Community-
wide and regional problems. The Community has a gen-
eral  interest  in  promoting  a  transport  system  which 
improves its energy  balance and protects its environ-
ment. For Community cohesion, it is equally important 
to improve access to transport services for regions and 
localities which are currently poorly served by  it.  Yet 
almost  paradoxically,  poor  transport  access  has,  on 
occasion, been an effective form of protection for rela-
tively uncompetitive economies. This illustrates a parti-
cular feature of economic integration which could have 
a noticeable bearing on cohesion. In isolation, a regional 
economy  may  cohere  fairly  well,  even  if its  rate  of 
growth is unexciting. But when it is opened up, all sorts 
of new  relationships  may  be  forced  on  it,  upsetting 
internal cohesion. 
Much current policy,  most notably the single  market 
programme, presupposes that transport costs will conti-
nue to form a fairly  small proportion of total costs in 
most industries, so that there will be gains from using 
lowest production-cost locations to serve the whole of 
the  market.  The continued  development  of transport 
infrastructure, especially in the currently less well-served 
regions,  will  further reduce  the costs of goods  move-ment, while  the shift to  higher value-added products, 
and information-based services that can be moved by 
telecommunications,  should  weaken  the  connection 
between  transportation  and  trade.  Caution  must, 
however, be exercised on two counts. Firstly, the Com-
munity continues to import about 70% of its crude pe-
troleum, and it  is  impossible to rule  out future  price 
increases  due  to  production  or  political  disruption. 
Reduction  in  oil  use  should  remain  an  objective,  to 
avoid the threat of growth interruptions on the scale of 
those that followed the two OPEC shocks.  Such inter-
ventions are problematic given the increasing aspiration 
towards car use  (especially in lower-income and rural 
regions),  and  the  differences  in  national  balance  be-
tween road and rail transport which might make pro-rail 
legislation appear as a non-tariff barrier. 
Alongside these overall changes in the use of energy for 
transport, the Community will continue to improve the 
quality of transport facilities in its regions, particularly 
those which are geographically distant from major mar-
kets. Much is already being done through the ERDF and 
EIB to upgrade road, rail, air and waterway communica-
tions. A perhaps more neglected need, identified in the 
context of the single  market, is  for short-range public 
transport tailored to users' needs in the assisted regions, 
for example by subsidized 'citizens buses' (IFO, 1991 ). 
3.2.9.  Agricultural policies 
The prominent position of agriculture in the affairs of 
the EC makes it a key area for policy towards cohesion. 
Since  the  early  days  of the  Community,  agricultural 
policy has been the flagship  of Community action. As 
the first 'common' policy, the EAGGF system of price 
support and structural assistance can be credited with 
creating food  self-sufficiency in Europe,  and has sub-
stantially improved the level and stability of agricultu-
ral incomes. By the same token, the CAP is seen as dis-
torting trade (to the detriment of the Uruguay Round) 
and having a perverse effect on income distribution in 
the Community. Yet  political difficulties  have  meant 
that agricultural policy has been resistant to change. For 
these and other reasons, the sector now faces a variety of 
challenges which will have to be confronted in the next 
decade. 
Because of past inertia, many of  the problems have now 
become fairly urgent. Budgetary costs are central: agri-
cultural guarantee expenditure has risen substantially -
up 250% in real terms between 1975  (when it totalled 
ECU 4.5 billion) and 1991 (when it will reach ECU 31.5 
billion). The current reforms, while intended to reduce 
expenditure in the long term, will add ECU 4 billion per 
year by  1996  (Commission of the European Commu-
nities,  1991 d).  This is  in addition to the  higher food 
prices paid by  Community consumers, and the cost of 
storing, converting or disposing of excess food stocks. 
Externally, the Community is  under growing pressure 
from agricultural producers who have dismantled their 
own  price-support  systems,  but  are  prevented  from 
competing for the EC market by the external tariff need-
ed to support high guaranteed prices.  This complaint, 
long voiced by developing countries negotiating through 
the Lome Convention, has now been taken up by the 
USA and the Cairns Group at the Uruguay Round of 
GATT negotiations. 
Internally, the full impact of Iberian accession to the EC 
is still to be felt, since the transitional period is only now 
nearing completion. The most direct reverberations of 
this will be felt in regions with similar structures of  agri-
culture, notably Italy and southern France which will 
face more intense competition in horticulture, wine and 
olive-oil production. Iberian producers will,  similarly, 
face  more  intense  competition  for  products  which 
enjoyed protection. There will also be an effect on the 
balance of  power, since the regions producing 'southern' 
products will now have a blocking vote, making it likely 
that the balance of support from the CAP will need to 
shift to accommodate this. 
Most of the EAGGF spending goes  on the guarantee 
scheme, which tends to benefit the larger farms that are 
disproportionately represented in the better-off regions. 
The Guidance Fund, which assists rural restructuring, 
represents only 5  % of agricultural spending. Commis-
sion calculations show  that 80 % of EAGGF support 
goes  to the largest 20 % of farms,  and analysis of the 
regional  allocation of guarantee payments shows  that 
they are  regressive  for  the lowest  40% of population 
ranked by income (DIW,  1991).  This also reflects the 
entry of Portugal and Spain, with regional incomes gen-
erally  below  the  Community average  and  a  different 
composition of agricultural production.  (With cereals 
and rice,  which  are  mainly northern-EC  outputs,  the 
lowest 40 % of regions by income received only 30 % of 
payments in 1986-89.) 
The  programme for  CAP  reform  (Mac Sharry,  1991) 
involves cuts in intervention prices most severe for beef 
and  cereals  - with  compensation  for  the  disposal  of 
livestock and the setting aside of land from production. 
Small producers will receive most compensation, with-
out set-aside obligations. The long-term objective is  a 
return to  'competitive' pricing, which will  remove the 
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ket price, and then disposing of surplus). However, the 
short-term effect of the reforms is to increase the agri-
cultural budget, with no financial savings in prospect 
until 1997. 
Since small farms, which include those with the lowest 
labour  productivity,  will  receive  the  most  compen-
sation, the scheme has also been criticized for protecting 
inefficient producers and punishing the more efficient. 
This conflicts with the CAP's long-term structural aim 
of  raising the efficiency of  agriculture, and helping small 
marginal  producers  to  find  alternative  employment. 
The  UK,  with  a  predominance  of high-productivity 
large  farms,  has  raised  particular  objections.  Unlike 
structural expenditures, agricultural guarantee expendi-
ture is not targeted either regionally or according to the 
needs of  the recipient. Thus the compensation proposals 
cannot discriminate between small farmers  who  have 
alternative employment opportunities and those  who 
rely  on  farming,  or  between  those  who  are  heavily 
dependent on Community support and those who could 
survive without it. 
The tangled links between agricultural policy and cohe-
sion include the effects of higher prices on consumers 
and the benefits to economic agents further down the 
value chain as well as the support to farmers. Support 
for  agriculture  is  also  prone  to  being  confused  with 
development of  rural economies. In the long term, a sig-
nificant real reduction in CAP guarantee expenditure 
will be necessary not only to honour the Community's 
international  trading obligations,  but to  increase  the 
budgetary resources available for other purposes includ-
ing structural policy. 
3.2.10.  The Uruguay Round 
Though currently stalled, it is  to be expected that the 
GATT Uruguay Round will eventually culminate in the 
establishment  of a  new  multilateral  framework  for 
world  trade.  Agriculture  is  certain  to  be  one  major 
source of contention between the EC and its main trad-
ing partners when the negotiations resume. There has 
been sustained pressure by the Cairns Group of  agricul-
tural exporters (Australia, New Zealand, Canada and 10 
developing countries), and by the USA, which is also a 
major primary exporter, to accelerate the reform of the 
CAP. These countries, as Table 3 shows, pay substan-
tially lower rates of  producer subsidy as a proportion of 
total output value. 
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Table 3:  Agricultural producer subsidies, 1984-88 
Country 
EC10 
EC 12 
USA 
Australia 
New Zealand 
Canada 
Japan 
All 
Source: Neville-Rolfe, 1990. 
(subsidies as a % of  the value of  output) 
198411985119861198711988 
33  43  52 
52  51  46 
28  32  43  41  34 
10  14  16  11  10 
18  23  33  14  8 
33  39  49  46  43 
67  69  76  77  74 
34  41  51  50  45 
These and other figures  for  agricultural support show 
that the Community subsidizes farm output more heav-
ily  than  the  USA  and  Australasia,  though  less  than 
Japan (and also than the EFTA countries). Apart from 
seeking lower subsidies, the USA has called for income 
support to be detached from price support, by switching 
to a compensation system that no longer requires exter-
nal protection or encourages overproduction. The EC 
has argued for action to reduce surpluses first, with sub-
sidies possibly increasing initially to  preserve current 
income  levels.  As  either  would  affect  agricultural 
incomes, effects on cohesion are inevitable. 
A  second  area  of current  reform  is  the  Multifibre 
Arrangement regulating trade of  textiles and textile pro-
ducts. This is designed to assist restructuring and rede-
ployment within the textile industries of industralized 
countries by slowing down the rate at which they are 
exposed  to  low-cost  imports.  Many  European  textile 
firms are SMEs which already face stronger competition 
within the EC after 1992, and many of  these are located 
in Objective 1, 2 and 5b regions. In the long term, liber-
alization of imports from the Far East and other devel-
oping countries will  reduce prices and raise consumer 
welfare in the Community. But in the short term, quota 
controls are seen as a means to prevent further regional 
imbalance. Pressure from developing country producers 
to speed the abandonment of the MFA is now reinfor-
ced by some EC retailers and wholesalers, as well as pro-
ducers  who  import  semi-finished  inputs  keen  to 
increase their non-EC sourcing as a way to retain cost-
competitiveness. 
The last year has seen some internal trading of national 
MFA quotas, as countries which have exhausted their 
quota buy additions from those with surplus quota. This may be rendered unnecessary by the current shift from 
country quotas to a composite Community quota. But 
this shift introduces an additional threat to cohesion: 
the attainment of additional quota for imports of semi-
finished products by larger producers at the expense of 
small and medium-sized producers - their former sup-
pliers - which tend to be  more heavily represented in 
the disadvantaged regions. 
A successful  outcome  to  the  Uruguay  Round can  be 
expected to include the opening up of  world markets for 
financial  and  business  services  in  which  many  EC 
regions are now comparatively specialized. Much of the 
activity  in  these  sectors  is  concentrated  in  relatively 
favoured regions. Thus, while the Uruguay Round may 
be of  benefit to the Community as a whole, it could pro-
duce  an outcome similar to  the process of economic 
integration if it favours the more prosperous regions. 
3.2.11.  Foreign investment trends 
Inward investment has long been regarded as an impor-
tant factor in regional development, although there was 
a marked reduction in the supply of 'footloose' capital 
in  the  aftermath of the  first  oil-price  shock  197 4-7 5 
(Wadley, 1986). Short-term capital flows have also been 
important for  several  countries  in financing  external 
imbalances,  and  thus  avoiding  excessive  deflation. 
Foreign investment trends are bound, therefore, to have 
an impact on regional economic development.  In  the 
1970s  and  1980s,  Europe's  financial  systems  gained 
from large inflows of portfolio investment from the oil-
exporting countries. Since the early 1980s, its real econ-
omies have also gained from an inflow of foreign direct 
investment, principally from Japan, which continues to 
run substantial trade surpluses from which to  finance 
capital export. 
The inflow to Europe, which is about a fifth of  the annu-
al  total of all  Japanese foreign  investment, rose  from 
USD 1. 9 billion in  1984 to USD 14.8 billion in  1989. 
Two countries, the UK and the Netherlands, have re-
ceived 55 to 65 %of  the total so far, but there are signs 
of  a broadening of  investments to other Member States. 
Most of the investment (47% in  1989) has gone  into 
developing  financial  services,  but manufacturing  has 
accounted  for  15  to  20 % of annual  inflows.  (Anglo-
Japanese  Economic  Institute,  1991 ).  The  cumulative 
investment came to USD 45 billion at the end of 1989 
(Thomsen and Nicolaides, 1991 ). 
Molle  and Morsink ( 1991)  provide evidence  that the 
volume and allocation of intra-EC foreign direct invest-
ment has been encouraged mainly by the push factors of 
high unit labour costs, strong R&D capacity and surplus 
financial resources in the investing country, the stimu-
lus factors of trade intensity and taxation differences, 
and the frictional factors of physical distance, cultural 
difference and exchange-rate risk which inhibit trade. If 
this is also true for non-EC direct investment in the EC, 
then the heavy trade flows  of the  EC  countries with 
investing countries, together with high unit labour costs 
in the investing countries may explain some of  the large 
investments in certain Member States (Spain, Portugal 
and  the  UK).  Britain  appears  to  have  attracted  its 
majority share through the access this gives to the UK 
and EC markets and through investors' familiarity with 
its language. Factor-based explanations, such as the skill 
and relative cost of  labour, are cited, but tend to be out-
weighed by market-based explanations (Thomsen and 
Nicolaides, 1991 ). 
The net benefits of inward investment for the recipient 
are difficult to assess.  On the positive side,  they may 
introduce  new  technologies  and  organizational 
methods, raise the general investment rate, encourage 
modernization by domestic firms, and improve the host 
country's trade  performance  by  substituting  imports. 
Inward  investment  to  a  region  offers  both  direct 
demand and employment stimulus and opportunities to 
acquire  new  technologies,  commercial  and  working 
practices. It is also common for a major investment to 
spawn work for subcontractors as well as facilitating the 
spin-off of smaller companies in the same sector. While 
there is a danger that investment originating elsewhere 
in the EC may simply have been diverted from another 
region in a 'zero-sum game', investment from  outside 
the EC represents a potential gain for the Community as 
a whole. On the negative side, investments may raise the 
cost oflocallabour and capital to indigenous businesses, 
out-compete indigenous enterprise and displace  some 
' existing employment. 
Studies of  Japanese investment in the UK conclude that 
there was net employment creation between  1979 and 
1985,  even  though  the  immediate  impact  may  have 
been to destroy jobs by  driving out domestic produc-
tion. The volume of investment was important, provid-
ing about 3 % of UK fixed capital formation in the late 
1980s,  and it helped to revive  certain manufacturing 
industries which the country appeared to be losing. But 
the  main  gains  came  from  exposure  to  Japanese 
methods of doing business. Although the product and 
process technologies were fairly  mature, UK competi-
tors were forced to adopt new quality control and pro-
duction-scheduling standards. The UK also gained from 
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1988, 1990). 
Some recipient regions, especially those with less deve-
loped human and physical capital and infrastructure, 
are  concerned  that  inward  investment  will  create 
'branch-plant' assembly operations which do little for 
local demand or factor conditions. The experience with 
Japanese investment  in  Portugal  and  Spain confirms 
that older technologies tend to be  exported,  but that 
these are generally compatible with current factor con-
ditions  in  the  host  region.  Local  sourcing  is  usually 
developed,  providing important linkages  to  domestic 
enterprise, and local management is trained to take over 
the operations. There is also evidence of substantial re-
investment of profits in the foreign subsidiaries. 
Host governments can improve the positive impacts by 
setting performance targets (e.g.  for the proportion of 
inputs purchased locally, or for that of  output exported), 
and  by  encouraging  joint  ventures  with  indigenous 
firms.  The  danger  is  that  too  much  regulation  will 
deflect the investment to another region.  Competition 
among  regions  to  attract  investment  can  result  in  a 
'zero-sum  game'  involving  subsidies,  tax  concessions 
and exemption from regulations. The Community has 
already created rules  to prevent undesirable forms  of 
inducement,  but  it  could  go  further  in  presenting  a 
united  front  as  regards  the  conditions  for  external 
investment in an EC country. 
On  balance,  it  seems  that  Europe's  less  advanta~ed 
regions could gain from policies to attract direc~ fo~e1gn 
investment.  The  integration of the  Commumty Itself 
will assist this, by offering increased opportunities for 
market growth, lower capital costs,  free  movement of 
goods and services, and tariff-jumping opportu~ities as 
motives  to  invest  within  its  borders.  Countnes  and 
regions  can supplement this with policies  to upgrade 
labour skills, improve physical infrastructures and gen-
erally  improve knowledge  of their advantages  among 
potential investors. However, the increasing imp?~ance 
of  skills, R&D capabilities and market opportumties, as 
opposed to low labour costs, makes it likely that exter-
nal investment will continue to concentrate on the more 
advantaged  regions.  Inward  investment  will  be  an 
instrument for accelerating Europe's development, but 
not for evening out its distribution. 
3.3.  Assessment of  the demand for cohesion 
in the 1990s 
Priorities for action to ensure cohesion inevitably differ 
between  countries,  over  time  and  amongst  different 
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political and social groups.  This means that whatever 
policy  towards  cohesion  is  eventually  implemented 
must represent a compromise. Some of the options are 
implicit in the objectives put forward for the structural 
Funds and will  almost certainly continue to figure  on 
the agenda for the 1990s. Other factors may come more 
into prominence and will call for new responses. 
What then are some of the main demands on policy for 
the  1990s?  There can be  little doubt that the current 
priority accorded to lagging regions will continue to be 
necessary in the next decade. Greece, Portugal and parts 
of Spain, Italy and Ireland still have a long way to go 
before they attain levels of development that co.mpare 
with those in the core  regions of the Commumty. As 
peripheral regions, it is likely that they will find it rela-
tively more difficult to keep up with core areas in the 
context  of economic  integration.  The  new  Lander of 
East Germany almost certainly have to be placed in the 
same category.  Although the aim of stimulating econ-
omic development to assist catching-up will remain in 
these  regions,  the  means  can  be  expected  to  evolve. 
Rather less emphasis will be needed in building up basic 
infrastructure, though there are inevitably areas where 
this will  remain important - especially in Greece and 
the Portuguese interior.  Instead,  it is  primarily in the 
realms of human capital and social  conditions that a 
greater effort will be needed, although enhancement of 
services based on infrastructure will also be called for. 
Improvements  in  administrative  capacity  and  in  the 
political control of implementation of policy are also 
sought,  chiefly  in  parts  of the  Mezzogiorno  and  in 
Greece. 
The aim of  industrial reconversion has long been promi-
nent in the objectives of the Northern European coun-
tries. Though this will  remain on the agenda in some 
regions, the likelihood is that it will  recede as  a major 
priority,  since  so  much has  already changed.  Instead, 
the indications are that the demand will be for a more 
flexible  approach to economic regeneration. Transfor-
mation of urban economies, rural development or the 
creation of new growth centres should perhaps be seen 
as  variants on the same sort of cohesion need,  rather 
than being seen as distinct aims of policy. 
In the 1990s, economic regeneration will be an issue in 
all countries, but in a much more varied manner than in 
the past when entire regional economies were afflicted 
by the decline of staple industries such as shipbuilding, 
textiles or steel-making. Instead, loss of  competitiveness 
or the need for structural adaptation can be expected to 
be a more localized problem. Shocks affecting sectors in 
which  localities  specialize,  whether caused  by  fluctu-ations in demand, new competition or supply-side fac-
tors  may  require  specific  responses.  Some  frontier 
regions may face  problems, while new transport devel-
opments can be expected to affect the competitiveness 
of localities they affect. 
In many ways, economic regeneration in the 1990s has 
to be seen as a social objective rather than a purely econ-
omic one. There is an emphasis in France and the UK, 
for  instance,  on  different  sorts  of urban  problems  -
deprivation in inner city or suburban ghettoes of large 
conurbations or in smaller towns. This is often associa-
ted with concentrations of immigrant populations and 
high incidences of  youth and long-term unemployment. 
In the past, such areas were characterized by poor hous-
ing and insanitary conditions - slums. Now, however, 
although the housing may be far from wonderful, it is 
above  all  social  deprivation  which  is  the  problem. 
Urban problems of this sort are also evident in some of 
the major cities of the Mezzogiorno, where high crime 
rates and burgeoning illegal  and black economies are 
important features of  local society. If immigration from 
outside the  Community continues to  rise,  this  could 
give rise to accentuated social problems at entry points 
or in major urban reception centres. This is a growing 
worry in Germany in relation to Eastern Europe, and in 
Italy and Spain in relation to Maghreb immigration. 
Among  other emerging  demands  linked  to  cohesion, 
action on the environment is increasingly being seen as 
a goal  to which  Community policy  should  pay  more 
attention. This sentiment is particularly strong already 
in  Germany  and  the  Netherlands,  but  can  also  be 
expected to increase in prominence in those areas where 
environmental damage poses a threat to the economy. 
Tourist operators, especially in Mediterranean coastal 
areas, the Danish fishing industry and residents afflic-
ted by congestion in urban areas are examples of  sources 
of pressure. A specific concern is water quality which 
has been degraded for many reasons and will need sub-
stantial investment.  Congestion  and air pollution  are 
increasingly conspicuous political issues in urban areas, 
highlighting the importance of  quality of life rather than 
narrow economic indicators such as income or unem-
ployment as cohesion issues.  A general preoccupation 
for the Community is to ensure that the less favoured 
regions do not become subject to ceo-dumping - toler-
ance of lower standards of environmental protection in 
less competitive regions as a means of attracting invest-
ment. 
Much  the  same  applies  to  social  dumping  from  the 
viewpoints of both favoured and less favoured regions. 
Achieving advances in levels of social provision is a key 
political objective in Spain, while those Member States, 
such  as  Belgium,  with  mature  welfare  systems,  are 
anxious to maintain their standards. The worry is that 
competitive  pressures  resulting  from  economic  inte-
gration or harmonization which  diminishes provision 
will prove to be politically damaging. 
It  is  inevitable that commitment to  cohesion  will  be 
greater within a country than between countries, and 
this is  a constraint that has to be  taken into account, 
particularly where there are pressing indigenous priori-
ties.  Germany's willingness to contribute to cohesion-
related outlays in other countries will, for example, be 
circumscribed  because  of its  obligations  in  the  new 
Lander. Political influences on how to achieve cohesion 
also stem from the power of different lobbies (notably 
the farm lobby) and from  the approaches of different 
governments. The UK, for example, is a leading advo-
cate of the view that market forces offer the best hope 
for progress. A cohesion strategy for the 1990s will need, 
consequently,  to  accommodate  a  range  of objectives 
and constraints. The next chapter considers the prin-
ciples that should guide such a strategy. 
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cohesion policy for the 1990s 
There can be little doubt that the Community will have 
to elaborate a strategy for social and economic cohesion 
for the 1990s, principally because some Member States 
and regions have legitimate fears  that the benefits of 
economic integration will pass them by. Unless they can 
be persuaded that the Community is  sensitive to their 
needs, progress towards economic integration could be 
jeopardized. At  the same time, there are worries that 
cohesion policies will distort markets and lead to exces-
sive demands on public expenditure, ultimately dimi-
nishing the realization of potential benefits from inte-
gration. These contradictions signal that a new strategy 
for cohesion will have to be carefully designed to ensure 
that equity and efficiency are both served. This chapter 
discusses the principles that should guide the formula-
tion of a new strategy and the objectives that should be 
pursued within it. 
Equity implies that the distribution of the benefits of 
integration should be sufficiently wide to assure the sup-
port of most constituencies in the Community. A more 
negative approach would be  to say that a strategy for 
cohesion is  needed,  in  the colourful metaphor of one 
expert interviewed for the study, to forestall 'a mutiny 
by the troops'. At  a minimum, equity should involve 
equality of opportunity which may, in practice, imply 
positive discrimination in favour of certain regions or 
groups. In this regard, it is worth distinguishing between 
those which are relatively less well-endowed in terms of 
the quality of their attributes, and those which for one 
reason or another do not make sufficiently good use of 
their  resources.  While  there  might  be  only  weak 
arguments on economic  grounds  for  slowing  integra-
tion,  the  political  reality  of the  EC  is  that  Member 
States could exercise vetoes if the perceived benefits to 
them are not evident. The danger of a failure to address 
unbalanced  growth  was  recognized  in  the  Delors 
Report: 
'If sufficient consideration were  not given to regional 
imbalances, the economic union would  be  faced  with 
grave economic and political risks'. (p.  18) 
Efficiency needs to be taken account of in two senses. 
First, the underlying rationale for economic integration 
is  that  it  encourages  the  Community's  productive 
resources to be deployed in a manner which enables a 
greater  aggregate  output  to  be  achieved.  Any  policy 
towards cohesion should, therefore, be fashioned as far 
as possible in a way that does not prejudice these pros-
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pective gains.  Second,  if money  is  spent in  trying to 
achieve cohesion, it is important not only that it actual-
ly  succeeds in doing so,  but also  that the expenditure 
yields sufficient gains per ecu spent. These are onerous 
demands and are bound to be hard to meet. Yet if net 
contributors as well as recipients are to be satisfied that 
policy is soundly based, they are precepts that will need 
to be met. 
It would, however, be wrong to view cohesion purely as 
a problem of social welfare in which 'donors' provide 
largess to less fortunate 'recipients'. A significant part of 
the demand which enables competitive regions to bene-
fit  from  integration  will  come  from  less  favoured 
regions. It is acknowledged, for example, that much of 
the fiscal  transfer to  the Mezzogiorno ends up in the 
turnover of firms in the Centre-North of Italy. Similar-
ly,  supply-side shifts which favour some regions at the 
expense of others are the direct result of agreements to 
liberalize markets by dispensing with protection. Regio-
nal  interdependence is,  consequently, a feature of the 
Community economy that has to be given proper atten-
tion in relation to cohesion. 
4.1.  Market forces, Community growth 
and distribution 
A fundamental question to begin with is whether cohe-
sion is best served by trying to let market forces work as 
effectively as possible, or whether explicit intervention 
is  necessary.  Three  basic  approaches  can  be  distin-
guished: 
(i)  The market approach which, as noted in  Section 
1.2, underpins much of  the theoretical justification 
for integration. It is  argued that the optimal way 
forward is to liberalize markets as comprehensive-
ly as possible because this will maximize allocative 
efficiency.  As  higher  output  and  income  are 
achieved,  demand  will  then  trickle  down  to  all 
regions thereby guaranteeing cohesion. Indeed, if  it 
were possible to achieve perfect markets, economic 
theory predicts that there would be a trend towards 
equalization of wages. 
(ii)  The redistribution approach also implies trying to 
achieve the fastest rate of growth for the Commu-
nity as a whole by encouraging production where it 
is most efficient. However, on the assumption that 
unbalanced growth would lead to wider disparities 
in incomes, intervention would be needed to redis-
tribute the benefits of that faster growth  so  that 
household  income  disparities are  reduced  across the Community. This means using market mecha-
nisms  to  ensure  that  output  is  optimized,  with 
intervention being used to distribute income. 
(iii)  The structural intervention approach starts from 
the  presumption  that  there  are  market  failures 
which result in unemployment or sub-optimal use 
of productive resources.  Policy should, therefore, 
aim to direct investment in infrastructure and pro-
ductive capacity from  advantaged regions  to the 
less-favoured  in  the  hope  that  it  is  possible  to 
increase  the  rate  of growth  of the  less-favoured 
relative to the average thereby narrowing differen-
tials. It is sometimes argued that such intervention 
can, in fact,  be a positive, rather than a zerosum 
game in so far as idle resources are activated. 
The relative merits of these  approaches for  achieving 
cohesion  are  difficult  to  establish. If the  Community 
economy functioned as  predicted by neo-classical eco-
nomics, with regions specializing according to compara-
tive advantage, there would be a tendency for incomes 
to be equalized.  On this reasoning,  the best policy to 
advance cohesion would, therefore, be to do as much as 
possible to eliminate barriers to the functioning of the 
market. But while comparative advantages can show the 
optimal allocation of resources at a point in time, they 
provide few clues to the optimal direction for long-term 
change. Where, for instance, would Japan be now if it 
had  stuck resolutely to  specialization  in  comparative 
advantage? 
An  unfettered  market approach  may  also  require  far 
greater  mobility  of labour and  capital  than  is  either 
economically realistic or socially and politically accept-
able. Labour mobility in the USA, where there is a com-
mon language, culture and (broadly) institutional struc-
ture, has traditionally played an important part in the 
trend towards convergence. In Europe, by contrast, the 
degree of diversity in social characteristics makes mi-
gration of labour particularly problematic.  Moreover, 
the trend towards a strengthening of regional identities 
that appears to be developing hand-in-glove with poli-
tical  and economic integration would  be  expected  to 
accentuate the political importance of preserving regio-
nal diversity. 
Even if factor  mobility were  feasible,  the speed  with 
which markets are able to adjust is  a further obstacle. 
Shifts in final or intermediate demand can be expected 
to  occur  rapidly  as  economic  integration  proceeds, 
whereas factor flows tend to take a long time. This could 
result in perpetuation of disequilibria, especially if new 
shocks result in further dislocations. 
The alternative view is that, with free markets, the pro-
cess of growth is  inherently unbalanced. If regions are 
going to be successful in the current international envi-
ronment  they  have  to  possess  attributes which  make 
them more competitive in the particular markets they 
are  addressing.  Under this  reasoning competitiveness 
means absolute more than comparative advantage, so 
that  if the  less  favoured  regions  limit  themselves  to 
specializing in  current comparative advantages which 
exploit relatively lower labour costs, they risk being left 
behind in capital- and knowledge-intensive  industries 
which  tend  to  be  the  more  dynamic  parts  of the 
economy. 
The work of Michael Porter in The competitive advan-
tage  of nations  provides  an  interesting  alternative 
approach to understanding competitiveness. His ideas 
refer primarily to  nations, but they can also  apply to 
other regional  entities which  have  effective  decision-
making powers and control over a substantial range of 
internal economic policy. This certainly extends to the 
first level of disaggregation of regions used in the Com-
munity,  although  to  differing  degrees  in  different 
countries because of their constitutional make-up. 
In his model,  building an effective competitive struc-
ture involves creating a four-pointed reinforcing struc-
ture where the points are: 
(i)  factor conditions; 
(ii)  demand conditions; 
(iii)  firm structure and rivalry; 
(iv)  related and supporting industries. 
This inevitably results  in a clustering of activity,  not 
necessarily  geographically,  but  certainly  in  terms  of 
industrial  structure.  In  this  way,  he  argues  that  the 
sources of Europe's success come from the concentra-
tion of various activities, such as areas of mechanical 
engineering in part of Germany, ceramic tile-making in 
a particular town in Italy, financial and related services 
in London, etc.  These clusters are seen by Porter as a 
desirable feature and are to be encouraged rather than 
resisted. There is a long list of sought-after characteris-
tics which includes: 
(a)  the  concentration of support  through  local  link-
ages; 
(b)  purchasers  demanding high  standards from  sup-
pliers- the model from Japan is often cited in this 
regard; 
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ger scale producers such as design in the clothing 
and textile industries in Italy; 
(d)  support  from  local  research  institutions  and 
universities who not only produce ideas themselv-
es but help train the people who will then work on 
research and development within the companies; 
(e)  support from local authorities in trade fairs, attrac-
tive packages for inward investment, mutually sup-
portive trade associations, like those for machine 
tools in Italy and Spain. 
The message is: let the potential sources of success blos-
som and redistribute the benefits. Cohesion then comes 
from  an acceptance by  both the successful  and those 
who are disadvantaged that the degree of redistribution 
is equitable. For it to be  both equitable and efficient, 
incentives for innovation and growth must be maintain-
ed in both the recipient and the donor regions. There is 
strong feeling in some quarters that high  marginal tax 
rates act as a disincentive - in any case if the rates are 
too high,  firms will  migrate to regions where they are 
more favourable. At the other end of the spectrum, pro-
viding subsidies is thought to dull entrepreneurial effort 
and to reduce the likelihood of  the self-generation of  fas-
ter growth  in  the  less  favoured  regions  that  is  being 
sought. 
Porter's analysis is rather more limited when it comes to 
proposing  how  regions,  nations  or  the  Community 
should  seek  to  exploit  the  advantages  of clustering. 
While policy can aim to encourage existing clusters to 
build up the four sources of  strength, it would be a legiti-
mate end to try to promote potential new clusters. Such 
a  policy  would  be  consistent  with  trying  to  create 
favourable  conditions  throughout  the  Community so 
that new clusters can develop.  One idea is  the encou-
ragement of milieux innovateurs, areas which display a 
strong propensity to innovate (see, for example, Camag-
ni,  1991 ).  This involves looking at examples of success 
and assimilating lessons that can be learned. However, 
policy has to be alert to the danger that it may not be 
possible exactly to replicate either the conditions or the 
outcomes. It would be wrong to seek a magic formula in 
which  science  parks,  university-industry  links  and 
access to venture capital are mixed together in propor-
tions that have worked elsewhere. Instead, flexibility in 
approach is needed to tailor the policy package both to 
what the region has to offer and to what can realistically 
be achieved. 
Like all strongly argued and simplified approaches, clus-
tering does not provide a universal solution to maximiz-
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ing growth.  One of the sources of growth  is  the very 
diversity of the Community.  Because of the artificial 
separation of  various regions in the past through nation-
al  non-tariff barriers on the freedom of movement of 
goods, services and labour there has been limited con-
tact between disparate approaches to the same problem. 
Without any requirement to adopt a common position, 
regions can develop rapidly by learning from  ideas to 
which  they  have  not  previously  been  exposed.  As  a 
crude generality, the least-favoured Objective 1 regions 
have often been those that have been most protected 
from  outside  influences,  unlike  Objective  2  regions 
.  which have generally been exposed to stiff external com-
petition. Such gaps in linkages are not just one way from 
the centre to the periphery but between different parts 
of the 'periphery'. The one-way model of the diffusion 
of ideas, techniques and products from the centre to the 
periphery  can  be  replaced  by  a  more  dialectical 
approach (Hingel,  1991 ). 
4.2.  The case for structural policies 
The foregoing  discussion  suggests  that although there 
are dangers in trying to distort market allocations, there 
are also powerful arguments for trying to improve the 
use of resources in less favoured regions by stimulating 
investment. These are articulated clearly in Article 130c 
of the Treaty which defines the function of the ERDF: 
'The European Regional Development Fund is intended 
to help redress the principal regional imbalances in the 
Community through participating in the development 
and  structural  adjustment of regions  whose  develop-
ment is lagging behind and in the conversion of declin-
ing industrial regions.' 
The main justification for investment in infrastructure 
and other resources is that it helps to ensure equality of 
opportunity. Because of their own lack of fiscal capac-
ity, the less favoured regions cannot provide the struc-
ture which will place them on an equal footing with the 
more prosperous regions. Indeed, given that they have 
inherent disadvantages like geographical peripherality, 
the desire to place them on an equal competitive basis 
may require an infrastructure base in excess of that in 
the advantaged regions - in essence, a form of positive 
discrimination. This sort of  argument would follow very 
much the lines that are used for encouraging the devel-
opment of  small firms or infant industries (or advancing 
the interests of  minority groups in society) that, because 
of their circumstances, need greater support than mere 
equality in the provision of  particular facilities in order 
to overcome inherent obstacles. Direct  investment  in  the  infrastructure  or  human 
resources of assisted regions has obvious attractions in 
that the funds are spent on improving the productive 
base of the local area and are thus visible evidence of 
policies that help  to achieve  cohesion.  This  does  not 
mean that the incidence of  the expenditure falls entirely 
on that area,  as  suppliers  and equipment  may  come 
from  outside the region.  A much larger proportion of 
investment in training is likely to be spent in the regio-
nal economy, although it has to be  accepted that ulti-
mately those trained may exercise the right to migrate. 
If such investment helps to overcome a constraint that 
the market cannot, because the social return is greater 
than the private return, other productive resources may, 
in addition, be activated, helping to engender positive 
cumulative processes. 
In addition, there are externality arguments to consider. 
If the free  play of market forces  leads to unbalanced 
growth, the outcome may be congestion and bottlenecks 
in favoured regions and underutilization of social capi-
tal  in less  favoured  areas.  Equity arguments are  also 
relevant. There is a deep-rooted presumption that it is 
better to attempt to move jobs to people rather than the 
reverse, particularly if a lack of opportunities threatens 
to damage the coherence of communities. This philoso-
phy is  central to the case  for  attempting to  stimulate 
indigenous activity  in  less  competitive regional  econ-
omies. 
Measurement of performance or effectiveness  of any 
kind of public support for industry and employment is 
notoriously difficult.  However, one indicator of parti-
cular relevance in the present context is  the extent to 
which additional private sector investment - especially 
inward investment - has been encouraged in the assis-
ted regions.  This was  recognized by  Commission offi-
cials  at  a  conference  held  in  Dublin  in  June  1990 
('Regional policies in the European single market: a new 
partnership with business'). However, the private sector 
should not simply be regarded as lying on the 'demand' 
side  of regional  development  initiatives,  as  it  has  a 
potentially valuable role to play on the supply side also. 
Its contribution can include: 
(i)  expertise in the packaging and provision of finan-
cial resources to include not only grants from the 
structural Funds, but also  debt and,  for  projects 
with an income-generating potential (for example, 
transport,  power  and  telecommunications  pro-
jects),  the  provision  of  an  element  of  equity 
funding; 
(ii)  skills  in project design,  selection and implemen-
tation including project management and control; 
(iii)  expertise in ex post project evaluation. 
A pro-active role for the private sector could be consi-
dered,  in  view of the shortage of skills  in initial pro-
gramme/project  design  and  selection,  financial  engi-
neering and high quality project management and con-
trol. The creation of partnership between public autho-
rities and private sector bodies would  help  to ensure 
that viable development initiatives are selected in the 
first place, that wherever possible private sector funding 
is used to supplement structural Fund grants, that pro-
jects  are  properly  managed  and  controlled,  and  that 
they represent effective contributions to regional devel-
opment once they are completed. 
It has to be recognized, however,  that structural poli-
cies, in the widest sense of  the term, may be insufficient 
to achieve equality of opportunity with the budgetary 
resources  currently  available.  For  significant  new 
resources to be available for expenditure on cohesion-
related policies, either the balance of expenditure in the 
next budget perspective would have to shift markedly or 
the overall budget would have to increase substantially. 
Even if more were spent, equality of  opportunity, which 
is a concept of potential rather than of realization, may 
still not be enough to assure cohesion. Additional policy 
instruments would therefore be required. 
4.3.  Reviewing objectives for support 
At  present,  the  structural  Funds have  five  objectives 
which can be seen as a distillation of the priorities for 
action to promote cohesion.  Since these arrangements 
have only recently been introduced, and are just build-
ing up to full operational status, their effectiveness can-
not easily be judged - even if the technical problems of 
evaluation could be  resolved.  However, in the light of 
some of  the emerging influences on cohesion, it is perti-
nent to ask whether these should remain as the principal 
aims of policy towards cohesion (both for the structural 
Funds and any other policy  instruments), or whether 
other objectives need  to be  considered. This is  given 
added poignancy by  the evidence of absorption prob-
lems in some of the recipient countries. 
A particular issue for the 1990s is whether social objec-
tives should figure  more in  cohesion policies.  In  line 
with the principle that cohesion means assuring equality 
of opportunity,  there  is  a  compelling case  for  policy 
intervention in education. If  residents in a less favoured 
region cannot obtain as good a standard of  education as 
in favoured regions, they will face long-term disadvan-
tages. The less educated will have a more limited choice 
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disadvantaged  if they  seek  to  migrate).  There  are, 
moreover, economic as well as social arguments to con-
sider. As economic activity becomes increasingly know-
ledge-intensive, regions deficient in human capital will 
become progressively disadvantaged and risk being con-
fined to specialization in stagnant or declining sectors. 
A more radical approach would be to set objectives in 
terms  of positive  attributes  such  as  target  rates  of 
employment creation, levels of infrastructure provision 
or environmental quality, rather than negative charac-
teristics such as unemployment rate or gaps in income. 
Clearly, though, the incidence (and purposes) of other 
policy areas needs to be taken into account in the setting 
of  objectives  to  promote  cohesion.  In  considering 
whether wider objectives should be targeted, the scale of 
resources has to be considered. Adding further objectives, 
such  as  environmental  improvements  or educational 
levels, will be more difficult without increased funding, 
as it would risk stretching resources too thinly and could 
mean that action fell below a threshold of  effectiveness. 
Apart from  the environment, a number of other new 
topics has emerged in the course of this study as war-
ranting action on cohesion. These include: 
(a)  Urban problems.  With  industrial  decline  having 
been most acute in urban areas in much of North-
ern Europe breaking internal cohesion,  and con-
centration of social problems in cities in Southern 
Europe, attention to the urban system is needed. 
(b)  Disadvantaged social groups. In the Europe of the 
1990s, where social and occupational mobility is 
an  increasingly prominent aim, the fact  that cer-
tain  groups  in  society  face  greater  barriers  than 
others  is,  itself,  anti-cohesive.  Ethnic minorities, 
the less  competitive groups  in  the labour market 
and  segments  of the  population  who  might  be 
adversely  affected  by  integration  are  examples. 
Such  a  focus  should  not  neglect  those  who  are 
economically inactive. 
(c)  Fragile economies and communities. An apparent 
paradox of economic and political integration is 
that it tends to accentuate the desire for diversity 
and  cultural  identity.  Some  of the  more  fragile 
economies, notably in peripheral rural areas, face 
the  specific  problem  in  relation  to  economic 
integration that they have few options for restruc-
turing. Where they depend on fishing or on precar-
ious tourist or agricultural sectors, the challenge to 
policy is to provide options which are economic-
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ally viable while preserving social and cultural val-
ues  and  the  viability of local  communities.  The 
West  of Ireland,  North-East  Portugal  and  the 
Scottish Islands are all examples of this. 
4.4.  Principles for determining eligibility 
and responsibility for cohesion policy 
A  critical  question  for  the  Community  is  where  its 
responsibility  for  cohesion ends,  and what  should  be 
left, instead, to national or regional tiers of  government. 
Though there would be resistance to too narrow a focus 
for cohesion policy, it is  highly unlikely, as the discus-
sion in the following section shows, that the Community 
will command budgetary resources sufficient to finance 
transfers of the magnitude available in Member States. 
The need for limited targets was already manifest in the 
1988 reform of the structural Funds which brought in a 
concentration  of  assistance  on  the  least  favoured 
regions. Nevertheless, all Community countries current-
ly  obtain some  assistance  from  the structural  Funds, 
even though  most of the resources go  to  Objective  1 
regions.  In  total,  eligible  areas  comprise  43% of the 
population of  the EC- 138 million inhabitants. Eligibil-
ity for the ERDF, for example, ranges from areas con-
taining 7% of  the population in Denmark and 12.9% in 
the Netherlands to 100% in Greece, Ireland and Portu-
gal. This spread of activity inevitably means that what-
ever resources are available become more thinly spread. 
A key question for the 1990s, therefore, is whether this 
eligibility is too broad and, if so, how it should be nar-
rowed down. The present arrangements are an uneasy 
compromise between giving assistance to the most de-
serving cases on the basis of Community-wide criteria 
and provision of some return to every Member State. 
This raises the question of  whether juste retour ought to 
figure in any way in revised arrangements. In principle, 
this would be hard to justify, but it may be a necessary 
political element. All  the same, the logical response to 
limited  resources  would  be  to  confine  Community 
expenditure on cohesion policy to the most deserving 
cases. As well as enabling more concentrated action, a 
clear advantage of a narrowing of  eligibility would be to 
make the scale of problems more manageable. 
4.4.1.  The role of regions in 
assuring cohesion 
With limited resources,  it  is  important for  the  Com-
munity to concentrate on assisting those regions which face the biggest constraints. This is a matter of  principle 
as well as of  resource constraint: it is incumbent on rela-
tively  prosperous  regions  or  Member  States  to  be 
responsible for the less-advantaged within their boun-
daries,  and only  to seek  the  help of the Commission 
where the scale of problems is beyond their capacity. In 
this regard, the scope for the regional tier of  government 
to assume a greater role in helping to secure cohesion 
plainly has to be considered. 
The degree to which responsibility for cohesion-related 
policies should fall on the regional tier is open to debate. 
In essence, the question revolves around the effective-
ness of different tiers of  government in formulating and 
delivering public policy. The main argument for public 
intervention in a market economy is that some form of 
market failure occurs which means that social welfare is 
less  than it might be.  In responding, the public sector 
has to strike a balance between achieving administra-
tive efficiency and being sufficiently attuned to poten-
tially conflicting demands. It is in meeting this balance 
that  there  are  compelling  arguments  for  a  greater 
involvement for the regional tier. If public intervention 
occurs at too low a level of  government, the prospect of 
actions in one locality affecting another are  consider-
able. In France, for example, the proliferation of com-
munes is considered to make collective action on issues 
such as transport links hard to achieve. Everyone wants 
access to improved facilities, no one wants the new road 
or airport to despoil their community. 
The regional level, on the other hand, is sufficiently large 
to be able to 'internalize' such spillover effects. Once it 
is accepted that, say, a new road is required, the region 
should be able to assess how it is best achieved to max-
imize regional welfare. At the same time, regions, being 
closer to their populations than the Member State tier of 
government, are typically better placed to identify local 
needs and to shape policy so as to take account of  regio-
nal culture and diversity. This is particularly true of  eco-
nomic development policies, where examples abound of 
superior results being achieved where an effective regio-
nal government or agency is involved. A trend towards 
regional rather than Member State intervention is appa-
rent not only in many European countries (the shift in 
emphasis in France being a notable example), but also 
in the USA where there has been a proliferation of new 
schemes in individual states of the union. 
The problem with seeking a greater role for regions in 
cohesion-related policies, however, is that the institutio-
nal structures vary enormously from one Member State 
to the next. As a result, it is likely to prove very difficult 
to create a common framework for the formulation and 
delivery of policy. 
4.4.2.  Eligibility criteria 
Determination of eligibility for Community assistance 
will require the application of appropriate criteria. Cri-
teria for  identifying regions  or localities where  social 
cohesion is an issue will not necessarily yield the same 
results as the economic indicators. Relevant social indi-
cators include: 
(a)  indices  of social  deprivation,  including housing, 
health and environmental conditions. These have 
to  be  looked  at  for  quite  narrowly  defined  geo-
graphical units to capture the incidence of poverty 
in  what  may  otherwise  be  relatively  prosperous 
regions; 
(b)  measures of need in terms of infrastructure, both 
physical and social, in order to attain agreed tar-
gets. On the basis of  periodic audits, revised targets 
for provision would be desirable; 
(c)  information on the distribution of income and of 
social  and  economic  mobility.  Identification  of 
particularly intractable ghettoes would be impor-
tant; 
(d)  assessment of the characteristics of the dependent 
population. 
Among  the  factors  which  to  consider  including  m 
respect of economic cohesion are: 
(i)  income per head or levels of current expenditure; 
(ii)  fiscal  capacity  of the  competent  tier of govern-
ment,  taking  into  account  existing  compulsory 
transfers from other tiers of government; 
(iii)  suitably defined measures of labour market imbal-
ance. These have to be sensitive to social and insti-
tutional peculiarities of different regions. 
Subject to satisfactory arrangements about how State 
aids affect  cohesion, responsibility for  assistance out-
side regions of Community concern would then fall on 
Member States or regions. While such an arrangement 
will almost certainly create an outcry, it represents the 
most logical division of responsibility. 
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A further aspect of eligibility that has to be broached is 
whether it makes sense  to designate purely on spatial 
boundaries,  that  is  transfers  from  richer  to  poorer 
regions determined by regional indicators. An  alterna-
tive would be to operate at the level of individuals or 
households.  A  Community-wide  progressive  tax,  for 
example, would not penalize poorer households in rich 
regions, whereas a general levy on a region would. Cur-
rently, it is rather hard to determine the incidence of  the 
Community's  revenues  because  of those  which  arise 
through the CAP. However, it is clear that the pattern of 
expenditure in some fields tends to go to richer house-
holds  in a group than to the poorer (as  indicated by 
Franzmeyer et  al.  ( 1991)  for  the CAP).  In  any  case, 
deprivation is not equally distributed across all indica-
tors for any given region and more closely targeted sup-
port on particular problems might be appropriate. 
These moves would extend equity at the level  of the 
Member State not just to the regions but to individuals 
and households as  well.  To achieve the latter, part of 
spending would  have  to  be  related  to  household  in-
comes  and for  this  reason  we  have  set  out  a  simple 
example of a social  security fund  for  the Community 
which would allocate funds  to  regions on the basis of 
household needs. 
4.5.  Who pays and the availability 
of resources 
Policy  on  cohesion  is  bound  to  be  constrained  by 
budgetary limits. There are good reasons for believing 
that the own resources of the Community, even if they 
are supplemented by agreement on raising more money 
from national exchequers, are unlikely to increase sub-
stantially during the 1990s. As Michael Emerson, one of 
the  leading  contributors  to  the  debate  on  economic 
integration, has written recently: 
'It is  certain that the Community will  not expand its 
budget in  line with  established federal  models'.  (May 
1991) 
There  would  be  strong  opposition  to  a  significant 
increase in the Community budget from the countries 
which are already net contributors. Moreover, although 
it can be argued that those Member States which benefit 
most from integration should be prepared to contribute 
more to the budget as a quid pro quo, it has to be accep-
ted  that this argument carries little weight  where  the 
Member States in question already have well integrated 
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economies. Experts consulted in Belgium, for instance, 
held the view that the Belgian economy had been open-
ed up to such an extent that consolidation of the single 
market and EMU would make little difference. Similar-
ly,  sentiment in Germany is  that although there  is  a 
strong disposition to be communautaire, support for the 
five  new  Lander coupled with  the  commitments that 
Germany is  making towards  Eastern  Europe and the 
Soviet Union must limit what the country is prepared to 
spend on the EC.  As the leading net contributor to the 
budget, Germany's voice would be very influential. 
Resistance to the establishment of new criteria for rev-
enue-raising is  also probable. A greater weight on the 
fourth resource would  increase the progressiveness of 
the revenue-raising and may be a possible direction for 
change. Major change on the revenue side must, never-
theless, be considered implausible. 
The scope for cohesion to be addressed by expenditure 
from the EC budget will, consequently, depend mainly 
on whether or not there is  a willingness  to reallocate 
money from  certain existing programmes to cohesion 
objectives.  The data presented  in  Section  2.5  of this 
report suggest  that there may well  be  some  room  for 
manoeuvre  in  this  regard.  Illustrative  calculations, 
drawing on the 1992  draft budget and the patterns of 
expenditure by Member State in the 1989 budget, show 
what might be possible. 
Although the size of the EAGGF budget makes  it  an 
obvious target, it is by no means the only one. In 1989, 
for  example,  identifiable  expenditure from  the  struc-
tural Funds in Member States amounted to just under 
ECU 8 billion. Less than half of this was  spent in the 
four  Member States with the lowest  per capita GOP 
(Greece,  Ireland,  Spain  and  Portugal),  even  though 
these  are,  by  common  consent,  the  countries  where 
most needs to be done. If  all of  the expenditure from the 
structural Funds were directed at these four countries, 
rather than being spread around, it follows that twice as 
much could be spent. It is true that the lagging Spanish 
regions compare with some of  those in the Mezzogioq10 
in their disparities from the Community average, and 
political realism suggests that exclusion of less favoured 
regions in higher income Member States is improbable. 
Nevertheless, it could be argued that where the Member 
State in question is above a development threshold, it, 
rather than the Community, should assume responsibil-
ity for  its own less favoured regions.  Ability to pay,  a 
basic principle of  public finance, would be respected. It 
would further be consistent with the principle of subsi-
diarity, with fiscal  capacity determining which tier of 
government pays. Table 4:  Preliminary draft 1992 budget 
million ECU  % 
EAGGF Guarantee Section  34660  53.2 
Structural operations  17 965  27.6 
Policies with multiannual 
allocations  2 700  4.0 
Other policies  5 048  7.7 
Repayments and administration  3 833  5.9 
Turning to the classes of  expenditure in the preliminary 
draft 1992 budget, the proposed breakdown of commit-
ments1) is as shown in Table 4. From this, it can be seen 
that agricultural guarantee payments continue to absorb 
over half the budget, while all structural operations add 
up to just over  a  quarter.  The  structural  operations 
include the Guidance Section of the EAGGF, which is 
not spatially targeted, while there are small amounts in 
the  multiannual programmes and the  "other  policies' 
which  are  regionally  targeted.  Making  allowance  for 
these, approximately 25% of  the budget could be said to 
be directed at cohesion aims. This means, for instance, 
that if there were to be transfers from the agricultural 
Figure 8: Agricultural guarantee payments 
(index of ecus per capita, EC =  1  00) 
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guarantees heading to cohesion objectives, a percentage 
point reduction in the former would increase the latter 
by two percentage points- an elasticity of about 2. This 
gives  considerable  scope  for  intensifying  the  flow  of 
assistance to the least favoured regions via cuts in agri-
cultural guarantees, without greatly altering the scale of 
support for agriculture. 
Computations based on figures published in the Official 
Journal (12. 12. 1990) show that per capita payments of 
guarantees  are  very  inequitably  distributed  amongst 
Member States (see Figure 8).  The major beneficiaries 
are Ireland, Greece, the Netherlands and Denmark. If 
the latter two  countries  had  their inflows  cut  to the 
Community average, the saving on guarantee payments 
in the 1989 budget would have amounted to ECU 2 950 
million, which is the same as the total outlay of  both the 
Regional  Fund  and the  Social  Fund  in  that  year  in 
Spain, Greece, Ireland and Portugal together. The chart 
also shows that Spain and Portugal received per capita 
payments well below the Community average. Although 
the operation of  the EAGGF means that there is no easy 
way of  planning reductions in spending, the point of  the 
exercise  is  to  demonstrate  that  a  fairly  unambitious 
reduction in EAGGF outlays could enable a near doub-
ling of  the flow of cohesion expenditure to the four least 
developed Member States. 
A more general point is  that given the sheer weight of 
ag:icultural spending, modest reductions in it can per-
mit very substantial increases on key targets of policy. 
At the same time, it has to be accepted that if a compre-
hensive  system  of  transfers  from  favoured  to  less 
favoured regions in the Community, as envisaged in the 
MacDougall Report, is  sought, much greater resources 
would be required. By the end of 1992, the budget will 
amount  to  1.2%  of Community  GDP.  If this  ratio 
increases at the same rate as in the current financial per-
spective,  it  might reach  1.25% by  1997.  How big  an 
increase in cohesion outlays would this permit? 
If agricultural guarantee outlays (and the new compen-
sation payments for price reductions) are scaled down 
gradually, it would not be unreasonable to expect these 
to fall  from the current 0.64% of Community GDP to 
0.5 %.  If,  in  addition,  all  other heads of expenditure 
remain at their present 0.26% of Community GDP, it 
would be possible for  cohesion-related outlays to rise 
from  0.3% to 0.49% of GDP by  1997.  But even this 
increase of two-thirds would fall far short of the targets 
put  forward  in  the  MacDougall  report.  These  sums 
would need to be spent only on a relatively small num-
ber of regions if they were to play a significant part in 
reducing disparities. 
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and beyond the  current or likely  Community budget 
will be needed if a degree of equalization is considered 
to be the route to cohesion. Alternatively, targets have 
to be more modest than might seem appropriate.  If a 
more extensive system of transfers (as called for in the 
Spanish submission to  the  intergovernmental confer-
ence) is sought then it is almost certain that some new 
redistributive  mechanism  will  need  to  be  created. 
Would  this  have  to  be  outside  the  traditional  own 
resources  of the  Community  and,  possibly,  outside 
Commission control? Although there would be  objec-
tions  on  grounds  of accountability  and  controL  the 
answer to both questions is almost certainly 'yes'. One 
model  would  be  the  German  Landerfinanzausgleich, 
through which there are automatic transfers from richer 
to poorer regions, though this would need a far greater 
political cohesion than at present. 
If it is accepted that need is a useful basis on which to 
grant assistance,  a  wide range of possible methods of 
allocation could be considered. A flat rate can be paid to 
all those above a certain level, payments can be propor-
tionate to need  (approximated by a  series of steps in 
payment levels perhaps) or payments could be focused 
disproportionately on the most needy. There is  a com-
mon  irony here  that  the  greatest  number of regions 
could be removed from  the category of the needy by 
focusing on those with the smallest need as it is cheapest 
to meet it. The Community has chosen the route of try-
ing to focus on the most needy but with some element of 
progression so that those with less need still tend to re-
ceive something. Since categories are used into which a 
region may or may not fall,  the receipts are inevitably 
somewhat unevenly spread compared with the graded 
need. However, these transfers have to be paid for and 
application of  ideas of  equity would suggest that budget-
ary contributions should be related to 'ability to pay'. 
vOP per capita is a commonly-used measure of ability 
to pay.  A means of incorporating it was  suggested by 
Padoa-Schioppa ( 198 7), namely that the funds available 
for  net  budgetary  contributions  to  regions  could  be 
related to their GOP per capita. This would give us a 
target against which to judge the actual  net  contribu-
tions, which vary because of the complexity of the pay-
ments system and eligibility for funds and the shortfall 
in take-up of the funds available. This need not be an 
exact formula but could cover a range either side of it 
before extra payments were triggered to bring it within 
the range. 
Padoa-Schioppa focuses on the Community budget as a 
whole at the level of  the Member State. His specific for-
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mula is  that the net  contribution for  a  Member State 
should approximate to the following 
N =in (y
8
)- c 
where N is net contribution for a Member State as a pro-
portion of its GOP, y is its average GOP per capita and 
c is  a  measure of the average capacity of the Member 
States  to  contribute.  The  parameter B represents  the 
extent  to  which  redistribution  is  desired  among  the 
Member States (Padoa-Schioppa experiments with val-
ues between 0.01  and 0.1 ),  the greater B the greater the 
redistribution. His illustration of the result is shown in 
Figure 9. Member States like C and 0  lie within the pro-
posed  band  before  the  system  is  applied,  hence  no 
change is required. Member States A and B however are 
having to pay too much (A is making a positive net con-
tribution but B's  net contribution is  already negative 
although insufficiently so).  By contrast E and F should 
pay more. 
One advantage that this formulation has is that it deals 
simultaneously with net beneficiaries and net contribu-
tors. The same functional form prevents contributions 
rising ever faster and gives a slowly falling share of mar-
ginal  incomes being  paid as  net  contributions.  Other 
functional forms are possible, even involving progres-
sively  rising  payments,  should  that  be  felt  desirable. 
Nevertheless, this smooth form  of transition both for 
the receipt of benefits and the payment of net contribu-
tions has considerable attraction to it. The width of the 
band of tolerance can also be debated. 
Figure  9:  An  equity  safeguard  mechanism  tor  the 
Community budget 
GNP per capita (EC=100) A difficulty with Padoa-Schioppa's schema, however, is 
that, since it relates to the entire Community budget, 
the equalizing method would tend to be a general trans-
fer and not greater expenditure under a particular pro-
gramme. This might be soluble if regional expenditure 
dominates the budget because if spending is  assessed 
relative to regional needs then the equalization will tend 
to be realized ex ante and the inequities, which largely 
stem from the CAP, would not be so important. 
4.6.  Good and bad practice 
Irrespective of  budgets, there is an onus on the spending 
agencies to demonstrate that the limited resources avail-
able are used in the most efficient way.  Satisfaction of 
donors  that  their  contributions  are  being  well  spent 
requires that it be demonstrated not only that inputs 
have been efficiently spent, but also that they produce 
acceptable results in terms of enhancing growth poten-
tial, adding to income and thus furthering cohesion. To 
achieve  this,  Community  institutions  must  develop 
their standards of financial  management  in line  with 
their growing responsibilities and ambitions, and con-
duct convincing evaluations of  the effectiveness of poli-
cy.  In addition, they have to be sufficiently flexible to 
change policy and to adopt best-practice instruments. 
Efficiency must be maximized because the opportunity 
cost of any expenditure, even with an increased budget, 
is alternative expenditure forgone on another project or 
region. The satisfaction of net donors is  equally essen-
tial  if taxpayers  in better-off regions  are to share the 
sense of  cohesion, and to continue contributing. A parti-
cular challenge,  with  respect  to  the subsidiarity prin-
ciple, is  to strike a balance between the economies of 
scale  and coordination achieved  by  a  higher level  of 
administration, and the local knowledge and flexibility 
of lower levels. Perceived inefficiency of local authori-
ties  may  justify  transferring  their  responsibilities  to 
regional  or  national  authorities.  But  it  may  equally 
reveal a need to reinforce the administrative capacity of 
the regional and local authorities themselves. 
A key part of  ensuring efficient delivery of  policy will be 
to learn from experience. There must be cause for con-
cern, for example, that the rate of take-up of structural 
Fund commitments is, at times, alarmingly low. In Ita-
ly,  for  example,  bureaucratic  delays  appear  to  be  a 
major problem in the administration of policy. Recent 
evidence from  East Germany indicates that there is  a 
pressing need for technical assistance in designing and 
implementing economic regeneration programmes. 
The recent evolution of regions which have manifestly 
had successful transformation can provide insights into 
the types of policies that have been successful.  Indus-
trial South Wales, which has long been recognized as a 
problem region in the UK, is an interesting example of  a 
region that has suddenly begun to exhibit dynamism. Its 
substantial  inward  investment has  undoubtedly been 
encouraged by the presence of a coherent development 
agency  which  has  been  able  to  create  appropriate 
packages for potential investors. The evidence suggests, 
however,  that the quality of the labour force  coupled 
with relatively favourable  wage  rates has also  been  a 
potent factor. 
Experience in some Italian regions, on the contrary, sug-
gests  that where  the  delivery of policy is  very  politi-
cized, its efficacy is much diminished. A separation of 
implementation from policy formulation would, conse-
quently, make sense. This is a direction being taken in 
Greece, where it has been recognized that local political 
control had diminished the impact of policy interven-
tions.  Of course,  where  agencies  or other bodies  are 
involved it is important that there be adequate forms of 
accountability to elected authorities. 
The mix of instruments used in economic development 
needs to be carefully judged. Major schemes that are ill-
suited to the needs of  the region or which cannot be jus-
tified  on  any  reasonable  cost-benefit  appraisal  - the 
Humber bridge in England or vast factories using inap-
propriate technologies in the South of Italy - not only 
waste resources, but can also be perceived as white ele-
phants and can be anti-cohesive in the impression they 
convey. Some of the experts consulted have, neverthe-
less, stressed the importance of  big projects able to make 
a mark on the recipient region and thus to demonstrate 
a commitment to cohesion. The celebrated Knock air-
port in the West of  Ireland is, arguably, an example of  a 
bold investment that can alter the direction of a local 
economy.  Policy instruments also  need to be  comple-
mentary  as  far  as  possible.  In  Ireland,  training  pro-
grammes, though expensive, have been seen as needed 
to provide the 'soft' infrastructure to go along with phy-
sical infrastructure and incentives to productive invest-
ment. 
The lack of coherence  in policy  can  diminish overall 
effectiveness,  even  if  individual  schemes  are  well-
judged. Scale of  overall effort is also relevant. In Spain, for 
example, it is considered that too little has been expend-
ed on regional development policy to have made a mea-
ningful difference. Equally, it is important to acknowl-
edge  the role  of non-spatial  policies.  Professor Allen, 
who produces an annual inventory of regional policies 
67 in European countries (Yuill et al.  1991) sums this up in 
the following aphorism: 
'Regional policy is part of regional economic develop-
ment, but regional development is  more than regional 
policy.' 
4. 7.  Modifications to the EC institutional 
structure 
One of  the complications in achieving social and econo-
mic cohesion in the EC is that it is not just a matter of 
who pays how much to whom. Nor is it just assessable 
by the opportunity cost of  the funds transferred and the 
use made of them by the recipients. The whole process 
of decision-making, administration and accountability 
forms part of the cohesive process and its acceptability. 
Thus the current moves towards what has been labelled 
'political union' form part of the process of achieving 
cohesion. 
There are several forces  at work,  some of which may 
conflict. The first  is  that major interest groups within 
society wish to feel part of the decision-making process 
and  in  the  case  of regional  cohesion  this  naturally 
includes regional and local administrations. The prob-
lem  in  the  structure of the  European  Community  is 
that institutional structures are  rather different  from 
those of  any State, whether federal or unitary. Decision-
making in the Council is  at one remove because it is 
conducted by the ministers of the Member States, not 
the constituent regions.  In the cases where the whole 
Member State is eligible for a particular form of assis-
tance, this may be less of a problem. 
Quite  radical  solutions  have  been  proposed  to  this, 
including  adding  a  second  regional  chamber  to  the 
European Parliament, making it more similar to the US 
model. It has also been suggested that there should be a 
further regional committee related to the Economic and 
Social Committee whose opinion is sought on all regio-
nal matters. This has excited considerable debate, firstly 
on the grounds that the ESC has not thus far been a par-
ticularly influential body and its expansion could mere-
ly result in a nominal increase in the inclusion of regio-
nal  interests  without  much  practical  effect.  Further-
more, it might weaken the power of more effective rou-
tes to increased regional influence which already exist 
such as those through the European Parliament and its 
committees.  It is  not at present clear what  might  be 
decided by the intergovernmental conferences but some 
increase in direct influence from the regions may assist 
the process of cohesion. 
68 
The position of  the Commission is rather different from 
any national administration and in many respects it is 
much more open to the lobbying process than is normal-
ly the case. However, exercising such opportunities for 
lobbying does depend on the level of  resources available 
and the ease of getting to Brussels. Thus small, low-in-
come and distant regions are likely to have less effective 
influence than their richer colleagues close to the core. 
This is certainly the pattern of  current representation in 
Brussels although peripheral regions are to some extent 
offsetting this by combining their forces. 
The regional voice is, of course, effectively heard in the 
Parliament but here the problem is of  the strength of  the 
Parliament  in  influencing  the  final  decisions.  Parlia-
ment's  powers  were  considerably  enhanced  by  the 
Single European Act  and it seems likely that the new 
treaty will enhance them further, perhaps going as far as 
co-determination. The role of  Parliament is particularly 
important, as far as policy for the regions is concerned, 
at the time when the policy is agreed and put into legis-
lative instruments and when the success of the policy is 
reviewed.  The  role  of parliamentary  committees  in 
making sure that the regional voice is heard should not 
be neglected and it is  no surprise that the Parliament 
should have been making the running in the debate on 
the treatment of cohesion. 
The intergovernmental conferences thus provide a cru-
cial opportunity to determine how great the role of Par-
liament should be  in the future.  There are,  however, 
other routes, not so much in this instance the Court of 
Justice but the Court of Auditors. As is clear from our 
study, the Court of  Auditors has played a central role in 
pointing out the problems of  previous use of  the structu-
ral Funds and has made several clear recommendations 
for the way forward. 
The principal function  that the  Court performs is  to 
provide an opportunity for accountability and to see not 
just that the money was spent on the right projects but 
that these projects achieved their stated aims. Combined 
with the effects of  the Committee for Budgetary Control 
in  the  Parliament, this  institution could  provide for-
midable assistance to  improving the process of cohe-
sion, especially from  the point of view of the regions 
that are net contibutors to the structural Funds, as  it 
would reassure them that their contributions are being 
used to their best advantage. 
However, the other side of the coin is that the recipient 
regions themselves wish to have substantial control over 
the way that the funds are spent. Spending a particular 
sum of money on a project when the local region agrees that this is  the right way  to spend the funds is  clearly 
more cohesive than having the decision imposed from 
above. This is one of the origins of the principle of sub-
sidiarity (see Padoa-Schioppa (1987), for example) that 
responsibility should lie at the most local level possible 
consistent with efficiency. This exercise of subsidiarity 
lies at the centre of the success of regional policies. The 
problem is to find a good balance between the  o~erall 
coherence of the programmes across the Commumty as 
a whole with the exercise of  local power. The derivation 
of  the CSFs and the switch to a programme rather than a 
project basis was  intended to help achieve this.  How-
ever, this process appears to have been only partly su~­
cessful so far (although we may get a wider range of evi-
dence when the mid-term review of  the structural Funds 
appears). 
In several instances, the new system has increased the 
bureaucratic load and has slowed down rather than sped 
up spending of the structural Funds. ~he  fault does. n.ot 
lie merely with the system but also with local adm.mis-
trations. It is noticeable that there has been a consider-
able shortfall in take-up of  the structural Funds, particu-
larly in the most disadvantaged regions. Clearly there is 
little  point  in  trying  to  spend  more  if the  limits  of 
absorptive capacity have already been  reached.  How-
ever, it appears that this limit is not because they are 
running out of suitable projects nor because there are 
insufficient local financial or building resources to carry 
through  the  programmes  but often  because  it  is  not 
possible to put together adequate project appraisal, de-
sign and management resources. 
This is something which can be solved both by an accel-
erated programme of training and development of local 
expertise  and  by  the  use  of task  forces  from  other 
regions.  Such  technical  assistance  is  difficult  to  give 
without  offending  the  sensibilities  of authorities  in 
recipient  regions  and without  contravening the  prin-
ciple  of subsidiarity;  it has  already been available  to 
some extent but has frequently not been taken up. This 
emphasizes the delicacy of balance required. If the size 
or scope of  the structural Funds is to be increased in the 
future, then the problem will be enhanced, but at least in 
this instance there are many examples round the world 
from countries at varying stages of development of  how 
such competences can be acquired. 
There are ways round the apparent conflict between the 
desires for accountability and subsidiarity. The process 
of accountability can of course be undertaken locally. 
All  legal  entities are  normally  subject  to  auditing. re-
quirements  and local  expenditures  are  no  ex~ept10n. 
The responsibility for keeping the local house m order 
can also be local. One problem that does arise, however, 
is ignorance on the part of the auditor of practices and 
progress elsewhere in the Community. In part this can 
be solved by exchange of information, but also by ran-
dom audit from the centre. 
The institutional structure of the  EC  has two  further 
impacts on the effectiveness of cohesion.  Not only  is 
motivation increased by local involvement in decision-
making and exercise of  the principle of subsidiarity, but 
it is also likely that those local needs will be more accu-
rately  identified.  Just because certain forms  of infra-
structure are  more effective  in achieving cohesion  in 
one region, this does not entail that they will necessary 
be just as effective in another. Priorities will vary. Sec-
ondly, cohesion is a dynamic problem and involves t?e 
response  to a  rapidly  changing  economic  and  social 
environment.  Improved  decision-making  throughout 
Community institutions can speed up the process consi-
derably. At present, for example, the Court of Auditors 
reports about two years after the event on the success of 
Community programmes. These reports are then debat-
ed and responses given.  It is,  however, clear from the 
latest report ( 1989) that the Court finds that it has to 
repeat the message on a number of  occasions on the sub-
ject of the structural Funds before action is taken. 
One further change in structure which has been mooted 
is the idea that there should be wider involvement in the 
process of formulating and executing the programmes 
using the structural Funds. While this would prima facie 
run counter to the objective of streamlining the admin-
istrative arrangements, the particular suggestion is for 
involving the social partners. Since it is the private sec-
tor that will,  in the main, take advantage of the new 
infrastructure, both hard and soft, in trying to increase 
the  rate  of local  economic  growth  and  employment, 
there is a clear argument why it should be involved in 
the decision-making process at the local level. If nothing 
else, this may reduce the chance of creating white ele-
phants which are built at great expense but subsequently 
not used or at least not used to the full.  On the other 
hand  it does increase the chance of  capture of  the Com-
mitt~es by particular interests, although scrutiny proce-
dures should be efficient enough to pick this up. 
This participation will tend to be more effective if  ~he 
attraction of  private sector funds forms part of  the cnte-
ria for assessing the economic viability of  projects. Such 
participation is a common requirement in the granting 
of loans.  It might appear more important to get  such 
commitment in cases of  grants where the principal does 
not have to be paid nor interest payments made as the 
project develops. 
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and economic cohesion after 1992 
The  mix  of instruments used  in  any  new  strategy  to 
advance cohesion in the next decade needs to be chosen 
in the light of a number of conflicting constraints and 
priorities. On the one hand, in acting to improve cohe-
sion, policymakers will not want to jeopardize potential 
gains from economic integration. This would imply that 
attempts to steer economic activity to less competitive 
areas  should  be  reserved  for  emergencies  rather than 
being a central plank of  policy. On the other hand, cohe-
sion policies need to ensure that potential losers from 
integration have the capacity to take opportunities that 
present themselves.  This involves building up compe-
tences, and redressing shortcomings in specific elements 
of the supply side,  for example, infrastructure, labour 
skills, or managerial talent. 
The existing portfolio of Community policies  can be 
revitalized in a way that makes them more effective in 
advancing cohesion, but there are pragmatic limits to 
what  they  can  sensibly  be  expected  to  achieve.  This 
means  that either the  demands placed on the policy 
agenda have to be scaled down, or radical departures are 
needed from current thinking on what to do to promote 
cohesion. This chapter looks at the instruments of poli-
cy that might be deployed to do so. 
5.1. The current range 
of Community policies 
In practice, the current armoury of Community policies 
to promote cohesion is limited. Although Article 130 c 
of the  Single  Act  refers  to the  role  of the  structural 
Funds, the European Investment Bank and other Com-
munity policies  in  reducing  disparities,  there  is  little 
attempt in the formulation and implementation of  other 
Community  policies  to  address  cohesion  objectives. 
Thus, the structural Funds, due to reach ECU 14 billion 
per annum by 1993, are the principal form of expendi-
ture  on  cohesion,  while  about half of EIB  lending is 
directed to regional development projects. Both types of 
intervention are  intended to  boost  investment rather 
than to support incomes (though critics of the way the 
Funds are administered maintain that the money from 
them is frequently dissipated as consumption). 
The  structural  Funds  are  coordinated  with  Member 
States' social and regional policies, and complemented 
by national financial contributions, through Communi-
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ty support frameworks (CSFs) for the assisted regions. 
The  1988  reform,  as  well  as  doubling  the  structural 
Funds over the next five years, calls for CSF assistance to 
become more clearly focused on integrated programmes 
in more closely defined regions.  Integrated Mediterra-
nean  programmes  (IMPs)  provide  some  additional 
funding and programme-management assistance to the 
Mediterranean regions of the Community. 
The  European  Investment  Bank  makes  commercial 
loans to development projects which in  1990  totalled 
ECU 13.4 billion (EIB, 1991 ). These are at market rates, 
but could be regarded as soft loans to the extent that the 
Bank is lending as though the borrower is triple-A credit-
rated, so that borrowers in less favoured regions avoid 
risk premiums. In some cases, this could be a significant 
advantage.  In  the  Mezzogiorno,  for  example,  data 
reported by Svimez ( 1991) suggest that the interest rate 
paid by  commercial entities is  two  percentage points 
higher than in the Centre-North of  Italy. Before granting 
a loan, the EIB makes a three-pronged appraisal of the 
proposed  project.  This consists of a  financial  assess-
ment, an  investigation of the technical aspects of the 
scheme and an ex ante economic evaluation. The allo-
cation between the main uses of EIB loans for the two 
most recent years is shown in Table 5. 
Table  5:  EIB financing  under the heading of regional 
development 
(million ECU) 
1988  %  1989  I  % 
Industry, services, 
agriculture  1750.5  35.6  2561.0  36.5 
Transport  854.2  17.4  1438.4  20.5 
Energy  730.5  14.9  1102.6  15.7 
Telecommunications  1003.3  20.4  1086.2  15.5 
Water, sewerage  299.7  6.1  507.4  7.2 
Other infrastructure  274.6  5.6  322.2  4.6 
Total  4912.8  100.0  7017.8  100.0 
Source: EIB Information 66, November 1990. 
The EIB lends at market rates, so the main direction of 
finance is towards production activity yielding positive 
financial  returns.  Facilities exist  within the structural 
Funds for assistance with payment of interest on loans, 
but this does not appear to be widely used. The Bank 
has largely assumed responsibility for special provision 
to  small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs),  origi-
nally provided by the New Community Instrument. Its 
capital base  has  been  progressively  increased,  with  a 
22% rise in resources in 1990 in preparation for the sin-gle market completion. The scope for further increase in 
lending activities was identified in the 1988 structural 
Fund review, which correctly points out that loans may 
be substituted for grants where a project is expected to 
yield commercial returns. 
5.2.  Changing the scope, role and 
administration of the structural Funds 
The structural Funds are the principal form  of Com-
munity  expenditure  aimed  at  enhancing  productive 
capacity  in  the  less  favoured  regions.  Together with 
loans  from  the  EIB,  they  have  the  role  of boosting 
investment  in  infrastructure,  productive  assets  and 
human capital. Considering how these Funds might be 
developed to improve their impact is bound to be a key 
part of any new cohesion strategy. The doubling in real 
terms of the structural Funds over the 1988 to 1993 pe-
riod and their recasting  within CSFs  has  meant that 
they have been able to lend support to a wider range of 
activities. However, there are serious doubts about how 
effective the fund  outlays have been in meeting their 
aims. Three kinds of difficulties have been apparent: 
(i)  absorption  of fund  money  has  not  been  easy 
because national or regional authorities have either 
not  been  able  to  generate  sufficient  projects  of 
quality which conform with Fund regulations or 
have  been  slow  or  excessively  bureaucratic  in 
implementing them; 
(ii)  co-financing rules  have  impeded those  countries 
with weak budgetary positions from implementing 
projects; 
(iii)  additionality rules have been hard to enforce, with 
some  countries  using  structural  Fund  money  to 
reduce domestic expenditure (e.g.  it has been sug-
gested that national vocational training schemes in 
France  and  the  UK are  partly  financed  in  this 
way). 
Concern has also been expressed about the bureaucratic 
demands  in  the  administration  of the  Funds  which 
appear to have increased substantially. In addition, it is 
very difficult to trace a direct link from the incidence of 
structural Fund spending to desired outcomes in terms 
of employment  creation,  income  generation  or  im-
provement in regional competitiveness. 
These problems suggest that a review of  the operation of 
the funds could be advantageous in enhancing their con-
tribution to cohesion.  This could go  in  several  direc-
tions, depending on how the aim of facilitating structu-
ral adaptation is interpreted. In order to provide viable 
long-term competitiveness, the real need is for the basic 
resources of an economy - the skills of the workforce, 
the supply of capital, the factories and the offices, and 
the managerial talent - to be convincingly and perma-
nently improved. This must be the central objective of 
economic development policies. At the same time, there 
is  a need to ensure that physical infrastructure (trans-
port and telecommunications) is  kept up to scratch -
particularly when the pull of Europe is  liable to draw 
activity away from peripheral regions. 
While  retaining  the  present  focus  on  investment,  it 
would be possible to widen the scope of the structural 
Funds  to  put  a  greater  emphasis  on  environmental 
objectives and social objectives, notably on building up 
human capital.  This would ensure that their coverage 
extended to investment in improving all the factors of 
production, rather than being limited to capital. At the 
same time it is essential to recognize not only that diffe-
rent factors  deserve  priority in  different  regions,  but 
that the priority in any region will shift through time. In 
many lagging regions, the need for basic infrastructure 
remains acute. The STAR programme, which has assist-
ed the installation of telecommunications networks in 
Objective  1 regions,  has patently helped to  accelerate 
change in this respect, but it is clear that gaps remain to 
be filled.  In a number of Objective 2 regions,  a more 
pressing need is to upgrade the quality of business ser-
vices which often fall  short of the quality available in 
more favoured regions (IFO, 1990a). 
Elsewhere, however, it is arguable that an altogether dif-
ferent  mix  of structural  interventions  is  called  for. 
Training schemes are a case  in point. The IFO study 
( 1990b) highlighted the importance of qualified labour 
as  a  factor  businesses  regard  as  crucial,  but it is  one 
which has to be approached with some subtlety, since 
skill needs can shift quite rapidly. Action on long-term 
unemployment or insertion of youths into the labour 
market plays a useful role in supporting disadvantaged 
groups  and  thus  in  improving  social  cohesion.  This 
tends,  however,  to  neglect  the  training  needs  of the 
employed  workforce  or  shortcomings  in  managerial 
skills  and  entrepreneurial  capability.  The  quality  of 
social infrastructure -the residential environment, the 
quality of  local services, etc. - is also worth attention as 
a factor in regional competitiveness. The implication is 
that policy needs to be able to adapt to shifting circum-
stances  and that priorities  are  bound to  differ  from 
region to region. 
How is this to be achieved? The first requirement is to 
establish an effective framework for the delivery of  poli-
cy.  In this regard, the CSFs obviously represent a fresh 
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from any appraisal of  economic development strategies, 
however,  is  the  importance  of a  flexible  approach. 
There is little point in having grandiose, rigidly design-
ed schemes which make it appear as  though plenty is 
being done but which pay little heed to local circum-
stances  and  which  do  not adapt as  problems  evolve. 
Part of  the answer may lie, therefore, in the application 
of  the principle of  subsidiarity to ensure that the various 
local public authorities and other local actors play a cen-
tral part in determining and delivering policy. Yet there 
are also dangers in continuing to rely on local adminis-
trations  which  manifestly  lack  the  necessary  level  of 
competence. It has been argued, for instance, that rad-
ical institutional change is needed in much of the Mez-
zogiorno to overcome shortcomings in administration 
that have hampered economic development policies. 
A second improvement would be  for  assistance chan-
nelled through the structural Funds to be more explicit-
ly  linked  with  national  and  Community  policies  in 
fields  other  than  the  spatial.  Some  countries/regions 
achieve this through the medium of development agen-
cies with broad remits. There is a case for Community-
funded agencies to become involved at local levels in 
areas where failings of administrative competence can 
be shown to have detracted from the effectiveness of  the 
structural Funds, although it would need to be recogniz-
ed that this could offend political sensitivities. 
As well as looking for improvements in the role of the 
funds in building up structures, it is worth asking wheth-
er some shift in emphasis towards incentives for pro-
ducers or the encouragement of  services is also warrant-
ed. This has been tried, if perhaps somewhat tentative-
ly, in the STAR programme in relation to telecommuni-
cations services. More generally, the importance of the 
availability  of business  services  to  regional  develop-
ment merits examination as a target for the structural 
Funds. 
With respect to additionality, three distinct points merit 
consideration. First, in those more favoured countries 
where the principle of  additionality is not strictly adher-
ed to, the recycling of money from national budgets via 
Brussels to national programmes is an evident absurd-
ity.  Second,  the  obligation  on  countries  with  weak 
budgetary positions to co-finance projects should not be 
allowed  to  obstruct  worthwhile  projects.  Conditions 
would  obviously  need  to  be  imposed  to  restrict  any 
windfall gains from being used to boost consumption, 
but there should be scope for the investment to proceed 
without unnecessary hitches. Derogations from additio-
nality rules might provide the answer, or a reserve fund 
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to assist public authorities facing budgetary stress might 
be contemplated. 
The third point regarding additionality is  perhaps the 
most critical. The real test of the effectiveness of any 
policy instrument is the aggregate effect it has on the 
target economy. Much more attention needs, therefore, 
to  be  paid to the total  investment,  employment  and 
activity stimulated by a project, as well as to the effects 
on innovation and entrepreneurial behaviour. To focus 
only on ensuring that public investment is  additional 
neglects the contribution of complementary investment 
from the private sector. 'Leverage', the response of pri-
vate investment to public is becoming acknowledged as 
an important test of  the effectiveness of  a scheme in fos-
tering economic advancement. It ought to be brought 
into  the  equation  for  structural  Fund  interventions. 
Part of this will,  of course,  be foreign  inward invest-
ment. External ownership of productive assets is  open 
to the criticism that it creates dependency, though it is 
generally considered that this worry is overshadowed by 
benefits. It is important all the same not to overlook the 
significance of  levering-in additional indigenous invest-
ment as well as seeking inward investment. 
5.3.  Intergovernmental and/or 
interregional transfers 
On the face  of it,  a form of fiscal  equalization system 
would seem to be a natural way  forward for the Com-
munity.  Virtually all  nation-States  have  some  sort of 
redistributive  mechanism,  whether  it  is  direct  inter-
regional equalization or is implicit in the interaction of 
taxes and benefits. Yet it is clear from the research car-
ried out for this study that any proposed scheme would 
face  formidable  obstacles.  Indeed,  the  difficulty  of 
extending Germany's extensive interregional redistribu-
tion  system  (Liinderfinanzausgleich)  to  the  Eastern 
Lander indicates the possible problems of attempting 
such a policy at the EC level. 
It is important, for cohesion, to look at how income is 
raised as well as how it is spent. At present, most of the 
Community budget  is  raised  from  expenditure taxes, 
and thus tends to be regressive, although it is obviously 
equitable  to the  extent  that countries  with  large  per 
capita expenditure pay relatively more. When the GDP 
resource is  called on (it  has  not been  in the last  two 
years), the link to ability to pay is more direct. 
An ever-present danger with unhypothecated transfers 
is  that they  create  a  climate of dependency  amongst 
recipients while being seen as handouts to scroungers by 
donors.  A related  risk  is  that transfers  would  favour consumption rather than investment and could lead to 
the Community as a whole investing too little. Although 
higher consumption may, in the short-term, be cohesive 
in  its  impact on  recipients of assistance,  the adverse 
effect on wealth creation would be damaging in the long 
term.  The  scheme  proposed  in  the  Spanish  Govern-
ment's submission to the intergovernmental conference 
for the creation of a fund which is financed by an auto-
matic levy on regions with above-average  incomes to 
pay for infrastructure projects in less prosperous regions 
is a clever mix of transfers and structural policies in so 
far as it would favour investment. 
The  MacDougall  Report  suggested  that,  using  a 
mechanism  similar to  the  German  Liinderfinanzaus-
gleich, a 40% reduction in inequalities between the nine 
Member States in  1975  could have been achieved by 
transfers to the national governments of the three poor-
er Member States from the six richer ones equivalent to 
2% of Community GOP. In practice, however, a total 
Community budget of 5 to 7% of GOP would be neces-
sary to support a full  EMU. Transfers on this scale are 
almost certainly beyond what is  politically realistic at 
present. However, provided that the visibility of what-
ever tax is used to finance any transfers is low, it might 
be possible to go some way towards an automatic trans-
fer mechanism. In this respect, a VAT levy, though less 
progressive than income tax,  may have much to com-
mend it. 
5.4.  R&TD dispersion or new forms 
of interregional R & D cooperation 
The perception that the EC  is  losing ground to Japan 
and the USA in the race to develop and diffuse a range 
of emerging technologies - including microprocessors, 
optical fibres,  robotics, new materials and biotechnol-
ogy- has prompted a series of Community initiatives. 
However,  the  introduction of these  technologies  is  a 
force for regional imbalance, since they tend to develop 
first in already-advanced industrial centres and to offer 
few  initial linkages to the areas outside.  Work by  the 
FAST team (Hinge  I,  1991) identifies 10 major 'islands 
of  innovation' in Northern Europe within which 80% of 
science-based innovations have occurred. The Commu-
nity's problem is  to maximize its overall rate of tech-
nical  progress  while  ensuring  that  the  income  and 
employment gains are equitably spread. 
Progress has been made in raising the scale and produc-
tivity of European research and technical development 
(R & TD) by increasing the resources allocated to it and 
reducing the duplication of R & TD effort in different 
companies and countries. A combination of increased 
competition  and  corporate  restructuring  within  the 
single  market  increases  the  ability  and  incentive  for 
companies to develop and commercialize new product 
and process technologies. At the pre-competitive stage, 
the twin deterrents to private R & TD in major new tech-
nologies  - external  benefits  from  their development, 
and the large long-term costs of some research - have 
been successfully overcome with the help of Commu-
nity  research  programmes  such  as  Eureka,  Sprint, 
RACE and Jessi. 
The exchange of  ideas among university researchers and 
between universities and industry, on which many cur-
rent innovations depend, has been promoted, as has the 
industrial training on which introduction of advanced 
techniques  often  depends.  There  are  also  successful 
programmes for the diffusion of new technologies, such 
as STAR for telecommunications and Tedis for electro-
nic data interchange. In Japan, R & TD joint ventures 
have  achieved  considerable  technical  advances,  but 
those  organized  by  private  firms  outperform  those 
sponsored by the State. In the USA, successful firms still 
appear to go  it alone,  and government-backed  initia-
tives (such as Sematech) have had few positive results. 
But for historical reasons, European firms still lack the 
close links that allow multilateral joint ventures, and the 
absolute  scale  or  geographical  clustering  that  assist 
large-scale  R & TD within the  firm.  Community-orga-
nized initiatives therefore have an important role, and 
have already recorded positive results. The Community's 
FAST programme for technology forecasting and assess-
ment has  identified four  priorities for  future  R & TD 
policy (FAST,  1989): 
(i)  Greater emphasis on basic research, to explore fun-
damental  links  between  science,  technology  and 
society. New initiatives are suggested in microelec-
tronics, photonics, new materials, cognition, nutri-
tion, and alternative land uses. 
(ii)  The use of current Community R & TD program-
mes to promote social cohesion, especially through 
improved working conditions, public understand-
ing of science and technology, and the diffusion of 
new  technologies  (especially  in  information  and 
communication) to small firms. 
(iii)  Application of R& TD to education and training, 
and to the creation of networks among enterprises 
in lagging regions similar to those that now exist in 
more advanced regions. 
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regions outside Europe.  Current Community ini-
tiatives focus  on leading-edge  R & TD, and their 
benefits will go mainly to cities and regions which 
already  support  concentrations  of  advanced 
industries. R & TD breakthroughs will continue to 
occur  predominantly  in  these  urban  centres, 
because  these  contain  the  advanced  users  from 
whom  innovative  ideas  increasingly  originate 
(FAST,  1989),  and  the  clusters  of enterprises, 
researchers and users within which they can best be 
developed. To maintain Europe's global competi-
tiveness, particularly against America and Japan, it 
is  vital that these R & TD centres continue to be 
promoted. 
Thus, the R & TD of  advanced technologies is necessari-
ly regionally unbalanced. To maintain cohesion within 
the Community, it is equally important to assist R & TD 
within smaller enterprises outside the economic centres. 
The less favoured regions tend to have an above-average 
representation of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs)  (Nam et al.,  1991 ).  These are  often less  well-
equipped  than  larger  enterprises  to  carry  out  the 
R & TD needed to remain competitive in fast-changing 
markets. At the same time, small enterprises can be an 
important vehicle for  the introduction of innovations 
(Rothwell,  1986).  The  difficulty  of forecasting  which 
new technologies will  become economically important 
makes  it  important  to  avoid  overconcentration  of 
R& TD either regionally or sectorally. 
The  diffusion-promoting  programmes  will  help  less 
favoured  regions  acquire  new  technologies  developed 
elsewhere,  as  will  inward  investment  by  innovation-
driven firms. However, there may be substantial additio-
nal benefits from creating R & TD capacity within these 
regions. This is, firstly, because technologies developed 
in advanced areas may not be appropriate to the factor 
conditions and consumption needs of developing areas 
(Schumacher,  1973); secondly, because imported tech-
niques arrive only after a lag, with inward-investors usu-
ally waiting for technologies to mature before exporting 
them; and, thirdly, because, as with all income-generat-
ing activity, it is preferable to install indigenous capa-
city than to rely on continual transfers. New measures 
to promote R & TD in smaller enterprises outside urban 
centres could build on structural instruments already in 
place. The social and economic infrastructures support-
ing innovation can be strengthened by improved scien-
tific and technical training; public provision of research 
funding and facilities;  easier access to venture capital 
for investment in new or improved techniques; scienti-
fic  and educational exchanges;  better telecommunica-
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tions; and provision of advice and information to small 
businesses.  There is  scope  for  promoting networks of 
small firms in peripheral and lagging regions, similar to 
those  which  have  been  identified linking technology-
based firms in the leading regions (Hingel,  1991 ). 
The Community would do well to continue to follow a 
two-pronged  approach,  promoting  'state  of the  art' 
R & TD to maintain its global competitive edge, but also 
ensuring a  wider production and  distribution of new 
technological opportunities. 
5.5.  Education and training 
Many  new  industrial  processes  make  additional 
demands on the skill and adaptability of the workforce. 
At the same time, rising competition in the world mar-
ket for existing products requires adoption of new tech-
nologies  and work  practices  for  which  a  trained and 
motivated workforce is  vital. The quality of the work-
force is an increasingly important factor in deciding the 
location of new investment, and considerable evidence 
has been found linking inferior labour productivity to a 
shortfall  in  educational  and  vocational  qualifications 
(Prais, 1990). Education and training are, consequently, 
central to cohesion, from the perspectives both of regio-
nal  competitiveness  and,  through  its  influence  on 
opportunities for individuals, on social cohesion. 
The new skills required in the industrial and service sec-
tors are often more analytical and less mechanical than 
in  the  past,  requiring  employees  to  understand their 
technology,  and  its  place  in  the  production  process, 
rather  than  repeating  a  narrowly  defined  task.  New 
techniques  of  organization,  such  as  total  quality 
management to eliminate separate quality checks and 
just-in-time scheduling to reduce stocks, place consider-
able new responsibilities on all levels of the workforce. 
New  technologies,  particularly  computer-numerical 
control in manufacturing and information technology 
in  services,  must  be  adopted  quickly  if competitive 
advantage is to be maintained. Employees must increas-
ingly combine a highly-developed technical skill with a 
broad-based understanding of  the principles on which it 
is  based, and of processes outside their specialism.  In 
some occupations, where product and process technol-
ogy is changing rapidly, they must be receptive to con-
tinual re-training. 
Widespread  reports  of skill  shortages  in  high-growth 
industries and regions have reinforced the perception of 
the availability of skilled labour as a limiting factor on 
industrial development. It is feared that if industries do 
not solve the problem by increasing the supply of skills, they will be forced to retreat into lower-skill, lower-pro-
ductivity and ultimately lower-wage products and pro-
cesses. The rapid increase in academic and vocational 
skills  in  the  newly-industrializing  countries,  once 
regarded  as  cheap  labour competitors,  reinforces  the 
economic  need  to  upgrade  European  labour  skills. 
There are  also  quite separate social  advantages from 
giving workers additional training, in terms of higher 
wages, better employment prospects, more mobility and 
a sense of personal value which bear directly on social 
cohesion. 
Another human resource deficiency often arises at the 
level of middle-management, both in  private industry 
and public administration. Ambitious and fundamen-
tally sound strategies often fail,  or become submerged 
by short-term considerations, because of a lack of tech-
nical skills and experience at the implementation and 
project-management level.  In some Community coun-
tries, employees typically rise into these positions after 
performing well in more junior posts in the commercial/ 
administrative  structure.  Problems  can  arise  when 
technical and craft skills are inadequately supplemented 
by  planning and  managerial  abilities  required  in  the 
new  post.  In  some  countries,  academically  successful 
employees are specially trained to fill managerial posts, 
but in others, both operational and managerial skills are 
generally lacking. The issue for policy to advance cohe-
sion is that the market tends not to supply the necessary 
investment in training.  Education and training there-
fore have the characteristics of a public good. 
There are some important distinctions between the eco-
nomic approach, of using training to enhance the skills 
of  the entire workforce in an industry or region, and the 
social approach of using training to improve employ-
ment opportunities. The first will tend to target training 
at those who are already in work and possess some certi-
fied  skill, while the second directs it at socially disad-
vantaged people, principally those out of  work and lack-
ing formal qualifications. The first will tend to empha-
size broad-based, widely applicable skills which employ-
ers can supplement with specific training, while the sec-
ond often targets specific skills which are believed to be 
highly employable. Success of  the first approach is mea-
sured by the rise in attainments within the workforce, 
the flow of  new inward and indigenous investment, and 
changes in overall growth and employment rates. Suc-
cess of the second is  measured by the attainments and 
subsequent employment success of individual trainees. 
To a degree this encapsulates the distinction between 
economic and social cohesion. 
Budget constraints raise three important questions with 
regard to funding of education and training: 
(i)  First, what is the appropriate public contribution, 
relative to the contribution of private employers 
and employees? 
(ii)  Second, at the margin, is cohesion advanced more 
readily by training to improve the stock of  skills in 
a region, or training to improve the employment 
opportunities of particular social groups? 
(iii)  Third, to what extent should education and train-
ing,  traditionally the  preserve of Member  State, 
regional or local authorities, be addressed by  the 
Community? 
The first question is difficult to answer because levels of 
public funding to post-compulsory education and train-
ing  differ  substantially  across  the  Community.  The 
comprehensive system in Germany, for example,  of a 
near-universal apprenticeship system is  mainly funded 
by  private employers,  while  in  France a  system  with 
similar coverage receives State support through training 
colleges  and technological universities.  In  some other 
Member States, provision is much more piecemeal. The 
extent of employee-financed training depends heavily 
on the availability of loans, and on the expected oppor-
tunities  opened  up  by  the  acquisition  of skills.  The 
extent of employer-financed training depends  heavily 
on rates of labour turnover and on the scale of training 
outlay  by  other employers,  since  widespread  training 
and low turnover rates reduce the threat of poaching 
and refusal to train. 
Within countries, educational expenditure is often fair-
ly  evenly  spread  (most  localities  have  a  school,  and 
universities are often located outside  main industrial 
centres), but private-sector vocational training will tend 
to be more readily available in urban regions supporting 
profitable enterprise, and some regions bemoan the lack 
of institutes of learning. Clearly, on-the-job training in 
new skills is most easily provided in regions housing the 
'sunrise' industries that demand them. The output from 
education and training is more regionally unbalanced, 
since  those  with  qualifications  are  more  likely  to 
migrate to more prosperous areas. Although an improv-
ed skills base makes a region better able to attract new 
enterprise,  too long  a lag  in  its  arrival will  cause the 
skills  to  go  elsewhere.  It  is  vital  that programmes of 
industrial development and employment creation oper-
ate alongside assistance to education and training. 
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debate. It is  quite possible that economic benefits are 
maximized by giving further training to those already 
qualified and in work,  while  social  benefits are  max-
imized by giving training to those without jobs or quali-
fications. However, it remains likely that the economic 
returns to human resource development remain higher 
when it is  directed at those who are already relatively 
privileged. A different allocation of funds between the 
regional  and social  objectives,  as  noted above,  could 
achieve this local variation. 
Given regional differences in the commitment to edu-
cation and training and the contributions of the private 
sector to funding it, the need for additional public input 
to human capital formation must be assessed separately 
for each assisted region. The answer to the third ques-
tion  is,  consequently,  linked  to  the fiscal  capacity  of 
regions. Whether structural Fund assistance should go 
towards  this  purpose  also  depends on  the  other uses 
available, and their expected social returns. 
5.6.  A common social security fund or 
similar automatic stabilizer 
One of  the crucial issues in achieving cohesion is wheth-
er actions should be aimed at improving the standard 
and quality of life  of those most disadvantaged or at 
enhancing the resources of particular regions  without 
specific concern for the distribution of benefits among 
the inhabitants of those regions. As Community policy 
stands at present it is largely in the second camp. Desir-
able objectives for expenditure have been derived prin-
cipally in terms of hard and soft infrastructure. How-
ever,  the further spending  moves  into the  soft  infra-
structure (for example, training, education, health), the 
more likely it is that the funds will be spent on individu-
als  and  particularly  on  those  individuals  in  greatest 
need. Thus, those who already have considerable skills 
are  less  likely  to  benefit  from  training  programmes, 
while those who can afford health insurance will  have 
less need for public schemes. 
Several other Community policies are already directed 
at  individuals.  For example,  the  latest  price  support 
proposals for the CAP distinguish between categories of 
farmers according to the size of  their holdings and hence 
their incomes. It is, therefore, worth exploring whether 
it might not be more appropriate to tackle these ques-
tions of individual or household need directly. 
Such needs can either be met directly by providing the 
appropriate  facilities  - hospitals,  doctors,  training 
courses  for  which  charges  may  or may  not be  made 
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depending upon the Member State or region's decision 
- or by providing income support to enable the poorest 
households to improve their standard ofliving. The par-
ticular form  of income  support could  be  general  - a 
social security payment - or dedicated to a particular 
service, e.g.  a bus pass, a training voucher, or an elec-
tricity bill rebate.  Various arguments are put forward 
for preferring one scheme to another, but the major jus-
tification for payments to the household is that they are 
better targeted. The more dedicated the payment/credit 
the more closely targeted it becomes. 
In general, such payments would be an addition to the 
existing structural Funds as they tend to cover current 
spending rather than the investment to provide the ser-
vice. However, they might be more successful in lever-
aging  private-sector  contributions  towards  cohesion 
than an increase in the availability of publicly owned 
and  operated  infrastructure.  Thus,  providing  retired 
people with housing vouchers which they could use in 
retirement homes might bring forward investment from 
the private sector to set up such homes. 
The establishment of a new fund aimed at individuals 
and households would be a way for the Community to 
demonstrate that it was concerned to address the prob-
lems of individuals as well  as  regions collectively.  To 
dovetail  neatly  with  the  existing  structural  Funds,  it 
could take the form of a new social security fund which 
tackles the problems of those who are disadvantaged in 
terms  of income  and  unemployment.  This  has  the 
advantage that it uses the same two principal criteria 
that are applied to the regions themselves. 
This proposal has a second advantage in that it lies be-
tween the two categories of payments that can be made 
to less favoured regions. The first is specific grants, as 
are used at present for the structural Funds, which must 
be  spent on agreed programmes currently specified in 
great detail, so  that the distinction between them and 
individual projects is actually rather small and the sec-
ond, unhypothecated transfers which regions can use to 
enhance their general level of spending. For the latter, 
the area of spending is  laid down but not the specific 
allocation. 
If  this new fund is to be accepted and come into place in 
the course of the next  few  years,  this set of transfers 
would have to be an addition to existing social security 
systems and not a new system. In any case, this proposal 
would have to respect the principle of subsidiarity and 
let  each  region/Member  State  decide  what  particular 
form of  social security transfer suited it best. It would be 
important to permit different  assessments  of relative needs within the overall requirement that the funds go 
directly to less advantaged households. 
Furthermore, by focusing on social security the spend-
ing requirement will vary with economic circumstances, 
rising as the economy turns down relative to trend, ris-
ing  for  areas  experiencing  problems  of  structural 
change,  yet  falling  automatically as  the problems are 
resolved. It would, thus, be a form of automatic stabili-
zation for both problems of adjustment to the require-
ments of closer integration and for asymmetric respon-
ses to shocks to the system, payments tending to flow 
towards the areas of greatest need. This could be parti-
cularly useful as new strains appear in the run-up to eco-
nomic and monetary union. 
The  specific  form  of the  fund  is  obviously  open  to 
debate, but needs could be assessed in a similar way to 
that used for the structural Funds at present, with one 
criterion  based  on  unemployment  and  the  other  on 
income per head.  It would  be  possible to construct a 
needs formula  which  might,  for  example,  give  added 
weight to unemployment according to length of  time out 
of work or age if it is thought that the emphasis should 
fall on a particular group such as the young. However, 
while unemployment measures directly identify the tar-
get population, measures of average GOP per capita do 
not. It is necessary to look at the distribution of  incomes 
and not just the  average  level.  Focusing  on  incomes 
rather than GOP would help overcome the problems of 
the net flows of income out of the region. 
At  first  blush  this  sounds  like  a  heavy  additional 
requirement, but all the information is collected already 
for national tax and social security systems. As  in the 
national cases, the relevant income would be that before 
tax. Clearly what would be required at the Community 
level  to assess  needs would  be  some  measure  of the 
nature  of the  income  distribution.  Such  a  measure 
might be a calculation of the proportion of the inhabi-
tants of  a region below a particular income level relative 
to the Community average or it could be the average 
income of the poorest x% in the region. 
Requirements of additionality could be imposed on the 
regions in an attempt to prevent them cutting benefits 
paid from their own resources, although this would be 
just as difficult to enforce as it is for any other form of 
spending, as  it is  impossible to say what would other-
wise have been spent. Even in the event of total failure 
to achieve such additionality, the payment would effec-
tively take the form of an unhypothecated transfer -
however, it would be possible for the nation to switch 
that transfer out of the particular region to the national 
budget if part of local expenditure is centrally financed 
as is universally the case. It is thus very difficult here, as 
in all other cases, to disprove the existence of additio-
nality as there is no objective description of  what would 
have been done otherwise to stand against the current 
spending plans. 
Member States vary in the way they apply their social 
security  systems,  variously  targeting  individuals  and 
households. Providing the calculations are universally 
on a similar basis from the point of  view of  assessing the 
per capita need, how the region chooses to allocate it 
need not be the same, thus preserving the principle of 
subsidiarity. While there may be externalities as a result 
of the differing systems and the way the regions choose 
to apply the new social security fund, the major reaction 
would have to be in terms of the labour force  voting 
with its feet  and moving to where the rules are more 
congenially interpreted. 
Thus, for each region in the Community, it is possible to 
assess the numbers falling below given income or unem-
ployment levels. It is up to the specific design whether 
all payments are focused on the worst off or whether a 
graded system is introduced, say a payment of one size 
for all those below 2 5 % of  average income and half that 
for  all  those between 25% and 50%. The size of the 
fund can be based on a proportion of Community GOP 
so  there  is  no  danger of total  spending  rising  above 
desired limits. The total size can be fixed in advance for 
the five-year spending programme of the Community, 
with the exact  sums  involved  being estimated on  an 
annual basis for the individual regions on the basis of 
their needs and the yield from Community GOP. 
It is likely that all regions would benefit on this criterion 
as all have wide ex ante distributions of income. A sec-
ond criterion would therefore have to be introduced if 
the fund did not need to be of enormous size, based on 
the ability of the region  to meet its own needs.  This 
could be on exactly the same basis as at present in terms 
of average per capita GOP, compared with the Com-
munity average, adjusted for abnormal costs stemming 
from low density of population, rapidity of structural 
change or need for urban renewal.  It is  also  a  choice 
whether the eligibility for funding varies across a range 
or whether it is a simple absolute criterion as at present. 
Under a  variable regime, eligibility could be assessed 
according to the extent to which GOP fell  short of the 
Community average as  is  discussed in more detail in 
Section 6.1.  For example, those with GOP per capita 
less than 60% of the average could receive 100% fund-
ing,  while  those  above  80%  would  receive  nothing. 
Using a straight line proportion would give those with 
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pa (1987) suggests a logarithmic approach whereby the 
poorer regions get progressively more. 
Other forms of fund for dealing with individual depri-
vation and stabilization have also been advocated, the 
most widely canvassed of which is  an unemployment 
fund (see the MacDougall Report (1977), for example). 
The advantage of such a fund is that it is directly stabi-
lizing  in character,  making transfers  to  those  regions 
experiencing  problems,  although  in  view  of the  low 
unemployment  rates  in  some  of the  least  favoured 
regions, the targeting would miss some important objec-
tives. Again, it is possible to restrict the range of spend-
ing on which the funds should be used. Such a fund can 
operate on a self-financing basis with those who are in 
employment  in  effect  making  the  contributions  and 
those  who  are  out  of work  receiving  the  benefits. 
However, most proposals for unemployment funds are 
for funds which are used to try to increase employment 
in areas of  high unemployment, rather than transfers to 
individuals who  are  unemployed.  Nevertheless,  even 
with a rather more broadly based stabilization instru-
ment like a social security fund, there is no reason why 
the means of equalization should not take the form of 
the German Landerfinanzausgleich if so desired. Such 
transfers do not have to be unhypothecated and can be 
paid into a specific fund. 
Stabilization  funds  could  therefore  take  the  form  of 
assisting households or the  unemployed directly or of 
providing regional assistance towards business activity 
during short-run difficulties. Just as with any State, it is 
difficult to forecast whether any current downturn is a 
cyclical  movement  requiring  temporary  assistance  to 
prevent unnecessary hardship and costly changes, which 
would  soon  be  shown  to  have  been  unnecessary,  or 
whether it  reflects an enduring change in competitive-
ness  requiring  longer-term  funding.  Beginning  with 
short-term  funding  and  then  making  a  transition  to 
longer-term  funding  is  not  the  right  response  as  the 
short-term funds  are aimed at preventing unnecessary 
change  not  encouraging  regions  to  undertake  longer-
term restructuring. 
5. 7.  State aids and cohesion 
There will always be conflicts between regional, nation-
al and pan-European cohesion objectives, a point exem-
plified by the debate on State aids. These are defined in 
the  Second survey of State aids  (Commission of the 
European Communities, 1990c) to be incentives or oth-
er forms of assistance which confer competitive advan-
tages on the undertakings receiving them (distinguish-
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ing them from general measures, which do not explicitly 
discriminate between different sectors or undertakings). 
All tiers of government adopt policies to promote eco-
nomic activity either generally in their territories or in 
localities which are judged to be  relatively  disadvan-
taged. Thus it is that rural areas of a prosperous region 
such  as  Baden-Wiirttemberg  have  been  eligible  for 
assistance from the Land government on the reasonable 
grounds that they compare unfavourably with the main 
urban centres. As  the Commission's Second survey of 
State aids shows, there is a wide range of  different sorts of 
State aids, a sizeable proportion of which is not readily 
visible. 
Aids have been concentrated on the manufacturing sec-
tor and appear to have been highest (as a proportion of 
gross  output)  in Greece,  Portugal,  Ireland  and  Italy. 
However, when aids are expressed in terms of outlays 
per employee, it is  Italy, with double the Community 
average, which gives most assistance. These aids are on 
offer throughout Italy,  though at a higher rate in the 
Mezzogiorno. In those countries with acute budgetary 
difficulties, State aids account for big shares of public 
expenditure: 6% in Italy, Greece and Belgium, compar-
ed with 2% in the Netherlands and Denmark. 
State  aids  in  relatively  favoured  regions  or Member 
States can be contrary to cohesion if they conflict with 
wider spatial objectives, be it less favoured parts of  Ger-
many, or Objective 1 regions where there are companies 
which  compete  in  the  same  markets  as  the  assisted 
firms. A second dimension of this is fiscal capacity. In 
general,  less  favoured  regions  of the  Community are 
less  able to finance aids to industry, because of other 
demands on public expenditure and a lesser tax base.') 
This is exacerbated where the public administration in 
question is in budgetary deficit, as in Greece or Italy. As 
a result, weaker regions are not able to offer incentives 
on a sufficient scale to compete with those available in 
more prosperous regions, let alone at levels that would 
yield competitive advantages, so that the effect of State 
aids tends to act counter to cohesion. 
DG IV of the Commission is already active in trying to 
curb State aids (in pursuance of Article 92 of the Single 
Act)  in favoured  regions,  but it is  plain that this has 
some  way  to go.  The Commission survey  shows  that 
most of the State aids are not regionally targeted. Over 
1  It might be argued, of  course, that if  expenditure on State aids is 
cut back, administrations in favoured regions would ceteris pari-
bus be  able to cut taxes across the board, thereby  improving 
competitiveness by a different route. However, as this replaces a 
targeted by an untargeted policy, the impact on the most sensi-
tive industries is likely to be smaller. the period 1986 to 1988, it is estimated that the volume 
of State aids was  three times as  great as  Community 
resources spent to support activity (and most of that, of 
course, was in agriculture). Derogations from Article 92 
are allowed for regional aid under the provisions of Sec-
tion 3 to the article which covers 'aid to promote the 
economic development of areas where the standard of 
living is abnormally low or where there is serious under-
employment'. 
Although  there  are  large  differences  in  the  cohesion 
impact of different sorts of State aids, it is plain that a 
greater stress  on Community rather than national or 
regional objectives in the way State aids are granted is 
necessary as part of a strategy to achieve cohesion. The 
whole question of  State aids is one that provokes heated 
debate. From the point of view of completing the inter-
nal market, any State aids can be regarded as an impedi-
ment. On the other hand, there is  widespread support 
for interventionist industrial policy, with differences in 
political ideology central to the question of whether or 
not such policies are regarded as worthwhile. 
From the perspective of cohesion, the key  question is 
how to regulate the use of State aids so that the broad 
aims of structural policy are met. Under Article 92, the 
answer has been to impose a  threshold  favouring  the 
least favoured regions. This is regarded by many experts 
as being too rigid an approach, suggesting that a more 
graduated schedule would be more appropriate. Secto-
ral coverage, assistance to SMEs and the encouragement 
of  entrepreneurial activity are additional points at issue. 
It could, for example, be argued that State aids which 
assisted  the  build-up  of  subcontracting  networks, 
increased the rate of formation of new company starts 
or improved the supply of venture capital would all be 
desirable.  Similarly, intervention which  improved the 
availability and quality of  complementary business ser-
vices while posing no real challenge to undertakings out-
side the region would be seen as an improvement in pro-
ductive potential. On the other hand, regions will want 
to  avoid  an  auction  to  attract  inward  investors. 
Although  devising  operational  guidelines  will  be  far 
from easy, the guiding principle ought to be that State 
aids with the prospect of  a positive sum game should be 
admissible, and the present over-rigid  income thresh-
olds should be relaxed or even abandoned. 
Perhaps the most obvious way out of  this dilemma is to 
replace the system of  various regional and national aids 
to industry with a Community-wide industrial policy. 
To an extent, this exists at present with support for var-
ious industrial developments like Esprit and Brite. Such 
spending can have an explicitly regional dimension as 
with Star, but it is then arguable whether support should 
be focused on those best able to use it rather than on an 
extension of regional policy. Whichever route is chosen 
it  is  clear than the two aims have to be put together, 
otherwise they stand a good chance of being contradic-
tory, with regional policy trying to encourage one form 
of industrial development in one part of the Commun-
ity and industrial policy trying to encourage another in a 
different set of regions,  thereby cancelling each other 
out and spending public money in the process. This is 
thus not just a zero-sum game but a negative sum. Clear-
ly this can be run either way round, either insisting that 
industrial policy has a regional dimension or that regio-
nal policy takes account of the wider industrial require-
ments. In either event a substantial increase in coordi-
nation would be required. 
5.8.  Improving administrative 
competences 
The difficulties apparent in many regions in making use 
of the  structural  Funds  indicate  that  administrative 
capacity has to be regarded as an important ingredient 
in cohesion policy. If public authorities lack the compe-
tences  to  use  resources  effectively,  the  chances  of 
achieving cohesion are bound to be diminished. In addi-
tion, where it  appears that resources are being poorly 
used, the confidence of donors in the value of the assis-
tance  is  undermined.  This  suggests  that  while  appli-
cation of the principle of subsidiarity means that con-
trol of  policy should remain with as low a tier of  govern-
ment  as  possible,  there  is  a  strong  case  for  making 
improvements in administrative competences a compo-
nent of  cohesion policy. In order to achieve this aim yet 
avoid upsetting political sensitivities in regional or local 
administrations, a number of possible approaches can 
be contemplated. 
A first imperative is to draw a clear distinction between 
the technical demands of programme implementation 
and project management on the one hand, and the polit-
ical  decision-making  process  on  the  other.  For most 
major structural programmes and operations, the regio-
nal tier of  government is probably the most appropriate 
level for the formulation of  policy and the setting of  eco-
nomic development objectives. This requires not mere-
ly administrative skills and political judgement, but also 
economic development expertise, which  is  often defi-
cient.  For  individual  projects,  local  knowledge  and 
judgement is more critical. 
At  both  levels,  however,  international  experience  of 
economic development suggests that the role of project 
executives and development specialists is often crucial 
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tant part in stimulating economic development could be 
played by the Community in assisting the training of 
such  individuals  and  in  supporting their  work.  This 
assistance could function in a number of ways. Within 
the present arrangements for the provision of technical 
assistance, there is allowance for training and briefing of 
officials,  business  leaders  and workers,  including  the 
opportunity for exchange visits. This appears to be gear-
ed mainly to the preparation and monitoring of CSFs. 
However, a key long-term need is the building up of a 
cadre of  experienced economic development specialists. 
It is  important to  recognize,  though,  that it is  not so 
much at strategic levels that such expertise is needed -
the  opinions  of respondents  indicated  that  top-level 
administrators with suitable training and track-record 
could, generally, be found. Rather, it is at the interme-
diate level that additional skills are needed. To fill this 
gap, a combination of the following options would be 
helpful: 
(a)  Creation  of a  Community-funded  training  pro-
gramme  for  economic  development  specialists. 
This could,  in  principle, raise a proportion of its 
costs  from  regional  authorities,  perhaps  on  a 
means-tested sliding scale. 
(b)  More  extensive  and  elaborate  exchange  pro-
grammes for  relevant  public officials.  It is  estab-
lished  that innovation  in  economic  development 
requires flexibility  and  the  ability to experiment 
with new approaches. One way to obtain informa-
tion on which to base such  innovation is through 
practical experience of what is effective elsewhere. 
(c)  Secondments either of  staff from other tiers of  gov-
ernment  or  from  specialist  agencies,  including 
those in the private sector. 
(d)  Regional  cooperation  on economic  development 
issues.  It emerged in research carried out for this 
study in the new German Liinder, for example, that 
information gleaned through regional conferences 
and contacts with Western Liinderhad been useful 
in influencing policy choices. 
At the technical level, the principle of subsidiarity not-
withstanding, the case for employing experts is compel-
ling.  In several of the Objective  1 regions,  especially, 
local  political  control of the  implementation of pro-
grammes and projects has been identified as a substan-
tial obstacle. 'Clientilism'-the use of  political favours-
in the awarding of contracts has been endemic and has 
greatly reduced the efficiency of policy delivery. 
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Possible solutions may be to build up task forces for the 
purpose of technical execution of projects, an approach 
that  is  now  being  experimented  with  in  Italy.  The 
French system of  agreeing contracts between sponsoring 
agencies and recipient authorities may also be a way of 
introducing higher standards of implementation. It has 
to be recognized, however, that such changes in certain 
regions, such as parts of  the Mezzogiorno or Greece, are 
not just  administrative  tinkering,  but would  involve 
major changes in the social and political environment. 
For this reason, they must be expected to face real diffi-
culties. 
A means of pushing the pace of reform in this respect 
might be the imposition of explicit conditions attached 
to the allocation of funds.  This is  sure to be  a vexed 
question, since any attempt by the Community to dic-
tate to regions would encounter hostility. On the other 
hand,  many  of those  consulted  in  the  course  of the 
research  indicated that external  pressure  of this  sort 
may be necessary to achieve change. 
5.9.  Credit arrangements within EMU 
There is a tendency for attention to focus on the use of 
grants as  a means of achieving cohesion.  However, as 
noted earlier and brought out clearly by Franzmeyer et 
al., loans can be an equally important source of funding 
for projects and, since they have to be repaid, they tend 
to be focused  rather more explicitly on projects with 
good real or social rates of  return. In 1986-87, EIB loans 
amounted to almost exactly the same as the structural 
Fund grants for Europe of the Ten; the two new mem-
bers were rather more dependent on grants. In practice, 
of  course, while individual loans may have to be repaid, 
it is normal to roll the general bulk of the debt forward 
and indeed to allow it to increase in parallel with the 
ability to pay the interest through current incomes. 
However,  regional  and  national  governments  have 
always  been able  to borrow.  Borrowing via the Euro-
pean Communities is only of interest if it offers better 
terms than are otherwise available. Since the European 
Investment Bank is  itself able  to  borrow at  the  best 
terms available, it is able to pass these rates on to bor-
rowers in the regions. This may give some advantage to 
higher risk borrowers, although the EIB is itself very risk 
averse and has sought to avoid building up the sorts of 
debts that have troubled the commercial banks in their 
dealings with the less developed world in the 1980s. It is 
loans for  eventualities that are not otherwise covered 
which will tend to be rather more important than the 
small differences in rates which can be obtained. In previous sections, we distinguished between policies 
primarily aimed at the longer-term issues of cohesion 
and prepared to provide transfers between regions on a 
continuing basis from  those which are aimed at redu-
cing the adverse impact of short-term fluctuations. To 
this we can add policies which are aimed at overcoming 
transition  problems  arising  during  progress  towards 
closer integration such as  the moves towards nominal 
convergence and reduction in fiscal  deficits  and debt 
ratios. Although these latter may not be aimed at cohe-
sion as it is usually defined, they do in fact affect it if  the 
policies required by Member States to adjust result in a 
reduction of cohesion. 
It is  appropriate that these  problems should  be  dealt 
with in their own right rather than trying to fall back on 
regional  policy  to  make  up  for  the  deficiencies  else-
where.  In general, these short-term problems are often 
best dealt with  by loans or short-term credits as  they 
reflect a problem of  timing rather than permanent need. 
Thus, for example, if monetary union is likely to benefit 
a region in the long term but considerable expenditure is 
necessary in the short term to overcome the problems of 
transition, a loan to tide it over may be appropriate. 
The simplest example  of this  approach  is  the  system 
within the EMS for providing levels of credits to offset 
short-term fluctuations. The conditions applied to the 
use of  these funds increase in harshness according to the 
length  of their use.  When  central  banks  in  the  EMS 
reach the point at which they should intervene to keep 
their currencies within the permitted bounds they may 
not have the appropriate quantity or mix of reserves. 
The very short-term financing facility (VSTF) was  set 
up to cover the obligation to intervene at the margin 
(there are also more limited credits to assist infra-margi-
nal  interventions).  This  facility  is  of unlimited  size. 
However,  the  credits  have  to be  repaid  within  three 
months with a limited ability to extend them for a fur-
ther three months. The system also contains a medium-
term financial  assistance facility  to help smooth tem-
porary balance of payments problems.  To this can be 
added the special loans to Greece to assist  its adjust-
ment  into  the  EC.  The  major  circumstances  under 
which this extra form of  support is required at present is 
in the transition to monetary union, although it is easy 
to envisage that the accession of new members in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe might pose some special, addi-
tional problems of transition which would require sim-
ilar steps. 
Three forms of  support for countries are available in the 
international system: 
(i)  outright grants; 
(ii)  medium- to long-term loans, such as  those admi-
nistered by the World Bank, for programmes and 
projects; 
(iii)  drawing rights on the IMF. 
Within the EC, the third option - drawing rights - is not 
currently  available  to  regions.  It might,  however,  be 
possible to develop a suitable credit mechanism similar 
to the international regime. Once the EMU is operating, 
these credits would not make sense in the same frame-
work, as we  would be dealing with the internal opera-
tions of the European central bank.  In the  transition 
such a role would be possible. However, it would, on the 
whole, need to be directed towards governments which 
have the appropriate monetary authorities, rather than 
to regions. Such loans would therefore be conditional on 
various actions being taken to transform the regional 
economies in question, in line with the sorts of condi-
tions that the IMF places on Member States. 
In both the transition towards EMU and (assuming it 
proceeds) full EMU, the scope for public authorities to 
borrow from whatever form of central bank is  created 
will affect cohesion. The present position is that nation-
al governments do have access to privileged borrowing 
through printing money, whereas neither the regional 
nor the  supra-national tier of government  can.  Once 
EMU  is  established,  on  present  proposals,  Member 
States will no longer be able to borrow in this way and 
during stage two of  the transition they will be discourag-
ed from doing so. Since budgetary policy is also likely to 
be subject to constraint the scope for funding will also 
be  limited.  Credit  mechanisms  can,  however,  be  an 
important  means  of achieving  transfers  and  conse-
quently deserve consideration as part of  a cohesion stra-
tegy. There will have to be some arrangement for relat-
ing  European  money creation to  its  distribution  and 
there may be scope in this respect to favour regions or 
countries facing difficulties. Such a system could work 
in a variety of  ways, depending on whether the aim is to 
provide permanent or temporary real resource transfers 
and the time profile over which net resource flows are to 
occur. 
A possible model is the special drawing right instrument 
(SDR) of  the IMF. In a recent paper, Coats, Furstenberg 
and  Isard  (Princeton  Essay  in  International  Finance, 
1990) discuss the extent to which the exercise of SDRs 
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resource transfers. The outcome is affected by the terms 
on which a country can obtain a 'loan' via an SDR-type 
system, and the rate of  interest charged on it. For exam-
ple,  countries or regions  which  would  otherwise  face 
risk premiums would gain even if an allocation of  funds 
(and thus the capacity to purchase real resources) was 
made  at  a  competitive  ecu  rate,  since  that  country 
would avoid the risk premium. Of course, it would also 
be open to a central monetary authority to issue debt to 
target  countries at  less  than market  rates  or on  soft 
repayment terms, adding to the resource transfer ele-
ment. 
It is important to distinguish between the possible oper-
ation of an unhypothecated financial instrument mod-
elled on the SDR and loans made through an institution 
such as  the  EIB  which  relate  to  specific projects and 
which are subject to a rate of return target.  Both can 
play a part in advancing cohesion, but the former would 
operate mainly by relaxing macroeconomic constraints, 
whereas  the  effect  of the  latter  depends  much  more 
(though not exclusively) on its microeconomic impact. 
On  the  whole,  the  scope  for  loan  finance,  whether 
through the EIB or some new mechanism, receives less 
attention than it deserves in the debate on cohesion. In 
widening that debate it might be worth considering the 
use of soft loans by the EIB  in the same way that the 
conditions for use of the structural Funds might be eas-
ed for countries experiencing difficulties in absorption. 
The loans through the EIB  involve industry in a way 
which is not true of the structural Funds.  It might be 
possible to extend this relationship further and make it 
closer if the extent of participation in  the  enterprise 
were to be expanded. One direction this might go is in 
the use of venture capital. One of the problems for the 
less favoured regions is that the average size of enter-
prise tends to be smaller and hence use of  official or oth-
er funding routes may be particularly difficult. This can 
be  offset  by  specific  lending  institutions focusing  on 
SMEs, such as exist in some Member States. This spe-
cialization can extend further to the most appropriate 
form that the lending might take and for  many small 
companies that route  is  venture capital.  For venture 
capital to be a successful if relatively high-risk form of 
activity, sheer lending needs to be augmented by mana-
gerial  and technical  advice.  To undertake  this  work, 
specialist institutions would be required even if the ori-
ginal funds were to be subscribed by the EIB. 
5.10.  Modifying other Community policies 
Although the Community's agricultural policies, given 
their large share in the Community budget, are seen as a 
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prime target for reform in order to advance cohesion, 
the underlying politics will make major change hard to 
achieve.  The most  likely  scenario  is  that the  various 
pressures for reform described in Section 3.2.8 in con-
junction with the Mac Sharry package will ensure that 
agricultural spending is held in check, with rather more 
support  flowing  to  the  southern  European  countries 
than hitherto. 
As  regards  Community  expenditure  other  than  the 
structural Funds or agricultural spending, its potential 
impact on cohesion is  not great. It is  true that certain 
Community institutions could be relocated in order to 
serve cohesion objectives, but this could prove counter-
productive if it raised administrative costs.  Neverthe-
less,  it  would  be useful  to  know what  the  territorial 
incidence of such expenditure is. 
There may, almost paradoxically, be greater scope for 
policies that do not directly involve public expenditure 
to be  refashioned for cohesion purposes. Competition 
policy or measures to support industrial development 
could be given explicit cohesion aims. In adjudication 
of mergers, for example, competition criteria are quite 
properly dominant, but there ought to be some grounds 
for  influencing  a  decision  if the  effect  on  cohesion 
would be adverse. 
Transport or telecommunications developments in one 
country can both complement and compete with those 
in others, and there may be a role for Community insti-
tutions to play in ensuring that the direction of change 
does not threaten cohesion. 
The Community's position in the Uruguay Round trade 
negotiations is  a good example.  If the outcome were, 
broadly, a deal in which the quid pro quo for an open-
ing-up of world markets for financial services would be 
a relaxation of Community restrictions on textile and 
food  imports, the regional  incidence of these changes 
would  almost  certainly  be  uneven.  Major  financial 
centres, most of which are in favoured regions, would 
stand  to  gain  most,  whereas  textile  regions,  notably 
those in low wage areas, would be threatened. While it 
would be  difficult to argue that this should prevent a 
deal being struck, it would make sense to implement the 
changes in a way that minimized the damage to cohe-
sion,  perhaps by phasing the implementation.  At  the 
very least, it is important to place the question of cohe-
sion on the agenda so that, if  a particular decision is tak-
en, it is with the knowledge of  what effect the decision is 
likely to have on cohesion. 6.  Operational questions 
Implementation of any new strategy will  require deci-
sions on a range of  matters. These in turn have a bearing 
on the feasibility  of the strategy,  since  they  affect  its 
total cost and thus its potential for success. Some of  the 
relevant  issues  are  discussed  in  this  section  of the 
report. 
6.1.  Determining eligibility 
In  the  light  of the  earlier  discussion  of new  factors 
affecting cohesion, an important issue is which indica-
tors to use to measure eligibility for any form of assis-
tance. The tendency in recent years to simplify and to 
concentrate on GOP per capita and unemployment has 
an obvious appeal, especially when the problem is  so 
obvious and there  are  so  many projects on which  to 
spend the money that further sophistication might seem 
unnecessary. However, because eligibility of a region as 
a whole depends to a great extent on the narrow ques-
tion of whether one or two indicators reach a threshold 
level, it is necessary for the indicators to be very robust 
if misclassification is to be avoided. 
There are four aspects which can be explored to try to 
improve this determination. The first  is  the choice of 
the indicators themselves, which depends in turn on our 
understanding of what constitutes a lack of cohesion. 
The  second  is  how  regions  should  be  delimited,  the 
third is the question of  whether eligibility could be more 
graduated and the last is whether, in fact,  spatial mea-
sures  encompass  all  the  categories  of economic  and 
social disparities that we wish to consider. 
The case for using GOP per capita is that it is a reason-
able  proxy  for  most  other characteristics of a  region, 
although what determines the standard of  living is post-
tax  incomes  (including any  transfers)  rather than the 
value of output.  However,  it is  not a  direct  measure 
either of the wealth of individuals or of the region in 
which  they live.  Private wealth,  particularly financial 
wealth, can be expected to generate an income which is 
picked up by monetized indicators like GOP. Such mea-
sures cannot, however, provide useful  information on 
the built environment and the quality of social infra-
structure or indeed, on factors which affect the quality of 
life in a region. Although income per capita (calculated 
in  terms  of disposable  income  rather  than  GOP)  is 
bound to be crucial, there may be a case for using differ-
ing criteria for different aspects of cohesion. The main 
statistical problem  is  the inadequacy of indicators of 
social cohesion, as they tend to be less well  correlated 
with basic economic indicators. 
In  designating  regions  for  assistance,  we  might,  thus, 
wish  to consider a range of indicators of the stock of 
infrastructure and its condition; some  might be  volu-
metric like: 
•  miles of motorways per inhabitant and per square 
mile; 
•  number of patients per doctor; 
•  proportion of dwellings  without  facilities,  such  as 
inside toilet, running water, bathroom; 
•  number of  reported faults per phone line, or waiting-
time  for  installation  (as  high  as  seven  years  in 
Greece); 
•  ownership/use of consumer durables; 
•  number of phones/cars/TV  s per 1 000 inhabitants; 
•  life expectancy; 
•  proportion of population with various educational/ 
skill qualification. 
Other components of infrastructure might actually have 
been valued.  Water, gas  and electricity industries, for 
example, may have had their assets assessed as part of 
Member State scrutiny of performance, or where  the 
industries in question have been considered either for 
privatization, or to appraise eligibility for further loan 
finance. 
However, this is a view of  cohesion as a static condition. 
We  have for example already noted the importance of 
considering rates of change as well  as  absolute differ-
ences in levels of disparities. A relatively well-off region 
may be in need of structural assistance if it is in rapid 
decline because the level of resources required to coun-
ter such a dramatic change exceeds that usually avail-
able,  even though the Member State  may  not be  less 
favoured. A society may be able to adapt to a particular 
level of  unemployment, for example, but a rapid rise in 
that level may be socially highly disruptive, even though 
the numbers becoming unemployed are still relatively 
small compared with those already out of work. 
Similarly  we  might  wish  to  consider what  is  already 
being done to address the problem of social cohesion -
either on an input basis: 
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(ii)  number of training places, hospital bed nights; 
or on an output basis: 
(i)  number  attaining  particular  qualifications  (with 
the two measures being necessary to indicate effi-
ciency). Changes in the stock are also important as 
an  indicator of new  problems  that  ought  to  be 
tackled; 
(ii)  proportion of population illiterate; 
(iii)  infant mortality. 
A second question is  whether regions should be desig-
nated  purely  within  national  boundaries  or whether 
cross-border definitions would be preferable. Taking a 
pan-European approach, it would be most equitable to 
concentrate assistance on areas or social groups mani-
festly  lagging  behin9  the  rest  of the  Community.  In 
practice,  there  are  bound  to  be  disparities  within 
countries  and/or  regions  that  demand  a  political 
response  but  not  at the  European  level,  so  that  it  is 
almost inevitable that cohesion policies will be required 
at different spatial levels. This will entail compromise, 
since it could be argued, as with State aids, that help to 
poorer parts of richer regions or countries undermines 
that given  to less  prosperous regions.  There will  also 
need to be a review of who decides eligibility. Bound-
aries  designated  for  ERDF  purposes  do  not  always 
accord with those applied by national governments for 
regional assistance. Some State aids can, moreover, be 
said to promote vital national interests, yet can affect 
EC cohesion adversely. 
A third question affecting these decisions is  that cur-
rently areas are either eligible for aid from the structural 
Funds or they are not; there is no question of  partial eli-
gibility, yet in practice there is a continuum of  problems 
from  the severe to the minor.  While severe problems 
should  be  the main focus,  this  should  not  entail the 
neglect of  lesser problems. Thus a whole range of  partial 
eligibility could be considered, attracting a proportion 
of the  support  available  to  those  regions  in  greatest 
need. To a degree, boundaries are arbitrary. For admi-
nistrative reasons, a rural area may need to incorporate 
a major town in its region in order to provide some of 
the basic services, yet that town may be either separated 
from the region as a whole or right on the edge of it. A 
small spatial displacement of the boundary may have a 
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major impact on a large range of  the indicators of  dispa-
rities.  Similarly,  there  are  minimum  and  maximum 
limits to the size and population of  regions for adminis-
trative cost and convenience which may have little to do 
with behavioural definitions of  regions or any feeling of 
regional identity. 
These problems can be  overcome by targeting groups 
within regions, such as the poor, by looking at the distri-
bution of indicators - percentage of population within 
20 miles of a hospital - and by  making the extent of 
assistance provided related to the extent of the dispari-
ties.  This  artificiality  of boundaries  was  particularly 
remarked upon in our interviews in Italy, probably in 
part because of the length of I  tali  an experience in hand-
ling these policies and hence the ability to observe the 
impact of distortions on the flow  of people and funds 
and on national cohesion. 
In a sense we  can invert the problem by listing social 
aspects where cohesion appears to be lacking and see if 
they  are  picked  up  by  existing  indicators.  There  are 
some obvious examples where this is not the case. The 
first is in the case of  ethnic minorities (even where those 
minorities are major groups). This is exacerbated when 
the minorities are also recent immigrants. Their social 
requirements may be greater than for the existing popu-
lation, not just because they do not know the language 
or demand different mixes of  consumer goods which are 
likely to cost more, but because they lack all  the asset 
and network benefits of  having lived in an area for gene-
rations. 
A second is urban problems, which can be caused both 
by  excessive growth or decline.  In less  favoured  rural 
regions, the problem comes from people arriving in the 
towns in advance of the jobs and the building of the 
infrastructure. But in the older cities it is a problem of 
decay. A fabric built a long time ago is now in need of 
massive repair. As the quality of  the housing stock dete-
riorates the wealth and income of those in the area falls 
as does its ability to put the problems right. The process 
can therefore be cumulative and exceed the resources of 
the region to correct it. Incomes required for survival in 
urban areas may be greater than in the country and costs 
for  the poor escalate rapidly when heating becomes a 
problem. In many respects this problem has best been 
illustrated in the USA where, in the absence of public 
intervention, extreme decline was permitted, leading to 
major dereliction. The ability of the market to correct 
this has proved to be slow-working and in many cases 
still ineffective. It would not be an attractive model for 
Europe to follow. 6.2.  Competences and responsibilities of 
different tiers of government 
That there will be disagreement on the extent to which 
different tiers of  government should be involved in for-
mulating, financing and implementing policy towards 
cohesion is inevitable. Although it is accepted that the 
principle of subsidiarity should prevail,  it is  typically 
quite  hard to  determine how  to  apply  the  principle. 
Land-use is an interesting case in point. The Commis-
sion's recent document Europe 2000 (Commission of 
the European Communities, 1991 a) shows that there is 
a  Community dimension to  such  questions,  yet  such 
policies have traditionally been the preserve of lower 
tiers of government. The current approach with respect 
to the structural Funds is to try to achieve a balance by 
developing  a  partnership  between  the  Commission, 
national, regional and local governments, with the lower 
tiers being primarily responsible for execution and the 
higher tiers providing guidelines, frameworks and rules 
for operation. In the main it is accepted that funds will 
be better targeted by the lower tier authorities as they 
have the detailed knowledge of local needs and ways of 
behaving. However, it is unlikely that the lowest levels 
of government will have much experience in establish-
ing  the  effectiveness  of the  various  instruments  and 
technical help will be required. To some extent this can 
be provided by higher level authorities, but the sensiti-
vities may be better handled by having task forces which 
are not part of the higher  tiers of government them-
selves but are recognized by them as possessing the ne-
cessary competences. 
Administrative competence raises similar issues.  Even 
though there is  a compelling case for the local tier of 
government to have a primary role, there may be cir-
cumstances where a lack of capacity weakens the deli-
very  of policy.  Such problems occur,  for  example,  in 
parts  of the  Mezzogiorno,  prompting demands  for  a 
fresh  administrative  approach.  Obviously,  any  such 
intervention is bound to offend local political sensitivi-
ties, but if  the alternative is persistently ineffective poli-
cy, difficult decisions may have to be taken. One aspect 
of administrative competence which tends to be stress-
ed is financial competence- the fear that money is not 
being spent wisely,  efficiently or indeed in some cases 
fairly. There are a number of  ways out of  this. The most 
obvious  is  to  strengthen the  accounting and  policing 
functions.  A  second  is  to  provide  Community-wide 
training programmes to improve administrative compe-
tences. Some argue that a new Community institution 
should be set up to achieve this, perhaps in one of the 
regions where the administrative difficulties appear to 
be greatest. An alternative route might be an expansion 
in the role of the European Institute of Public Admi-
nistration or similar existing institutions. 
6.3.  Monitoring and evaluation 
Policies to achieve cohesion are bound to create ten-
sions. Whatever strategy is adopted, net contributors of 
resources will need to be persuaded, first, that there is a 
convincing case for providing assistance, and, second, 
that the resulting policies are effective. This is partly to 
do with establishing a suitable monitoring framework. 
Criticisms have been expressed about a lack of  informa-
tion  on  how  structural  Fund money  is  used  and  an 
absence  of transparency  in  accounting  systems.  This 
clearly needs to be improved. But checking policy effec-
tiveness means more than verifying that money is spent 
as intended. It is also necessary to ensure that the out-
come of the policy conforms to expectations.  Does a 
specific  infrastructure  project  lead  to  higher  than 
expected investment, are there more jobs in an area as a 
result of training programmes, or do incomes actually 
rise in line with transfers? These are the sorts of ques-
tions to be answered if  a genuine evaluation of  policy is 
to be conducted. 
Evaluation can occur at three levels  within the Com-
munity. There is a clear role for the Court of Auditors, 
which acts in much the same way as public auditors in 
the Member States. Similarly, in the Member States, the 
legislature  has  considerable  powers  of accountability 
over the  actions  of the executive,  although  there are 
manifest variations between countries in the extent of 
these powers.  At  the Community level,  the European 
Parliament's Committee on Budgetary Control is  able 
to conduct its own investigations into the implementa-
tion of the Community budget. 
However, subsidiarity has been stressed as a key con-
cept in  the flexible  and effective use of the structural 
Funds to meet regional needs. This would imply the use 
of satisfactory  systems  of local  accountability.  The 
monitoring function built into the Community support 
frameworks falls a long way short of  such accountability 
and hence would either need to be reinforced or supple-
mented by a secondary mechanism if both subsidiarity 
and accountability are to be fulfilled simultaneously. 
A third mechanism already exists in that a minimum 
level  of public  funding  from  each  Member  State  is 
required for projects using the structural Funds. Such 
public funds are subject to the normal scrutiny of the 
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ject the Community element to exactly the same process 
thus providing a measure of devolved responsibility. 
Where  direct  redistribution  from  the  Community 
budget to households is involved, here again there is an 
opportunity to consolidate this with the public accoun-
ting procedures of  the Member States concerned, which 
may operate through agencies, central or local govern-
ment departments. 
Taken together, therefore, a new strategy could involve 
a balanced package of expanded resources matched by 
greater emphasis on the efficiency of their use, a wider 
range  of  objectives  and  instruments,  greater  local 
responsibility and accountability and a stronger role for 
scrutiny by the Court of  Auditors and the European Par-
liament. 
6.3.1.  Managing the budget 
It is normally argued that three basic criteria need to be 
met in budgetary management of programmes such as 
those covered by the structural Funds. First, there must 
be proper ex ante appraisal of the spending, requiring a 
precise statement of  objectives and a review of  the alter-
native means for  achieving them; this should include 
scrutiny of their anticipated costs and benefits (not all 
of which will be quantifiable) and of the robustness of 
the proposed management of the expenditure. Second, 
there must be mechanisms for monitoring the progress 
of the programmes/projects thus  funded,  in  terms of 
tangible progress as well as in financial terms. Finally ex 
post evaluation is needed to establish both the legality 
of  the actual spending and of  its efficiency and effective-
ness in relation to its objectives (value for money). 
In the past, management of  Community spending in all 
these respects has been weak,  although improvements 
are in hand. Ex ante appraisal has tended to be largely 
left  to the  recipient Member States although more is 
now being done within the Commission, particularly to 
ensure that proposed expenditures are consistent with 
the broad planning represented by the Community sup-
port frameworks. More might be done, though, possibly 
along the lines adopted by the EIB. However, according 
to the 1988 report from the Court of Auditors: 'Weak-
nesses at the national level are not compensated for by 
sound controls at Commission level' (Court of  Auditors, 
1989).  Both  the  1988  and  1989  (Court  of Auditors, 
1990a) audit reports provide several  examples  where 
the information supplied to the Commission was inade-
quate to  enable its  officials to  make a  fully  reasoned 
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judgement either on such matters as  the eligibility of 
certain projects, or on their likely chances of success, 
taking into account such matters as anticipated demand 
for  output  or supplies  of raw  materials,  inadequate 
quantification of  their expected costs and effects. These 
weaknesses revealed a lack of  rigorous ex ante appraisal 
procedures; although standardized information has to 
be  provided and is  reviewed,  the  Court of Auditors' 
reports suggest that the processes have been excessively 
formalized with inadequate testing of the robustness of 
the underlying assumptions or expectations. 
Ex ante appraisal procedures have been strengthened 
since  1988,  but Commission officials  suggested  to  us 
that the procedures and spirit of the matter are still ra-
ther formal and fall short of best practice in the private 
and public sectors elsewhere. The lack of vigorous pro-
bing of Member States' submissions is usually justified 
on the grounds of  subsidiarity i.e. it is not for the Com-
mission to behave as a kind of neo-colonial power with 
respect  to  sovereign  Member States.  However,  while 
matters of  high policy may not be for criticism or review 
by the Commission, a careful analysis of the expected 
economic effects, costs and project management arran-
gements  of developments  financed  with  Community 
funds  are  entirely  legitimate  areas  for  concern,  and 
should  include constructive suggestions  and coopera-
tion with the national authorities on the ground. 
A more rigorous approach to appraisal could embrace 
such matters as: 
•  The precise objectives of the proposed spending, in a 
quantified form,  e.g.  number of jobs to be created 
over what period. 
•  The options considered. 
•  The constraints involved. 
•  The costs and benefits of the options. 
•  Important unquantifiable factors. 
•  An economic/industrial analysis to provide a basis for 
judging such matters and likely levels of demand, uti-
lization,  availability of supplies and raw materials, 
etc. wherever appropriate. 
•  The preferred option and its justification. •  The precise timetable of the operation in  terms of 
financial developments (e.g.  a programme of expen-
diture on equipment, labour and other supplies and 
physical milestones relating to stages in the comple-
tion of the development). 
•  The  monitoring  information  to  be  provided  and 
when. 
•  Arrangements for project management and control. 
•  Sensitivity of the operation to altered assumptions, 
e.g. changes in the economic environment. 
•  Arrangements  within  the  sponsoring  Directorate-
General  for  managing  and  monitoring  projects  to 
ensure the above criteria are met. 
It has been argued that the main basis of ex ante apprai-
sal is to see whether proposed developments are consis-
tent with Community support frameworks which were 
put together somewhat hastily in  response to political 
imperatives and without the benefit of  independent eco-
nomic analyses of the regions and developments con-
cerned. This does  represent a significant development 
in the Commission's efforts to improve the quality of  its 
financial management and these are still somewhat ear-
ly days. None the less, it would be desirable if  the results 
of any analyses currently being undertaken of the quali-
ty  of the  CSFs  and of ex  ante  appraisal experiments 
were to be made available to the Parliament, particular-
ly the Committee for Budgetary Control. 
The Court of Auditors' reports suggest  that organized 
monitoring of projects - in terms of both financial pro-
gress or the use actually made of funds, and of physical 
developments of the project with respect to previously 
agreed  milestones  - is  largely  absent;  where  several 
agencies in the recipient country are concerned, liaison 
can be poor and in many cases monitoring reports are 
not submitted on time or in sufficient detail. Projects 
are frequently abandoned and in some cases it has taken 
the Court of Auditors to identify this, to the surprise of 
higher-tier national authorities in the country concern-
ed and the Commission: abandonment reflects weak ex 
ante appraisal and - when it comes as a surprise - weak 
monitoring procedures. Putting Community taxpayers' 
financial resources into projects which have not been 
rigorously appraised and then only sporadically moni-
tored does not represent respect for the principle of  sub-
sidiarity:  it  is  simply  acceptance  of waste  and  mis-
management, and possibly fraud. 
Although monitoring committees exist, they vary with 
respect to the quality of  the work and the frequency with 
which they meet: it is not unknown for such a commit-
tee virtually to suspend its activities if it does not re-
ceive the necessary monitoring information. Monitor-
ing in both tangible and financial terms has been weak 
while  failure  to  obtain  necessary  financial  and other 
reports from Member States has been endemic.  Infor-
mation needed for monitoring purposes is, according to 
the  Court  of Auditors'  reports,  frequently  late  and 
incomplete;  sometimes,  problems  arise  because  of 
inadequate coordination in Member States where seve-
ral government departments or agencies are involved. 
In the circumstances, the ability of the Commission to 
monitor  and  control  its  own  cash  disbursements,  to 
monitor progress of projects financed with Community 
funds and to get  early warning of difficulties faces  se-
vere problems and might even be impossible. 
Ex post evaluation has been sparse, although studies are 
now under way (often they will need to infer what the 
precise objectives were  and will  face  difficulties if no 
information system  for  facilitating  ex post evaluation 
was put in place). Ex post evaluation cannot be under-
taken effectively if there was no ex ante precise specifi-
cation  of objectives,  costs,  milestones  and outcomes 
and if there was no prior provision for an information 
system to supply data needed for ex post evaluation. It 
is also the case that good practice in the private sector 
involves an evaluation team quite separate from the ex 
ante appraisal group: this acts as a strong discipline on 
the ex-ante appraisal. In all these respects, evaluation of 
the impact and effectiveness of Community spending 
programmes reveals immense scope for improvement. 
Reports by the Court of Auditors have often tended to 
focus on matters of regularity, i.e. was the money legally 
spent? rather than value for money, i.e. 
(i)  Economy -were resources of the lowest cost need-
ed to do the job sought and budgeted? 
(ii)  Efficiency  - was  the  mix  and  volume  of inputs 
minimized for the given desired outcome or, to put 
it another way,  was  the greatest  possible  impact 
achieved for the given expenditure of resources? 
(iii)  Effectiveness  - were  precise,  desired,  objectives 
attained? There is  no  point  in  doing  something 
well if  it is ofless value than something else requir-
ing the same expenditure of resources. 
There is a feeling in many quarters that the needs of the 
weaker regions of the Community are of such magni-
tude that attention to the matters outlined above are 
mere  unnecessary  details.  'After  all,  their  needs  for 
improved infrastructure in such matters as telecommu-
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by the Community must be a good thing', as one senior 
official put it. But resources are limited so  we  need to 
consider, even in the case of a road in an area lacking 
good roads: 
(a)  What is the best route for this road? 
(b)  What is the anticipated volume of traffic and why 
do we claim this? 
(c)  What is the most efficient way of constructing this 
road in terms of  the mix of  materials, the depth and 
cost  of its  foundations,  the  trade-off between  a 
more expensive initial outlay on a first-class  road 
with  low  subsequent  maintenance  costs  (i.e.  one 
having a high  cost  in present value terms at  any 
positive rate of interest) and one which is cheaper 
to construct but which will  create higher running 
costs in later years (i.e. one where the present value 
of costs is lower)? 
One might go on but the attitude displayed in the quo-
tation above is one which, if it were at all widespread, 
creates the risk that slackness in budgeting and manage-
ment, waste and mismanagement - all, perhaps, of less 
importance when the Community budget was  smaller 
and had lower ambitions - become endemic and irre-
versible.  Sadly,  the impact of the  Court of Auditors' 
reports in the European Parliament has been much less 
than that of comparable reports in the parliaments of 
the Member States. 
Commission officials, while acknowledging past weak-
nesses, emphasize: 
•  the unwillingness of  Member States to accept advice 
including  (and  sometimes  especially)  those  with 
pressing needs for technical assistance; 
•  that, as EC funds have been relatively small and only 
part of the project finance,  the recipient  Member 
State has been relied upon to minimize waste, fraud 
and mismanagement; 
•  shortage of staff with appropriate skills; 
•  that technical assistance is available to help Member 
States; 
•  political imperatives to spend more and not worry 
too much about how it is  spent, provided it is  not 
fraudulently spent; 
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•  current  efforts  to  improve  the  quality  of ex  ante 
appraisal, monitoring and ex post evaluation; 
•  efforts to mount training programmes in the neces-
sary skills. 
Critics claim that: 
•  sound financial management has been a low priority 
in  the  Community  institutions,  emphasis  having 
been  on  increasing  the  quantity  of  Community 
budgetary resources, in response to intense political 
pressures,  with  insufficient· attention  having  been 
paid to its quality; 
•  skills, accountability and systems should be radically 
improved;  they  do  not  command  sufficiently  high 
priority and skill training is sporadic, unsympathetic 
and  not a  high  priority.  Thus  in  contrast to some 
Member States, regular, centrally determined train-· 
ing  on  financial  management  intended  to  ensure 
standards of best practice throughout the services of 
the Commission does not appear to be systematically 
provided; 
•  technical  assistance  budgets  are  underutilized  and 
their  provision  should  be  mandatory  and  not  a 
voluntary matter; 
•  the  Community institutions  should  be  much  more 
pro-active in encouraging improvements to adminis-
trative capacity and skills in the weaker regions; 
•  that a significant percentage of any existing funds are 
not spent because of weak project planning capacity 
in intended recipient areas; 
•  that things would not be even as good as they are but 
for the commitment of individual officials. 
6.4.  Timescale and targets 
Constrained resources  impose  limits  on  what  can  be 
ac~ieved and make it clear that the Community ulti-
mately  has to be  clear about how  committed it is  to 
attaining cohesion. Some policy initiatives necessarily 
require more expenditure; others might imply compro-
mise on other objectives such as the speed of integra-
tion.  The  timescale  according  to  which  cohesion 
advances, and the degree to which it is achieved must, 
therefore, be seen as involving difficult political choices, 
as well as being technical problems to be solved by eco-
nomic and social analysis. In practice, progress towards -
cohesion will probably have to be confined to realizable 
targets,  rather than full  attainment of objectives.  Any 
new strategy must also be set out on a realistic timetable 
and have the flexibility to adapt to changes in circum-
stances. 
There are three obvious elements to the timescale. First, 
a number of improvements can be implemented imme-
diately as they relate to the better operation of existing 
Community  systems  and  require  procedural  changes 
rather  than  any  elaborate  changes  in  legislation  or 
budgetary  ramifications.  These  include  most  of the 
planning,  monitoring  and  evaluation  procedures  dis-
cussed in the previous section. The Community is out of 
step with best practice and should move without delay. 
The second clear stage in the timetable is that planning 
is already afoot for the next budget financial perspective 
for the years 1993-98. 
This timetable is also relevant to the structural Funds, 
which will have completed the process of  being doubled 
by 1993, and will be due to be renegotiated. The starting 
date  matches  the  coming  into  force  of many  of the 
remaining measures  relating to the completion of the 
internal market and it also embraces what is anticipated 
to be stage two of  the progress towards EMU. It is there-
fore  essential  that  proposals  are  put  forward  which 
involve achievement of targets related to these major 
issues over that period. 
However, the major question is what form such targets 
should take.  There have been two major successes  in 
recent years in attracting public attention, the first and 
most outstanding being the 1992 programme. The idea 
of setting a target date for an ambitious programme of 
legislation  galvanized  activities  and expectations.  No 
doubt the intergovernmental conference on economic 
and monetary union is strongly concerned about how to 
retain the momentum. The other successful concept has 
been the doubling of the structural Funds.  These are 
simple concepts and quite probably misleading in their 
importance but effective in capturing the imagination 
and therefore in actually getting firms and public autho-
rities to act and to overcome the inertia which has sur-
rounded some previous moves towards closer integra-
tion. 
However, there are many forms of  targets. Completing a 
legislative programme or spending given sums of  money 
are input targets. In some respects they are much easier 
to achieve than the output targets that are the real objec-
tives of the actions. Thus, in the case of the single mar-
ket, it is still very much open to question how far the 
effective barriers will have been broken down by 1993. 
With respect to the structural Funds it will be difficult 
to ascertain how effective they have been in reducing 
disparities.  The  simplest  reason  is  that  they  are  not 
being measured. No serious evaluation is being under-
taken of what will  be achieved (compared with what 
would have happened without them) either in aggregate 
or in terms of specific instruments. 
It is, therefore, arguable that the next five years should 
have real, not just financial objectives; indeed it is argu-
able  that  the  continuing  size  of the  budget  should 
depend upon what could be achieved. Part of  the prob-
lem is  simply the difficulty of measuring jobs created 
or extra output. This does not mean that the process 
should not be attempted. The simplest form of target 
would be  to reduce disparities for  various groups, e.g. 
that by  1998 no region  should have a GOP less  than 
60% of  the EC average or that no region should have an 
unemployment rate more than double the EC average. 
Alternatively, one could have targets which relate to dis-
parities for the Community as a whole. Thus one could 
argue for a reduction of 10% in the variance of regional 
GOP in the Community (as measured by the weighted 
coefficient of variation).  Cohesion  is  also  affected by 
adverse change, so that there may be a role for policy in 
trying to  diminish any  detrimental effects of integra-
tion. 
In  the  foregoing,  we  have  argued  that  a  framework 
should be set up for the choice of how money should be 
spent, that the allocation of expenditure to regions and 
the framework for net contributions by Member States 
should be agreed in advance so that the financial dimen-
sion ceases to be controversial. This does not mean that 
there need not be any financial targets, such as adding 
50% in real terms to the structural Funds over the next 
five years, but these might be limits as either minima or 
maxima, with the outturn dependent upon real achieve-
ments. This then enables a focus  on real objectives as 
the point of the programmes.  Such  objectives can be 
absolute or relative but, as suggested in the previous sec-
tion, they need to be continuously monitored and the 
programme modified as it develops in the light of expe-
rience.  The whole  point of having grants for  specific 
programmes is that they should achieve specific results. 
If  the form of  spending and its use is not important then 
the transfer should not be linked to any objective. 
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The budgetary cost of a strategy to improve the econo-
mic  and social  cohesion of the Community is,  inevi-
tably, contingent on the targets selected. To raise living 
standards  in  less  favoured  regions  rapidly  obviously 
requires  a  bigger  effort  than  if a  longer  timescale  is 
allowed.  Similarly, aiming for a higher target will cost 
more. The test of cohesion is political or social accept-
ance,  either of which  will  be  liable  to  fluctuate  from 
time  to  time,  rather than  the  value  of a  supposedly 
objective indicator such  as  GDP per capita.  An  out-
come  acceptable  to  some  people  may  be  rejected  as 
hopelessly inadequate by  others. This means that it is 
impossible to give a single figure that constitutes a best 
estimate of the cost of achieving cohesion. 
Instead, an appreciation of  the magnitudes involved can 
be obtained by considering a range of options. In Table 
4.1.1. of the fourth periodic report (Commission of the 
European Communities, 1991 b), the Commission pre-
sented  indicative  figures  showing  the  differentials  in 
growth rates that would be required to ensure that regio-
nal convergence occurs. These figures are purely hypo-
thetical  rather than relating to  identified  regions.  To 
give an idea of  what might be needed in practice, a simi-
lar exercise  has  been carried out to show  the  cost  of 
increasing GDP per capita in the Objective 1 regions. It 
has to be stressed that these are illustrative, broad-brush 
figures  and  that  the  outcomes  shown  depend  on 
assumptions that may be open to question. 
The Objective 1 regions, according to data in the perio-
dic report, had a GDP per capita measured in purchas-
ing power standards of 66.9% of the Community aver-
age in 1988, ranging from 39.9% of the EC average in 
Voreio Aigaio (Greece) to 89% in Abruzzi (Italy). These 
regions,  in  aggregate,  contained  21.7%  of  the 
Community population in 1987 and produced 14. 5% of 
Community GDP, measured in PPS. For the Objective 
1 regions to increase their GDP per capita relative to the 
rest  of the  Community,  they  have  to  grow  faster. 
Although this has happened in some  time periods, in 
others the gap has widened.  In the calculations which 
follow, it is assumed that in the absence of policy assis-
tance, the Objective 1 regions would grow at the Com-
munity  average  rate.  For real  convergence  to  occur, 
therefore, there would  have to be a flow  of resources 
from  the  rest  of the  Community  to  the  Objective  1 
regions. 
Table 6 shows the results of  an exercise to determine the 
resource transfers required to attain real convergence. 
In  these  simulations,  the  Community  growth  rate  is 
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assumed  to  be  a  steady  2.5%  per annum.  It is  then 
assumed that flows of structural assistance from the rest 
of  the Community enable GDP per capita in the Objec-
tive 1 regions to rise by the amount of  the transfer. This 
is, of  course, a questionable assumption. If  the transfers 
are  used  inefficiently,  or if the  recipient  region  lacks 
complementary resources needed to make optimal use 
of  the assistance, considerably more would be needed to 
attain the targets. Evidence presented in Appendix E of 
the Padoa-Schioppa Report suggests that the marginal 
efficiency of  capital - a measure of  the growth impact of 
investment  - is  substantially  lower  in  less  favoured 
regions.  Conversely, if structural measures engender a 
leap  forward  the  cost  may be  exaggerated.  Interested 
readers can make their own adjustments by scaling the 
figures  up or down.  The figures  in the table show the 
costs of combinations of pace and scale of convergence: 
to bring the Objective 1 regions up to 90% of the Com-
munity average GDP per capita in five years, 1.16% per 
annum of  the GDP of  the rest of  the Community would 
have to be transferred. This is virtually the same as the 
entire Community budget today. By contrast, if the tar-
get is 80% in 15 years, the annual cost would be 0.26% 
of the GDP of the rest of the Community. 
The estimates have been calculated to take account of 
the projection that population in the Objective 1 regions 
will grow slightly faster than in the rest of the Commu-
nity, although the difference is so small that it does not 
make much impact. Manifestly, if more regions are des-
ignated for assistance (as would be the case if regions 
currently designated as Objective 2 or 5b were to con-
tinue to  receive  assistance),  the volume of assistance 
will be greater, while the donor base would shrink. As a 
result, the numerator of  the ratio of  assistance provided 
to designated regions to GDP in the rest of the Com-
munity would rise at the same time as the denominator 
fell. Spreading eligibility for assistance would, therefore, 
cause a sharp increase in the ratios. 
For short-term targets to be attained, the pace of  econo-
mic growth in the Objective 1 regions would have to rise 
substantially. Thus, for the target of 80% to be attained 
in .1 0 years, the growth would have to be 3.9 percentage 
pomts faster than the Community average- meaning a 
rate of growth of 6.4% which has rarely been achieved 
in ~ny single year, and certainly not over a prolonged 
penod. It should be noted, moreover, that the figures 
~how~ relate to the Objective 1 regions as an aggregate, 
Implymg  that  the  regions  where  GDP per  capita  is 
lowest would remain below the target. Table 6:  Illustrative costs of reducing disparities 
of Objective 1 regions 
% of EC average GDP per 
capita to attain: 
75  80  85  90 
Number of years 
to achieve target  % of GDP of rest of EC per annum 
5  0.46  0.71  0.94  1.16 
8  0.30  0.45  0.60  0.73 
10  0.25  0.37  0.48  0.59 
15  0.18  0.26  0.33  0.40 
20  0.14  0.20  0.26  0.31 
Note:  The figures in the body of  this table show the per-
centage of GDP that has to be transferred from 
the  rest  of the Community to the Objective  1 
regions  to  raise  GDP per capita to  the  levels 
shown in the columns over the number of years 
shown  in  the  rows.  Thus,  for  the  Objective  1 
regions to be brought up to 80% of the EC aver-
age in eight years (i.e. by the end of the century), 
the required transfer is 0.45 percentage points of 
the GDP of  the regions not designated as Objec-
tive 1. 
These calculations also need to be treated with caution 
in the light of some of the assumptions. If, as has been 
argued earlier, the impact of  economic integration is to 
tilt the balance of growth in favour of the more pros-
perous regions,  assistance would be needed simply to 
avoid the widening of existing disparities. This would 
add to the costs shown in the table. By the same token, if 
the transferred resources are squandered, the outcome 
would fall short of  the growth target. Nevertheless, these 
illustrative numbers suggest that manageable increases 
in the EC budget would be sufficient to make progress if 
targets are sufficiently focused. 
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options 
7  .1.  The policy mix 
The European Community has a wide range of options 
in forming a new strategy for social and economic cohe-
sion after 1992. However, the experience of  the past and 
the new demands from developments anticipated dur-
ing the next decade (including completion of the inter-
nal market, progress towards economic and monetary 
union,  the  probable  widening  of the  Community  to 
include new full members and closer relations to assist 
the liberalizing economies of  Eastern Europe) mean that 
the suitability of past policies has to be questioned and 
major changes introduced. The importance of cohesion 
was recognized in Article 130 a in the Single European 
Act and is likely to be given even greater prominence in 
the  new  treaty  which  is  being  negotiated  in the  two 
intergovernmental conferences at present. In the view of 
the President of the Commission, cohesion is crucial if 
the  next  stages  of closer  integration  are  to  succeed. 
Indeed,  if the  problem  is  not  addressed  properly,  it 
could jeopardize agreement on a new Treaty and could 
even result in disintegration. 
We are persuaded by the report ofNam et al. to the Par-
liament (on the regional impact of  the completion of  the 
internal market)  and  the  results  of the  wider  debate 
about  the  impact of the  transition to  EMU  that the 
pressures in the 1990s will tend to exacerbate disparities 
in the Community. A better allocation of resources will 
improve  the  competitive  position  of  Community 
industry and thus engender a faster rate of  growth in the 
EC  as  a  whole.  But  it  is  inherent  in  the  successful 
achievement of economic integration that growth will 
be  unbalanced,  as  more  competitive  regions  exploit 
their advantages, at least partly at the expense of  the less 
competitive. A successful policy towards cohesion has 
to ensure that these benefits are redistributed to the dis-
advantaged in a way which is viewed as equitable, offers 
an equal opportunity to all regions to compete and yet 
does not destroy the source of the growth process. 
The report by Franzmeyer et al. to the Parliament shows 
that although the structural Funds make a major contri-
bution to trying to improve cohesion, the Communities' 
budget as a whole makes a relatively limited contribu-
tion towards redistributing resources to the less favour-
ed  regions.  There  is  thus  the  potential  for  a  major 
increase in the effort that can be made to improve social 
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and economic cohesion in the 1990s within the existing 
budget,  before  considering  whether  an  expansion  of 
resources over the next decade might be necessary. 
Thus far in this report, we have attempted to set out the 
objectives of policy for  cohesion and the instruments 
that can be used to achieve them in the context of the 
requirements of  the 1990s. We have also tried to set out 
the process which needs to be followed in deciding upon 
a new strategy. Many options could be followed, but in 
this section we draw our conclusions from the foregoing 
analysis by setting out the major decisions which have 
to be made and our views on what would constitute a 
suitable package. 
Our proposals have six elements to them: 
(  1)  an evaluation of the success of existing policies; 
(2)  a development of the current structural Funds to 
make them more effective and better targeted; 
(3)  a broadening of the range of current objectives to 
increase social cohesion; 
(4)  a tightening of the administration, evaluation and 
monitoring procedures  to  improve  accountability 
on the one hand and the operation of subsidiarity 
on the other; 
(5)  the introduction of a new instrument to assist the 
poorest households in the Community; 
(6)  a  reappraisal  of the  Community's budget  with  a 
view  to  reforming  its structure towards  a greater 
emphasis on cohesion. 
7  .1.1.  An evaluation of the success of 
existing policies 
The success of present policies in achieving the objec-
tive of increasing cohesion and, in particular, in dimin-
ishing  social  and  economic  disparities  among  the 
regions of the Community has not been assessed. The 
emphasis has been on spending the allocated funds in 
the eligible  regions.  Before  proceeding to the formu-
lation of a new  strategy for the next five-year budget 
perspective, the Commission should, as a matter of ur-
gency,  establish  the  effectiveness  of existing  policy 
instruments  in  achieving  their  objectives.  In  future, 
expenditure should be based on the principle of achiev-
ing the greatest improvement in cohesion. In part, the 
problem has arisen because of  the vagueness of  the defi-nition of  cohesion in the first place. We have offered our 
interpretation and set out principles for understanding 
cohesion, but a robust definition needs to be agreed so 
that it becomes a shared objective. One clear feature, 
however, is that the components of cohesion change as 
time passes.  In particular, during the  1990s,  it seems 
probable that social  and environmental concerns will 
increase in importance. 
7  .1.2.  A development of the current 
structural Funds 
The thrust of  current policy in seeking improvements in 
the  structure  of the  economies  of the  less  favoured 
regions  is  an  eminently sensible  basis  for  seeking  to 
reduce the disparities among the regions.  In practice, 
this should enhance equality of opportunity which we 
regard  as  a  core  element  in  cohesion.  However,  to 
achieve this equality, a proper assessment needs to be 
made of  the needs of  the various regions while the funds 
should be  allocated on  a more flexible  basis.  Existing 
indicators  in  the  form  of GOP  per  capita  and  un-
employment are, at best, inaccurate measures of need 
and should be supplemented by a more specific range of 
indicators relating to the extent and quality of the built 
infrastructure and the public services stemming from it, 
the  education and  skills  of the labour force,  and the 
quality of life of the population. 
These broad economic indicators clearly do not pick up 
some  disadvantaged groups and areas,  such  as  urban 
ghettoes, ethnic minorities and immigrants. The level of 
disparity is only one facet of cohesion, rapid unfavour-
able  movements  in  a  region's  relative  position  also 
require action. Official boundaries of regions in many 
cases do not delimit the groups in need. Specific atten-
tion should be given to cases which run across existing 
national borders, but in general there should be concern 
not just for the average value of indicators but for their 
distribution.  Use of GOP per capita,  for  example,  in 
regions with a number of major high value-added pro-
duction activities may disguise both the extent of  pover-
ty and low quality of  the social as opposed to the purely 
economic infrastructure. 
Collecting information on this wider range of indicators 
is not as daunting a task as it might appear, since much 
is available publicly and that which is not widely avail-
able through local surveys and their collation could be 
collected and compiled readily by Eurostat. Most of the 
additional information needed would not be expressed 
in monetary values which could be misleading, so that it 
would not present too serious a problem of  comparison. 
A persistent problem for the structural Funds has been 
the vexed question of additionality. Although the prin-
ciple of ensuring that money from  the Funds does in 
fact add to what would have been spent anyway, there 
are problems of  both administration and identification. 
Certainly,  the  underlying  purpose  of  intervention 
through the Funds should be to enhance investment so 
that resources are not dissipated in increased consump-
tion (even though the latter may have short-term attrac-
tions). Our preference would, however, be to shift the 
emphasis towards the aggregate  investment impact of 
intervention, rather than too narrow a concept of pro-
ject or programme additionality. This implies not only 
ascertaining the response of  private investment, but also 
taking a wider view  of what  is  needed to  attain that 
investment. For example, if the Fund rules, as  at pre-
sent, demand co-financing from the regional or Member 
State authorities, projects which might be strategic may 
founder  because  of a  lack  of fiscal  capacity  in  the 
Member State or region. In the same vein, it is vital to 
identify binding constraints on economic development 
and to use the Funds to address these. A way forward in 
this respect might be for  the Funds to assist  regional 
authorities in conducting economic development audits 
in order to devise a strategic development plan which 
sets out priorities.  This would be  altogether wider in 
scope than the existing CSFs which have the more limit-
ed aim of coordinating diverse sources of intervention. 
7  .1. 3.  A broadening of the range of 
objectives 
The emphasis on the built infrastructure can have only a 
limited impact in providing a competitive basis for less 
favoured regions and an attractive location for domestic 
and inward investment. Although existing Community 
policy  also  includes  investment  in  training  to  try  to 
improve the quality of the labour force, this is only one 
step in improving social cohesion. Vocational training 
has to build on the framework of a good education sys-
tem, indeed for young people it needs to develop direct-
ly out of it. When dealing with an existing society, the 
problem of transforming the skills of the labour force is 
much more difficult if that missing education cannot 
readily be replaced. It is therefore necessary to do more 
than  support  training;  structural  support  should  be 
offered for the educational system. More than this, for a 
region to offer a full  range of facilities and attractions 
for  labour,  it  needs  investment  in  health  and  other 
aspects of the social infrastructure. These social aspects 
are  often  most  important  not  in  Objective  1 but  in 
Objective  2  regions  where  a  decline  in  traditional 
industries threatens the existing social structure. That 
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transition. Deficiencies in social infrastructure and the 
quality of  life are also a characteristic of  some declining 
urban areas and areas populated by ethnic minorities, 
particularly recent immigrants. 
The priorities of cohesion tend to alter as time passes. 
Social and environmental concerns are in the ascendant 
at present with the avoidance of  social and eco-dumping 
being on the agenda for both favoured and less favoured 
regions.  During  the  next  budgetary  perspective  the 
structural Funds programme will  need to reflect  that 
change in emphasis. It might also be thought desirable 
to follow  up the increasing emphasis being placed on 
innovation  and  the  speedy  development  of modem 
technologies as sources of regional growth. 
However, the priorities of cohesion extend outside the 
structural Funds.  In  trying  to dynamize  the  regional 
economies, recourse might usefully be made to methods 
of public-sector support which are currently being out-
lawed as part of the single market programme because 
they discriminate in favour of local industry. But this 
discrimination  in  favour  of  regions  otherwise  less 
favoured is the point of the policy. Hence their control-
led use might well form a useful component of  achieving 
equality  of opportunity.  As  we  point  out,  for  a  less 
favoured region to be able to compete on an equal basis, 
it may actually require a greater infrastructure and sup-
port framework than a favoured region, purely because 
of  what causes the region to be less favoured in the first 
place,  such as  geographical  peripherality or inherited 
characteristics. 
7  .1.4.  Tightening of administration, 
evaluation and monitoring 
As the Community budget expands and the operation of 
the principle of  subsidiarity increases the disaggregation· 
of  its administration, it becomes increasingly important 
to have straightforward and effective procedures for the 
administration of funds,  for  evaluation and for  mon-
itoring of  programmes and for a speedy response to effi-
cient auditing. In most areas, the Community has pri-
ded itself in trying to adopt best practice in its policies. 
This  unfortunately  does  not  seem  to  apply  to  these 
issues. Poor administration and an apparent inability to 
provide adequate ex ante appraisal of projects in some 
of the less  favoured regions has meant that they have 
been unable to take up the full amount of funds avail-
able. Increasing the ability to absorb funds must be an 
immediate priority otherwise it will be pointless to try 
to  increase  either their  size  or scope.  This  could  be 
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achieved by setting up a new Community institution to 
provide the relevant training and in the interim by pro-
viding task forces for the affected regions. 
However, this tightening up of procedures needs to be 
applied  at  all  levels:  within  the  Commission  in  the 
administration of programmes, through strengthening 
the role of  the Court of  Auditors in monitoring progress 
and pointing out deficiences over which action must be 
taken; in increasing the role of the Parliament in being 
able to scrutinize budgetary actions and in insisting on 
the  implementation  of  recommendations  from  the 
Court of  Auditors; by national, regional and local admi-
nistrations in ensuring that the Community program-
mes are subjected to rigorous scrutiny. But above all, the 
problem is one of cooperation across the boundaries of 
responsibility. The planning and monitoring functions 
within Community support frameworks  are vital and 
continuing activities to ensure that administration of 
the operational programmes respond quickly and effec-
tively to the lessons of  experience and changes in oppor-
tunities. 
We think it particularly important that the private sec-
tor be involved directly in the implementation of regio-
nal development as it is primarily the vehicle by which 
cohesion  will  be  improved  using  the  new  resources 
created  by  the  structural  Funds.  Inadequate  coordi-
nation and commitment by the two sectors has led to 
major waste in some infrastructure projects. Indeed, to 
try to ensure that commitment, we suggest that leverage 
of private-sector funds be an explicit objective of the 
CSFs.  In social and economic affairs generally in the 
Community, the involvement of the social partners has 
been welcomed; a similar case can be made here for the 
establishment  of  powerful  monitoring  conunittees 
which  include both employers and representatives of 
the work force. 
7  .1. 5.  A new instrument for social cohesion 
Providing equal opportunities does not ensure that dis-
parities will be reduced, even despite the best efforts ofthe 
Commission and national, regional  and local govern-
ments. Indeed in no other State has it been found possible 
to achieve adequate cohesion without substantial redis-
tribution. The same will be true for the Community. At 
present, there is limited enthusiasm for any substantial 
increase in the EC budget or for unhypothecated trans-
fers  between regions, as the lukewarm response to the 
Spanish proposals for a system of  transfers as in Germa-
ny  shows.  So  any attempt to deal with the disparities that remain will need to be more specific. A simple solu-
tion is to target the worst-off residents in regions across 
the Community and support their incomes. 
7  .1.6.  A reappraisal of the Community 
budget 
It is not enough to focus purely on structural policy to 
achieve  cohesion.  As  Franzmeyer  et  al.  show,  some 
other Community policies,  particularly price  support 
under the CAP, are anti-cohesive. In our view, therefore, 
the whole structure of  the budget (and, indeed, of other 
Community  polices  which  do  not  have  expenditure 
implications, such as adjudication of mergers) needs to 
be further appraised to look at its impact on cohesion. 
Even if little is then done, it is important to know how 
policy  affects  cohesion.  Agriculture  being  the  largest 
heading needs  the  most  detailed  consideration of its 
regional impact. Because of the size of the agricultural 
budget, small reductions could result in large increases 
for expenditure on cohesion. In our view, the structure 
of price support has not only outgrown its original pur-
pose,  but  is  showing  very  considerable  internal  and 
external strains. The latest proposals for change by the 
Commission are trying to switch spending away from its 
current bias favouring wealthy farmers, an emphasis on 
the  better-off,  towards  smaller-scale  farmers  in  less 
favoured  areas.  However,  the  proposed  means  of 
achieving this would encourage inefficiency.  We  con-
sider that attempts at income support should be expli-
cit. The social security fund we have proposed should be 
used to support all those in the less favoured regions, 
including farmers. 
7  .2.  Budgetary implications 
It is  clear from  the foregoing  analysis that the major 
problem in the short run is  not shortage of funds for 
structural adjustment: in fact,  under the present rules, 
the  limits  of absorptive  capacity  have  already  been 
reached  in  some  regions.  A tightening up of existing 
monitoring procedures and a refocusing on the greatest 
needs and the most effective routes to achieving cohesion, 
together with the likely continuing real increases in the 
funds available as the Community expands in size and 
grows  in  income,  should  result  in  a  considerable 
improvement  in  the  impact  of the  planned  budget. 
Instead it is  the use  and allocation of the prospective · 
budget that requires attention. 
The current Community budget as a whole shows consi-
derable inequity compared with a pattern that would 
engender cohesion, say along the lines suggested by the 
Padoa-Schioppa Report in  1987.  These would ensure 
that the least favoured would be net beneficiaries, with 
the  benefit increasing more than proportionately, the 
greater  the  need,  while  regions  with  above  average 
resources would make net contributions which increas-
ed in line with their relative advantage.  In particular, 
while the three lowest income Member States are the 
greatest beneficiaries,  Spain gains relatively little and 
two of the richest countries, Denmark and the Nether-
lands, are also substantial net beneficiaries instead of 
being net contributors. More minor adjustments might 
be called for in the case of other Member States if the 
bands of  tolerance within this framework of  equity were 
drawn relatively tightly, but taken together, this would 
have a further important impact on the funds available 
to the less favoured regions. 
By focusing narrowly in this way, it is possible to reduce 
the net redistribution budget below the figures suggest-
ed in the MacDougall Report. There, in the transitional 
phase, it was thought possible to operate with a total 
Community budget of 2 to 2.5% of GDP, rising to 5 to 
7% in a federal  system.  A net transfer system  in the 
Community, as  it  stood  in  1975,  with transfers from 
richer to poorer countries, would have required 2% of 
GDP to reduce disparities in income per head by 40 %. 
Today, assuming some reductions in agricultural sup-
port, a real increase in the total budget of  the same mag-
nitude recorded over the last financial perspective (  4% 
a year) would be able to fund a significant programme of 
redistribution, within the current own-resource limit of 
1.4% of Community GDP. 
7.3.  Political and institutional issues 
Although cohesion is usually measured in economic and 
social  terms,  it  is  ultimately a  politically  determined 
concept. Cohesion requires the acceptability not just of 
actual  and prospective  disparities  but of the  mecha-
nisms being used to try to reduce them. Our proposals 
need, on the one hand, efficient  planning,  execution, 
monitoring  and  control  of programmes,  and  on  the 
other, the enthusiasm and commitment which comes 
from identification with the objectives of the work.  In 
general, the principle of subsidiarity is intended to help 
determine the level of government at which the various 
functions  should  be  undertaken.  Effective  structural 
change involves detailed local knowledge and commit-
ment of the public and private sectors,  including not 
just firms and local authorities, but the whole network 
of education,  training,  finance  and  business  services 
and public utilities. It depends very much on the struc-
ture of the Member State as to whether these are local, 
95 regional  or  national  responsibilities.  However,  even 
though the programmes may be put together at the high-
er levels there is clearly a strong need for local and regio-
nal involvement. 
Equally, planning, evaluation, administration and mon-
itoring often require a wide range of technical skills not 
available at the lower levels of  government. In our view, 
this should be dealt with by a three-pronged approach. 
In  the  first  place,  a  major effort  should  be  made to 
increase  the  general  run  of technical  competence  in 
these  aspects of structural projects,  principally at  the 
intermediate level.  The top echelons are already well-
qualified throughout the Community, while there is less 
of  a requirement for skills at the lowest levels. Secondly, 
to  overcome  current  bottlenecks  and  to  make  faster 
progress in the short term, teams of experts should be 
put together to  act  as  temporary task forces,  moving 
from one region to another as the need arises,  as  has 
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always been the case with most intercountry assistance 
programmes. 
The  greatest  difficulty  and  hence  the  gravest  need 
requiring attention  from  the  Community institutions 
lies in the links between different agencies, both verti-
cally and horizontally, in the system of administration. 
There  is  a  series  of improvements which  need  to be 
made at Community level, with regard to liaison bet-
ween parts of the Commission, to enhancing the power 
of the Court of Auditors and to the impact of scrutiny 
by the Parliament. One idea which we think has a lot to 
commend it is the French arrangement of  a contract bet-
ween the government and the regional administrations 
to manage their area in such a manner as to achieve the 
central objectives. This sort of  performance contract has 
resulted in considerable improvements in the efficiency 
of public purchasing in parts of the Community so that 
its extension to local development programmes finan-
ced in part by the Community budget would be logical. 8.  Action programme 
In considering how  a new strategy might evolve,  it is 
useful to distinguish between what can be done imme-
diately  to  bolster  the  impact  of existing  measures, 
reforms that can significantly improve cohesion in the 
medium term, and lastly, how the Community should 
approach the question of cohesion in the next century 
on the assumption that EMU has been achieved and 
that the European economy has become a much more 
integrated  economic,  social  and political  entity.  This 
section sets out a sequence of  possible initiatives in each 
of these three phases. 
I  - Immediate changes 
(  1)  There  should  be  an  immediate  strengthening  of 
assessment procedures on the use of existing funds: 
in  particular programmes should be  evaluated for 
their effectiveness in achieving the real objectives of 
the  expenditures,  namely,  reducing  disparities  in 
GDP per capita, in unemployment; the focus should 
go beyond the immediate use of the funds to what 
stemmed from them: 
(i)  What private sector investment was attracted? 
(ii)  What new enterprises have been set up? 
(2)  Representatives from the social partners should be 
invited  to  participate  in  the  decision-making  on 
developing and monitoring the use of the structural 
Funds through the CSFs. 
(3)  Leverage of  private-sector funds should be an objec-
tive for the structural Funds. 
(4)  In undertaking its review of the structural Funds, 
the  Commission  should  make  a  comprehensive 
examination  of the  effectiveness  of the  various 
forms of structural Fund support in achieving their 
objectives. It is  important, then, that there should 
be extensive discussion of the results for use in for-
ming the next structural Fund plan for 1993-98. 
(5)  A crash  programme  of expanding  administrative 
capacity  for  project  evaluation,  programme 
management and monitoring should be implement-
ed throughout the less favoured regions with a view 
to improving the management of  Community-fund-
ed programmes and allowing funds available to be 
fully used. In the short run, conditionality and co-
funding rules might be eased to increase absorption. 
(  6)  There should be an immediate improvement in the 
budgetary control, monitoring and evaluation pro-
cedures for the structural Funds. In particular, the 
Court  of Auditors  should  have  in.creased  powers 
and should add the achievement of  value for money 
to financial regularity as a principal objective of its 
assessments. 
(7)  The role of the Parliament's Committee on Budget-
ary Control should be increased to provide effective 
accountability for  the spending of the Communi-
ties' funds. 
II  - Issues to be sorted out for  199 3 
(  1)  A new set of specific objectives for use of the struc-
tural Funds should be agreed, including new compe-
tences for education, health and the environment. 
The  size  of the  funds  available  for  each  region 
should be on the basis of need - shortfall of hard 
and soft infrastructure compared with targets which 
take  into  account  a  variety  of factors  including 
population density, age  structure, industrial struc-
ture, compared with the fiscal  resources available. 
Consideration should be given to making receipt of 
structural Fund assistance conditional on respect of 
certain strategic objectives to be agreed between the 
Commission and the region in a contract. 
(2)  The definition of eligibility should be broadened to 
include  disadvantaged  groups  such  as  migrants 
without regard to spatial boundaries. 
(3)  A new  welfare  fund  should  be  set  up to  provide 
income  support  for  less  favoured  households. 
Where possible these funds should be administered 
at  regional  rather than Member State level.  Allo-
cation should be assessed on the basis of need ver-
sus fiscal capacity. 
(  4)  A new budgetary framework should be set out for 
the years  1993-98  along the lines suggested in the 
Padoa-Schioppa Report of 1987. 
(5)  Future spending programmes under other headings, 
as  well  as  other Community policies,  should take 
account of their impact on the regions. 
(  6)  There  should  be  an  easily  identifiable  target  for 
spending on cohesion during the budgetary period 
1993-98. A real increase of 50% is an example (sub-
ject  to  the  constraint  that  the  total  Community 
budget does not exceed its real growth rate in the 
previous five years (4%)). 
97 III  - Issues for later in the decade 
(1)  The  prospective  widening  of the  Community  to 
include new members needs to take account of  their 
fiscal impact if they are to be equally treated. It is 
particularly important to establish an appropriate 
transition mechanism for the countries of Eastern 
Europe. 
(2)  The costs of structural adjustments to prepare for 
EMU,  which  involve  the changing of deficit  and 
debt structures of  Member States, should be treated 
98 
as a different issue from regional policy and !Should 
be dealt with from separate adjustment funds. 
(3)  New credit mechanisms to enable regions to cope 
with  macroeconomic  imbalance  should  be estab-
lished. 
(  4)  Since reforming the structural Funds and establish-
ing a social security fund will only go part of  the way 
to achieving cohesion, a thorough examination of 
possible mechanisms for more substantial interre-
gional  redistribution  should  be  carried  out  (as 
explored  in the MacDougall  Report of 1977,  and 
discussed  again  in  this  report)  and  the  preferred 
scheme adopted. Bibliography 
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